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WARNING TO THE WEST

Works by Krishnalal Shridharani

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Dunga*), A Novel of Life in Jail,
Dakshinamurti, 1932

SPRING FLOWERS (*Pila Palash*), Three Plays for
Children, Dakshinamurti, 1933

THE SUTTEE (*Padmini*), A Historical Play,
Navayuga, 1934

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WARNING TO THE WEST

SHRIDHARANI

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Foreword

THIS war has almost become an elemental struggle of mankind. It has already taken several crucial and unexpected turns ; but we may live to see changes of an even more fateful character before the dawn of peace.

There are portentous signs on the horizons, foreshadowing one more global and mortal realignment of friend and foe. The gravest danger that we face now is that this war between democracy and dictatorship may deteriorate into a titanic inter-continental struggle between East and West, or into a global racial conflict between whites and non-whites. In the West the Nazis are the extremists who are deliberately plotting this realignment. The Japanese in the East are also trying to force this twist of the war ; they have certain powerful historical forces working in their behalf and therefore they may have a better chance of success than the Nazis.

Their diabolical designs must be frustrated ; humanity must be spared this ultimate ordeal. But, we must realize in all seriousness, the extremists of East and West will not be stopped by warnings or threats ; they must be defeated on the battlefield.

There is a third source of danger, which is unwittingly lending its help to the same catastrophic end ; the Anglo-Saxon people and their leaders. The sins of the Anglo-Saxon, at present at least, are those of omission rather than of commission, of failure to act or to comprehend. There is still hope that he will see the light and draw away from traditional habits of easy rule and uneasy thought. He—and through him the whole world—can profit by a warning given in good time.

It is this wavering yet optimistic faith in the Anglo-Saxon that inspires me to make him my chief concern. The Nazis and the Mikado-men are beyond redemption, and they are also beyond my feeble voice. I ask for a hearing from the Saxon because I share with him a common cause. It may be that he will soon rise to the grand occasion of the war and that he will do justice to the East gracefully and during the period of grace. The victory will come quicker for that, surely. But political action dictated by the exigencies of war will solve only a surface problem. A deeper conflict will remain which may disturb the peace, after it comes, or create another war when this one is over. And the solution of that deep conflict calls for the payment of a tremendous psychological price—nothing less than a revolution in the insular psychology of the western man. That, precisely, is the warning of the East to the West, and that is also the contribution of the East to this war and throughout the coming peace.

If my manner is blunt it is because I cannot be polite and "mean business" at the same time. But I pray that my warning will be taken in the same somber and hopeful spirit in which it is uttered. Let me begin with the words of Buddha with which I shall also end my book: "Only a friend warns; the enemy strikes."

—SHRIDHARANI

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WEST GOES EAST

1. JAPAN THE TRISHANKU
2. FALL OF THE FORBIDDEN CITY
3. WESTERNIZATION AND THE HINDU MIND

WEST GOES EAST

"WHAT is East and what is West?" Emperor Akbar asked Birbal the jester.

"No one knows, Your Majesty," said Birbal, who needed some slight hint from his master before beginning one of his meandering and endless tales. "But," he continued, "too far East is West, and too far West is East."

Noticing the We-Are-Not-Amused look on the Emperor's face, Birbal went on in another vein. "The Hindus, as Your Majesty well knows," he said, "have an exquisite story of genesis. First, Brahma, the Creator, fashioned a beautiful woman, Tillottama, from the essence of all the pearls in the world. Now the duty of this woman was to tempt her own Creator. She began to circle around him softly, and on whichever side she appeared there was a majestic face of the Creator. The face that turned North was mild like the moon, but the face that turned South was terrible and destroying. The countenance that faced East was relaxed and joyful, but by the face which turned to the West he ruled. However, though the Creator had four faces—North, South, East, and West—he had but one world-mind."

Emperor Akbar was not satisfied. After summoning his servants and instructing them, he rose and left the palace hurriedly. The royal elephant was waiting for him in the palace yard, but Birbal had moved even more swiftly and he stood before his master in the role of the mahout. The Emperor and Birbal set forth and they went on, mile after mile; for hours on end they did not speak to each other.

"What direction are we taking?" asked the Emperor at last.

"Where do you want to go, Your Majesty?"

"It does not matter where we go," the Emperor shouted.

"Then it does not matter what direction we take," Birbal replied.

To the Japanese, China was West, while to the Chinese, India was "the western heaven, land of Buddha's birth." To the Indians . . . well, I think it was Jekyll who used to say that the further he went West the more convinced he felt that the wisemen came from the East. "Asia was civilized," wrote W. Winwood Reade, "when Europe was a forest and a swamp. Asia taught Europe its ABC; Asia taught Europe to cipher and to draw; Asia taught Europe . . . how to philosophize with abstract ideas."

But that brings us to the cultural concept of East and West as distinguished from the geographic one. In this book I am concerned, primarily, with the political concept of East and West that has occupied our minds for some time past. I am interested in something crucial—in tracking down the process which even now, as I write, is turning the political concept of East and West into a deep psychological affair.

It is not, therefore, difficult to define East and West for the purpose of my inquiry. In fact, it is easier to define East than it is to define West. For East is an inclusive concept, while West is an exclusive concept. Whatever is left out of western civilization by the self-styled West is apt to belong to the East. It is the nature of exclusiveness to become more and more exclusive, and no one can deny that West has become, over the period of the last four hundred years, progressively more exclusive. The result is that the West has become smaller and smaller, while the East has become larger and larger.

Thus the East, in large part, is the world away from the modern West. In any case, the key to the East lies in the specific conception of the West, and the West characterizes itself by an insularity of mind which regards Asia either as a harmless old man or as an insufferable upstart, and which takes no thought for South America and Africa. It is not that the Turks and the Egyptians and the Indians and the Chinese and the Japanese feel alike. It is that the West

groups them all together. The centripetal trend of the western mind endows the East with a centrifugal consciousness of kind.

The conflict between the Cross and the Crescent, resulting in the Crusades, prepared the ground at the start. Then came the Congress of Verona in 1822 at which was coined the phrase "The Eastern Question"—a euphemistic term used in discussing the impending dissolution of the Turkish Empire. And yet until the opening years of the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire was the only East with which European statesmen were collectively concerned. The Middle and the Far East did exist on the maps, but they had no reality in the diplomatic mind of Europe.

What is this western civilization which has excluded as eastern everything that does not belong to it properly? Some scholars maintain that it is, in effect, European culture, while others limit it further and call it European culture as nurtured under Christianity. Still others go back to the Greeks and assert that the European ethos is the result of a blending of Greek humanism with the Christian religion. W. T. Stace sums up this view when he says, "Western civilization . . . in a very general sense . . . is European civilization during the Christian era . . . The spiritual forces which have molded the West are Christianity and Greek philosophy." In other words, West was born on European soil through a synthesis of Greek rationalism and Christian other-worldliness.

Oswald Spengler, a high priest of westernism, gave even more exclusive coloration to the West. He renounced the Greek heritage and expelled a major part of Europe from what he called western civilization. And make no mistake about it. The West, like the Indian caste system, is nothing if not exclusivistic. It has an incorrigible shrinking tendency that is truly suicidal. It seemed determined to reduce itself to the vanishing point, to become the shadow of a shadow.

According to Spengler, western civilization is the "Western-European-American civilization." Listen to his pronouncement: "We men of the Western Culture are, with our historical sense, an exception and not a rule. World-

history is *our* world picture and not all mankind's. Indian and Classical man formed no image of a world in progress, and perhaps when in due course the civilization of the West is extinguished, there will never again be a culture and a human type in which 'world-history' is so potent a form of the waking consciousness."

Believing that "the expansive tendency is a doom," Spengler took another exclusivistic step and ruled out all non-Protestant Christianity from his picture of western culture. But what was merely a mental concept to the German philosopher was a stratagem of everyday behavior to the Anglo-Saxon who emerged as the world-conqueror. It was the Anglo-Saxon's Protestant Christendom that knocked at Asia's gates. This was the West that went East. And what could be more exclusivistic than the Protestant Christendom of the Saxon, deprived even of the universalistic appeals and overtures of Catholicism?

Before the West turned to the East, it had acquired great physical power—guns and ships and more guns, and huge factories and stores to maintain its forces. It was a powerful and aggressive West which went East. The Renaissance opened the way for the West by freeing the European soul from religious restraints. Then came the Industrial Revolution, partly financed by the gold of India, which developed the technology of mass production, freeing the western body and preparing it for conquests abroad. From that day to the present, Asia has been the loser. One by one the great lands of Asia have come under the direct or indirect control of the European powers. And the whole of Asia has felt the irresistible pressure of western civilization. West arrived as a conqueror and, in doing so, inflicted a deep and grievous injury on the collective consciousness of Asia. The story that follows is a saga of West's victories in the East, and also of that reawakened Asia which is determined to drive out the western conqueror while it continues to cherish the western friend.

1. JAPAN THE TRISHANKU

The fable of Trishanku the Chandala is unique in Hindu mythology. A Chandala is a man who belongs to a low

caste, and Trishanku was precisely that, but he was too clever for his low station in life. Trishanku had one consuming ambition. He wanted to go to Heaven and live among gods. But that was not all. He wanted to go to Heaven in his human form.

Trishanku went to Vashistha, an honest guru or teacher. And he implored the guru to help him get to Heaven in his own body. "That can't be done, my son," said Vashistha the honest teacher. "When you acquire something new, you evolve into something new."

Trishanku was not discouraged. He went to Vishvamitra, a rival guru who was exceedingly wise. "I will do anything you say, O Master," Trishanku begged, "if you send me to Heaven just as I am."

Vishvamitra, the bright one, to reveal his powers, undertook to send Trishanku to Heaven in human form. He sent Trishanku off to Heaven through the tremendous power of his virtue and penance; so great was the force of the guru that not even the gods could resist.

So there Trishanku was in Heaven, in his mortal form, enjoying the new realm and happy in the company of gods and goddesses. And for a time the gods and goddesses also enjoyed their new and odd-looking companion. But after a while the newness of the experience wore off, and the gods began to loathe godhead in a mortal frame, while Trishanku began to resent the airy forms of the gods.

Trishanku decided to go back to earth and, taking leave of the gods and goddesses, he began to descend. Now Vashistha saw Trishanku coming down to earth and he felt that it was improper for a man who had had the experience of godhead to become a man among men. Since all the mortals on earth agreed with him, Vashistha exerted himself and, with the vast power of his virtue and penance, he stopped Trishanku's descent. Forced to the realization that he could not descend to earth, Trishanku decided that he would go back to Heaven. He began to ascend, but this time the gods did not want him. They felt that it was improper for a mortal to ape the ways of immortals, and with their divine powers they began to push Trishanku downwards.

There was Trishanku, who had desired to go to Heaven in his human form and not through evolution: he was being pushed downwards by the gods who would not have him in Heaven and he was being pushed upwards by man who would not have him on earth.

And there Trishanku still is, hanging in limbo.

The story of Japan's westernization is as unique as the story of Trishanku. It is so different from the tale of India and China that, in their search for a pattern in the chronicle of the East, historians have missed the point. The initial mischief was done by the popular tale that it was Commodore Perry who opened Japan to the world for the first time in 1853. This notion has fostered a fuzziness in our thinking about modern Japan and has caused us to make blundering judgments in connection with that crucial area of the globe called the Far East.

Actually, what Commodore Perry did was to *re-open* Japan to the western world. It is even more important to realize, however, that Perry forced an entrance into the guest house rather than into the Japanese home. But even this fact is of comparatively minor value; for to understand modern Japan, one must know that the era of seclusion, preceding Perry's arrival, has played a far more decisive role in Japan's destinies than the later period, during which Japan has appeared on the world stage.

The chief clue to an understanding of Japan's two-faced and contradictory westernization is to be found in the successful revolt Japan staged against foreign influences in the seventeenth century. India's so-called Sepoy Mutiny, which was anti-western in its emotional source, miscarried itself in 1857. The Boxer Rebellion in China was a somewhat similar explosion of the steadily gathering resentment against western encroachments on a settled way of life. It failed in 1900. But the Japanese rejection of unfamiliar customs found triumphant expression in the Exclusion Edicts of 1637 promulgated by the Mikado, and it was a long time indeed before any sailor from the New World issued even a partial challenge to those edicts.

For centuries the outside world has battered against the crescent-shaped volcanic archipelago of Nippon. Japan floats in the blue sea in a relationship to the Asiatic mainland that resembles that of England to the European continent. It is perhaps no cause for wonder that it was the great Kublai Khan who, first in history, made the attempt to conquer Japan. He launched two monster armadas and sent them across the Straits of Tsushima to put an end forever to Japan's isolation. The great Khan failed in his mission and it was not until the sixteenth century that anyone else contacted the lone wolf of Asia's shore. European sailors knew India and the East Indies and the Philippines and China, but Japan was far to the north and off their course. Then, by sheer chance, the Portuguese stopped off at Japan and discovered there a virgin market for their worldly goods. In their wake came other European powers who had ships to sail the seas in those days. Before the Industrial Revolution, however, Europe had little to offer which would enrich the material life of the Asiatics. Their chief exportable commodity was Christianity, and it spread like wildfire, but along with it came the several civil wars that religious denominations were waging back home in Europe. Added to this fire was the fuel of social upheaval that the tradition-bound people of the East suddenly faced with the onset of new modes of life. It was the conservatives who rose in revolt!

Japan locked itself up; after a long and thorough trial, alien customs were found to be injurious to the native habits. The Nipponese had accepted the Buddhism of India centuries before, but now they could not adopt a younger faith. The conservatives felt that the land had to be purged of Christianity, with its internal feuds and rivalries. The intruders were tortured, deported, or executed, and their religious practices were banished with them. By the Mikado's Edicts of 1637, the white men in their "black ships" were kept at bay, excluded from the harbors, and the islanders themselves were forbidden to go beyond the fishing banks. Any ambition they might have had to explore farther afield was held in check by the legal limitations on shipbuilding: a Japanese ship could not be longer than seventy-five feet. In many cases, Japanese sailors, who had been shipwrecked

and had had a chance glimpse of the outside world, were decapitated on their return to Nippon—so that they could not pollute the serene air of the island realm.

It was two full centuries before any irresistible knock came pounding at the closed door of Japan. On a hazy July day in 1853, the black ships of Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry, ignoring the impotent shore batteries, anchored in Yedo Bay and issued a shotgun invitation to the shy hermit of Asia to come out of his retreat and take his place in the march of modern nations. But the Japan that Commodore Perry faced was not the Japan that the Portuguese traders had lured into world communication two hundred years before. Perry's arrival was not a shock visit but a second experience at the hands of the westerners, and Japan's feelings about foreign men and ships had wizened and become rigid in the meanwhile. There were now two centuries of conscious withdrawal behind Japan, two hundred years of forced and deliberate insularization and interiorization. Japan had made peace with its soul, and it was all the more unshakable because it knew what it was doing. Its heart was sealed; only its mind could be touched.

The first acts of Commodore Perry, by some strange coincidence, recognized this state of affairs; they were entirely symbolic of the only part of western life that Japan was ever to accept. The American crew went ashore to display the mechanical magic of the new world; they exhibited a miniature railroad and a telegraph apparatus. Japan, having expelled the old West in the seventeenth century, was not ready even now to rediscover it. Commodore Perry was introducing a new West. When he concluded the Treaty of Kanagawa that spring, he paved the way for the Japanese adoption of the Industrial Revolution; Japan had refused the Renaissance.

This act of Japan's is the main reason why this nation had a tolerance for modern mechanical developments such as was, until lately, utterly lacking in other parts of Asia, including India and China. It was the simple matter of adopting the western civilization's system of tools and techniques. There was no thought of assimilating the culture,

the West's system of values. There was not going to be any change in the social and communal life, which was based upon the land's ancient traditions, and, therefore, there was no need for a Japanese Ruskin to lament the passing of an agrarian culture and the onrush of an industrial one. These were things apart.

In the case of China and India, on the other hand, the adoption of new tools and techniques meant also that some of the attendant folkways and mores of the West were welcomed. It was a process of integration or evolution rather than merely one of imitation. The minds of the Chinese and the Indians were held back by the past and, in consequence, their modernization was slow. To Japan the question was one of adaptation to a limited degree and, therefore, modernization went ahead with astounding speed. But in that very drive, Japan developed a double personality; it remained the oldest of the old while it was becoming the newest of the new. Most of the tortures it has visited upon its neighbors reflect its own self-torture. Japan has thus become the Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde among nations—or, if you like, the Trishanku of Indian lore.

2. FALL OF THE FORBIDDEN CITY

In the history of Asia's westernization, China has contributed the most unexpected chapter. Ask any European or any American today to choose an eastern nation with which he feels the strongest kinship, and he is bound to name China—rather than India, despite the fact that the major part of the Indian people comes from what is now loosely described as white racial stock, while the Chinese are racially more like the Japanese. Moreover, Indians are closer to Europeans and Americans through their language, literature, religion, and scientific thought. Nevertheless, the peculiar earthiness of the Chinese, in contrast to the philosophic flights of the Hindus, endears him to modern man. The modern westerner has stronger instincts of mysticism than the Chinese and it is only recently that he has begun to build up his terrestrial wealth, under the influence of nineteenth-century utilitarianism and materialism; he has, therefore, a secret admiration for the Chinese who has always been one century-long step ahead in this-worldliness.

Even before Pearl Harbor, the American felt nearer to the Chinese than he did to the Japanese, though the logic of modern technology should have favored a greater understanding between America and Japan. This was true because the Japanese made a conscious effort at standardization, while they kept their innermost soul completely untouched and immune from alien influence. The Japanese are seldom off guard with westerners; they tend to be a bit aloof and disconcerting. The earthiness of the Chinese, on the other hand, has made him a past master of the art of informality and casualness, an art that puts the westerner at ease.

And yet China is less westernized than India, and far less westernized, on the surface at least, than Japan. Some thinkers have hinted that Chinese pride in the superiority of their culture has kept them from change. Such pride is not given to the Chinese alone, and yet others have changed. China, moreover, can hardly be called the source of eastern culture any more than it can be described as an end of that culture. Its historic role has been in between; it has been the Middle Kingdom of the Asiatic mind. For thirteen hundred years China has been giving to Japan, but for two thousand years it has been receiving from India. From India came Buddhism, Brahmin thought, Hindu-Buddhist arts, and ways of monastic living. That was an era of a totally different kind of Chinese westernization; in those days, as I have pointed out, India was to China "the western heaven, land of Buddha's birth."

Buddhist books were first imported into China from India in the closing years of the first century of the Christian era. In 399 A.D. Fa Hsien of Wu-Yang in Shan-si departed for India; after fourteen years he returned to Nanking where, with the aid of Buddhahadra the Brahmin, he translated Indian works into the Chinese. Sung Yun, who was sent to India around 518 A.D. by the Empress of China, brought back a library of one hundred and seventy books.

A variety of cultural gifts from India is found in the list of what Hiuen Tsiang brought back to China. For sixteen years, from 629 to 645, he traveled the "Kingdom of the Brahmins," and when he returned on the Pamir-

Kashgar-Khotan road, his possessions included: five hundred grains of relics belonging to the body of Tathagata the Buddha; a golden statue of the Buddha on a transparent pedestal; three statues carved out of sandalwood; one in pure silver; another one in gold; 124 works (sutras) of the Grand Vehicle and 520 fasciculi.

It took twenty-two horses to carry the spiritual ware of this Doctor of the Three Pitakas, and once he had returned he translated 657 works into the Chinese by "inspired command" during the Tang dynasty.

Racial pride cannot be the only explanation of China's haphazard westernization.

In contrast to Japan, which stampeded itself into modernization, China has ambled along; there is a distinct lag, so glaring that it catches the eye of any observer. There have been and there can be various explanations of the casual nature of China's westernization. But among all the witnesses Hu Shih stands out, by virtue of the fact that he has been one of the most eminent leaders in China's recent shift from the age of tradition to the world of tomorrow. According to him, three factors have been at work, for better or for worse, the existence of which has produced modern Japan, whereas their absence has given us the semi-modern China.

To begin with, there has always been a powerful ruling class in Japan which has provided the necessary and organized leadership aiming at advancement, material as well as spiritual. Whenever a culture is forced into contact with an alien way of life, it develops uneasiness as well as reactionary tendencies. This prevents a natural form of development, of evolving changed patterns of life through a mingling of old and new. The confusion of conflicting ideas can be thrown off only by accepted and effective leadership. Japan had that in its ruling class, but the outlying and sprawling communities of China, governed in vague fashion by the ebbing Manchu dynasty, could not secure a guiding force from the civilian bureaucracy. While the daimyo and the samurai of Japan succeeded in subduing the Shoguns and in reinstating the Mikado, the Manchus were not as fortunate.

Secondly, the ruling class in Japan was also the highly respected warrior, or military, class. It was easy for them to understand what made up the missionary strength of western civilization—military and naval science. Endowed by the fighting traditions of centuries that lay behind them, they adeptly became the masters of the techniques of force which have contributed so much in creating and maintaining the modern state. China had no such luck.

And lastly, there existed in Japan a nucleus of authority in the Mikado which kept alive the idea of a central force, throughout the five-hundred-year regency of the powerful house of Fujiwara and later under the seven-hundred-year military dictatorship of the Shoguns. When the time came, the whole nation was rallied behind the Emperor and this gave Japan that peculiar kind of loyalty to the central symbol which goes to make the modern state. In this manner China was again unlucky.

But not all the luck was with Japan, nor was all the bad fortune with China. The principle of life, historically speaking, is one of amassing experience rather than of rejecting it, and a nation cannot discard its heritage any more than an individual can set aside his past. Furthermore, it is not possible for a nation to divide its life into compartments; a nation can no more live a double life and, at the same time, be sound than an individual can be two persons at once—and be healthy. Japan developed its twofold existence, Jekyll and Hyde, but China underwent a more profound and integrated change, first under the Republic of 1911 and later under Chiang Kai-shek—who taught his countrymen that the only failure lay in failure to act.

The success of the republicanism of 1911, which gave an official blessing to China's renaissance, recalled the failure of the Boxer uprising in 1900, which had sought vainly to raise another Chinese Wall against the industrialized West. Unfortunately for Japan, a similar coup had been carried to its successful ending by Lord Mori of Chōshū, resulting in the Exclusion Edicts of 1637 which forever prohibited the birth of a new Japanese soul to the marriage of East and West. The shape of things to come, against which the Shoguns fought successfully and the Boxers battered

in vain, was simple : First, the machine ; then, the machine-using mind ; then, the machine-repairing mind ; and finally, the machine-making mind to produce a new man in a new culture.

1900 had its roots in 1894. Japan's victory over China revealed the weakness of the latter and maritime powers were made bold enough to demand concessions from the Flowery Kingdom. Once these had been granted, the salesmen and the missionaries arrived upon the scene, flaunting their material and spiritual wares. Then came the machines, and finally the railroad. The iron horse pranced and galloped roughshod over the hinterland and aroused the anger of the benighted provinces against the foreigners and the swift-moving life that came with them. China's "Hundred Days' Reforms" in 1898 were the last gallant effort of foresighted but weak men, supporting a weak emperor, to foist the foreign ways on an unwilling populace. It had no success ; instead, the Society of Harmonious Fists, mistakenly known as the Boxers, increased its numbers. The Society was aided by the imperial coup which brought Empress Dowager Tzu-Hsi to power. This ancient Buddha of the Forbidden City, who was known as a tradition-bound old shrew in the foreign settlements, displayed the typical Manchu isolationism and hatred of foreigners ; she willingly provided the Boxers with underground leadership. Theirs was a revolt against the Industrial Revolution, with its locomotives, bathtubs, and alien shrines ; the victims were salesmen and missionaries and converts, any foreigners that the Boxers could lay their hands on.

In the end, the West prevailed, and a protocol was signed in the September of 1901. This paved the way for China's gradual westernization, both in technology and in thought, so that eventually the Chinese Civil Code of 1930 included the following significant preface : "It follows in its theoretical portions the principles which the modern juridical science is spreading steadily all over the world, and which are tending to constitute a sort of universal common law, and to remove the discrepancies due to the dissimilarities of the various national legislations, thus facilitating the development of international relations."

3. WESTERNIZATION AND THE HINDU MIND

The West came to India as an uninvited guest, appropriated the host's place in short order, and lingered on as a ruler. According to Tagore, that was not so sad an event as many over-enthusiastic nationalists make it out to be. He believed that the listless attitude of the Indian people to the world outside had made it imperative, if India were to survive in a scientific age, for foreigners to foist themselves on easygoing Hindustan. The attitude of the Indian people had always been one of self-sufficiency, which was probably a reflection of the abundance of their land. India has never reached out for territory, trade, or even modern science. Perhaps that is why there has never been an Indian Fa Hsien or Marco Polo, an Indian Columbus or Vasco da Gama. Perhaps, also, that is why India's relationship with the world outside has been a one-way process. The Far East took its religion and philosophy from India but she had nothing in return; the Europeans took mathematics and logic from India while she had little in exchange. She learned about other peoples and other countries only as the latter took the initiative and approached her. The outsiders who came to her brought with them the information and inventions of their own countries and thus influenced Indian thought and culture. The Near Eastern Mohammedan world came to life for India through the Afghan and Persian invasions. So far as India was concerned, the western world took on actuality only when the Portuguese, French, and English pitched their tents in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras—the English to linger longer than the rest.

The countries which did not impose themselves on India had no effect on the average Indian's design for living. Other lands of the Far East, in spite of their geographical proximity and cultural affinity, were always far from India, simply because neither China nor Japan was in touch with India—except for occasional travelers, monks and traders—until after 1400. Thus we see the paradox of India and China—next-door neighbors of equally tremendous proportions—pursuing their respective national courses without relation to each other. This fact, coupled with the common Indo-European linguistic and racial heritage, made the average

Indian feel closer to the Europeans and European institutions than to the Chinese or Japanese, popular belief to the contrary notwithstanding. Until 1904, the average Indian knew more about Europe than about eastern Asia, and his Pacific contacts had always been through European interpreters and intermediaries.

The meeting of East and West found its most natural and sympathetic ground in India because of racial and linguistic factors, as I already have said. Another thing that must be considered is the common basis of the Vedic and Greek mythologies. It emphasizes the main reason for the success of India's modernization, which is the quality of the Hindu mind. Although the Hindu mind is easily distinguishable from the classic mind of the West, it is not as far removed from the latter as are the minds of the Chinese and the Japanese. A survey of the achievements of the Hindu mind before its westernization will clarify the point I am making.

The Hindu is not so much of a mystic as he is generally believed to be; Christians and Mohammedans are better mystics than the Hindus. The philosopher in the Indian makes him an unmistakable sophist in company, master of adroit and spacious reasoning; by bringing in unusual angles of perspective, he displays at times what to the westerner appears to be a good example of a upside-down mind.

It is this faculty of observing an object or a problem from several points at the same time which distinguishes the Hindu mind from the western mind. The Hindu has literally an abundance of "standpoints"; he sees a series of pictures and images where the westerner sees only one. This becomes clear as soon as one places a good example of Indian art beside the work of most famous European artists. The western masterpiece is usually—with the exception of surrealism, in which anything can happen—perfect in perspective, almost photographic in its details of distance and light and shade, and one might, if one desired, determine from the relative proportions of the objects in the composition the exact point where the artist was standing as he painted. You cannot do that with an Indian masterpiece.

The artist who filled a niche in the Ajanta caves with a beautiful fresco used not one but several perspectives in the same composition ; he did not diminish the elephant parade as it receded into the background ; he did not necessarily put shade under the full contours of an Apsara's breasts ; he did not conceal an object because from one standpoint it must have been hidden behind a human figure ; he did not even create his men equal. He must have wandered about while he painted, looking at the same scene from a hundred angles, physically and in his imagination. He painted in time alone, not in time-space ; he combined Now with Eternity.

It is one thing to describe the Hindu mind as philosophic and quite another to call it negative, as many a well-meaning western scholar has done. What they are driving at can best be explained by saying that to many westerners, the Hindu mind appears to be "upside down." When they encounter the Hindu mind, they feel the same uneasiness, though for different reasons, as when they come up against the points of view of such men as Bernard Shaw in England or Thorstein Veblen in America.

The Hindu is apt to find the classical western mind strange too. Such misunderstandings arise because more often than not the Hindu's frame of reference extends beyond that of the westerner, conceiving a universe which almost seems to begin at the point where the Greek mind ceased to speculate. Who, to take the supreme example, could invent *zero* as a starting point for what is now mistakenly known as the Arabic system of notation ? Only the peculiar Hindu make-up and genius could, I think, conceive, at least the first time, that the very point of differentiation between plus and minus, between positive and negative, was real. It is this peculiar sense of reality—which I would like to call the "zero trend" of the Indian mind—that some westerners have called the negative quality of the Hindu reasoning. Shunya (o) or void is as real as one-two-three now to the whole civilized world, but it first dawned on the Hindu mind.

Of all the definitions of God I have come across, I think the Vedic description is not only the most ingenious,

but the most reasonable and real. It is : *Neti, neti, neti, neti*—meaning, not this, not that, not even that, and not that either ! Of course it is a negative definition, but it is the best possible, admitting the finite quality of the human mind and the overpowering aspect of the infinite. It does not display the arrogance of creating God in one's own image, yet it does not dismiss as unreal that which is still unknown. Both the western and the Hindu minds are engaged in tracking down reality ; the difference is that the former generally is bent upon the physical, while the latter is intent upon the metaphysical.

Just as the Indian mind is philosophical but not negative, so is it idealistic but not other-worldly. Had it been otherwise, India, like China, would have little to show in the realm of science. The fact that India has a proud scientific record proves that the Hindu mind has been concerned with the " here and now." Right up to the end of the sixteenth century, Indian scientific thought marched abreast of the rest of the world, sometimes even outdistancing Europe in invention. Few people in the West realize today how much they owe to India in their own scientific and technological advances. It began with the epoch-making discovery of zero, which revolutionized the entire discipline of mathematics : the Indian zero or Shunya which became the Arabic *ssifr*, which in turn became the Latin *zephyrum*. The Indian invention of the decimal system of notation led the way to European refinements in the science of numbers. Arithmetic and algebra, despite their Arabic credit lines, are of Indian origin ; the Arabs, who came in contact with Hindustan through trade, learned these sciences from India, refined them, and then handed them on to Europe. Also little known to western historians of scientific thought is the fact that the Pythagorean theorem had been solved by Hindu geometers independently of Greek influence. Centuries before Euler attempted it under the patronage of Frederick the Great, the Hindus had provided the solution of indeterminate problems of the second degree. Eight hundred years before Descartes, the Hindus had regularly formulated the principles of co-ordinate geometry, and they had also anticipated Newton by five hundred years in their principles of

differential calculus. Tycho Brahe's astronomy, developed in sixteenth-century Europe under the patronage of King Frederick II and Emperor Rudolph IV, was little more advanced than the explained rotation, eclipses, epicycles, processions of the equinoxes, and many other heavenly phenomena long before Europe began to record celestial behavior.

In the sphere of chemistry, the Hindus were more, advanced than the Greeks, and up to a very recent time. Indian metallurgists could forge bars of iron larger than any that their contemporaries could forge. So far as the discovery of gunpowder is concerned, there are rival claims by China and India. Indian chemists were masters in the art of fast dyes, and they knew how to extract indigo. What are known as "Damascus blades" originated in India. Up to the end of the sixteenth century, the Hindus were not far behind Europeans in the field of physics. The Hindu physicists had propounded the atomic theory of matter and understood conservation of energy. They had explained the phenomena of evaporation, refraction, and magnetism. What is even more interesting to nautical-minded Europeans and Americans, the Hindus invented the mariner's compass. And what may interest musicians, Hindu music has the same octave as the western, because sound had been mathematically analyzed by the Hindus in order to calculate musical notes and intervals.

Furthermore, up to the end of the sixteenth century, India had a more glorious heritage in medical science than did Europe. The Yajurveda, one of the four Vedas which are considered the earliest documents of man, was solely devoted to the art of healing; though full of superstitions and moon-lore according to modern standards, it represented the highest scientific advance of its time. India took the lead in using mercury, iron, white oxide of arsenic as medicines, which Europe took up only in the sixteenth century. Hindu surgeons with their 127 instruments, very crude from the modern point of view, could give instruction to the barber-surgeons of Europe as late as the sixteenth century.

Other-worldliness is not truly characteristic of the Indian mind then, and neither is mysticism in the light of

the Hindu's great achievements in the sphere of logic. With the exception of the ancient Greeks, the Hindus of the olden times were the only people in history who gave the world profound and at the same time precise and punctilious formulations in the realm of logic. Indeed there are scholars who say that classical logical thought was definitely influenced by chronologically older or even by contemporary Hindu achievements in psychology and epistemology. Hindu pramanshastra or logic reached its scientific exactitude at the time that Greek sophism was crystallized into formal logic, if not a little earlier.

The great revolution in the habits of the Hindu mind, the secularization of Hindu systems of knowledge, the triumph of inference over the authority of scriptures, took place during what is now known as the Age of Buddha. In the history of the Hindu mind that is the period of supreme importance, almost the Age of Reason. It may have begun a little before Buddha, for the Enlightened One himself must have been the spearhead of the growing revolt against the authority of the Vedas as interpreted by the entrenched Brahmins. Buddha was to Hinduism what Martin Luther was to Christianity, and Buddhism can very well be described as the Reformation in Hinduism. When this intellectual ferment was at its height, during the sixth century B.C. and for a long time afterwards, the great Buddhist thinkers had to use logic to destroy certain Hindu beliefs and dogmas upheld by the four pillars of the four Vedas; the same can be said about the Jaina philosophers who also flourished around that time. The Hindu pundits on their part, had to use the same weapons as their Buddhist opponents; for the theological was fast giving way to the logical. Of course, many Brahmin pundits continued to cite chapter and verse from the Vedas, but more often than not the authority of scriptures served merely to lend an air of sanctity to intellectual findings.

Moreover, the Hindus developed, at quite an early stage in their history, a sensitive and intricate science of grammar—a rarefaction which curiously the Chinese never arrived at in spite of equally long literary traditions. As the

Hindus disciplined their thought, so they disciplined their language. Yet the stress was not so much on the limitations of man-made logic and grammar as on lofty flights of imagination and speculation, ever seeking a wider and wider frame of reference. Although more often than not these wings of fancy battered themselves against the unknown and the unknowable, the start was always upon the firm ground of logic.

It was in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that the Hindu mind lost its scientific grip. It was also in that post-Renaissance period that Europe began to outdistance India. What is now crystallized into a definite lag between western science and Indian other-worldliness emerged out of the Dark Ages of Indian history, the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. For, shaken to its very foundations by successive invasions and by the religious bigotry of the Mohammedan conquerors, the Hindu mind stopped its excursions into reality; defeated in this world, it began to seek solace in speculations about the other world. The cultural lag was made greater also by the fact that the European mind, unleashed by the Renaissance, began to make rapid strides at about the same time. The Dark Age of the furious invasion of India had driven the zest of life from the Indian mind; it was a period of drifting, of existence at any price. That is why a handful of foreigners was able to rule a country of hundreds of millions.

Escapism did not spell the death of the Indian mind, though it was a serious relapse. At the time of the Meiji era in Japan came the Period of Enlightenment in India, in the middle of the nineteenth century. Raped by invaders, India was getting used to her violators. The failure of the Sepoy Mutiny destroyed any organized resistance to westernism, and the British conquest seemed to brook no interference, which was in itself a form of security for India.

The British rulers provided India with much-needed leadership in her transition from stagnation to modern dynamics. That is the reason why India has enjoyed a more ordered process of modernization than China. And yet India's change has not been so rapid as Japan's; for in India the leadership was foreign, while in Japan it came from

within. However, there steadily grew up a so-called Anglo-Indian culture, the result of the contact between East and West.

The English were not alone. Many Indians had a clear understanding of the inevitable and helped to bring about India's westernization. This tendency on the part of some Indians was not always born of an appreciation of western civilization ; often enough in India the acceptance of western standards and ways of life, the deliberate transformation of Indian culture to conform with the values of the new and aggressive civilization, was a means chosen to halt the increasing dominance of European culture. Be that as it may, at the dawn of the Indian Enlightenment there emerged the towering figure of Raja Ram Mohan Roy, who proposed social reform as well as modification of Hindu religion in the light of modern science and modern western Christianity. He was soon to be followed by Tagores and Nehrus, Gandhi and Tilak, and a myriad more, all of whom advocated the acceptance of certain western standards so that the rest of the Indian life could maintain its dignity born of history.

In the field of natural sciences, India now has a Nobel Prize winner, the physicist Sir C. V. Raman. In the same field it can also boast of Megh Nath Saha, another scientist of international reputation. Then there are men like the late Jagadhis Chandra Bose and Sir P. C. Roy, recognized throughout the world as outstanding men of science in our time. What is more important, laboratories all over India are full of promising young scientists. For the Indian mind has lately found its scientific self.

The introduction of the English educational system has contributed much to the shaping of modern India. The hybrid character of what is loosely called the government educational system in India owes its origin to the decade preceding the year 1835 in which English became the official language of India. That decade saw the famous controversy between the Anglicists and the Orientalists, the Anglicists advocating the introduction of the British school system while the Orientalists upheld the traditional curriculum based on the teaching methods in ancient Aryavarta. The Anglicists won out. Since the end of the eighteenth century, millions of Indians have studied the English

language ; in fact most educated Indians have a good grasp of the alien tongue which is now the "state language." Hundreds of thousands of students have gone to study at French, German, American, and especially British universities, and the contribution of these expatriates to the westernization of their land has been substantial. On the industrial front, in the twentieth century, India was making rapid strides in spite of obstacles set up by governmental policies dictated by the Manchester interests in England, and, with the exception of Japan, it was well on its way to becoming the most industrialized nation in Asia. Westernization was penetrating even more deeply into the social and religious life of the people. Raja Ram Mohan Roy had dealt a fatal blow to the practice of Suttee. Then came Keshab Chandra Sen who, along with the Tagores, brought forth a modern version of Hinduism. He was followed by other reformers, including those who, adopting some of the missionary spirit of Christianity, began to "reclaim" Hindus who had deserted either to Christianity or to Islam.

A powerful flank attack was made on such Indian problems as child marriage and polygamy by the dramatic flowering of "romance" at this stage—strictly an importation from the West. English poetry, glorifying the love affairs of modest heroes, singing of the boy and girl in love, gave the idea of romance to the students of India. Shelley, Byron, Keats, Browning, and other romantic poets gave the Indian youth confidence that romance would come to him, in his own lifetime and in his own land. Novelists like Hardy, who wrote epic novels of the trials and tribulations of men and women in love, did a great deal to undermine the traditional marriage system of India. The young poets of India imitated Keats, while Hindu novelists tried to outdo Hardy. One has only to run through India's literature of the past fifty years to become convinced that there has been a national psychological crisis which went deeper than most of the political struggles which have tormented India. Seven out of every ten novels written during the past fifty years—in Gujarat, Bengal, Maharashtra, the Punjab, Madras, as well as in the other provinces of India—have for their central theme the tragedy of an "English-educated youth married to an uneducated Indian girl."

This concentrated study of the problems of love and marriage has helped the causes of co-education and women's training. When the educated men of India began to think of women as companions and sweethearts rather than as mothers for their children, the feminist movement suddenly took on remarkable new life and became solidly planted in the native soil. What was taking place in religion, social customs, and literature was also reflected in the arts and in technology. India even began to manufacture the tools and weapons of modern warfare.

The purely western and relatively non-Asiatic overtones of the awakening Indian consciousness were nowhere so ironically evident as in the first chapters of the history of Indian nationalism. English-educated Indians read about the Magna Charta, the exploits of Oliver Cromwell, the American and the French Revolutions; they even read Mazzini. Thus their resistance to Great Britain, a western power, was largely influenced and conditioned by their western education. Even in the formation of the Indian National Congress, now a great revolutionary organization, fine English hands were discernible; for two English liberals, working with Indian politicians, actually founded that body. India was fighting a western power in a western way without reference to similar situations in other Asiatic countries. Her nationalist struggle lacked a Far Eastern framework, let alone an Asiatic one. True to tradition, she regarded her struggle as a domestic affair to be settled behind closed doors, preferably through parliamentary procedure. Even wealthy and powerful leaders who asked their audiences to boycott foreign goods were found to be wearing Bond Street suits. India was frantically bent on westernization, partly through a natural tendency to ape the conqueror, partly out of sheer admiration for new values and new tools, and partly in self-defence. The poet would not have had India in his mind when he wrote :

*The East bowed low before the blast
In silent deep disdain ;
She heard the legions thunder past
And plunged in thought again.*

THE WHITE SAHIB OF INDIA

1. BRITISH SUPERIORITY
2. MISSIONARIES : THE STRANGE ALLIES
OF IMPERIALISM
3. THE WAYS OF THE WHITE SAHIB

THE WHITE SAHIB OF INDIA

INDIA'S westernization, as we have seen, had a happier beginning than that of Japan and a more orderly progress than that of China. It was inevitable for India, therefore, to look forward to a culmination of the new culture based on the blending of East and West in the past hundred and fifty years. Yet the sad fact remains that the period of the last century and a half, instead of becoming the Golden Age of India's emergence as an alert modern community, has turned out to be most disappointing for India. A hybrid civilization has been offered in place of a new, evolving culture. The peculiar results have been stagnation, utter helplessness, and, in some places, even degeneration.

Free choice affords the healthiest process in cultural development. When one culture is free to choose what it wants from another culture, its selection is based upon its known needs and its subconscious awareness of needs. Its changes, therefore, are those of a graded and relative imitation or education, and not those of a wholesale revision of the settled way of life. There are many examples in history which tell us how such natural cultural changes have taken place. The results of assimilation have often been admirable. But, unfortunately, in the case of modern India's coming of age the element of free choice has been limited, if not entirely missing. The reformers of India offered the only avenue through which the process of free choice could work, but even their zealous desire to bring about change was offset by a nervous anxiety to prevent any further penetration of alien influence into the spheres they held sacred. They believed, just as Lafcadio Hearn believed, that a limited change in certain outer and militant forms of their life could be built into the wall behind which their other traditions could go on untouched. In contrast and opposition to the Indian reformers, there were those other and

dominant advocates of change, the British rulers. They wanted no free choice operating in the cultural intercourse ; they preferred to decide exactly what their Indian wards should take or not take from the western culture which was theirs. They tried to enforce a general transvaluation of values, and, as a consequence, India's will to change lost its vital force.

Moreover, the changes proffered by the British raj were introduced under the most hostile conditions ; they were ushered in at a time when the background was one of economic hostility and political strife. The British, who were trying to give western forms of civilization to India, were still very much the conquerors, and the conquered peoples of India resented the yoke mightily. Their deep-seated resentment flared up in the form of the Sepoy Mutiny, which was more in the nature of a cultural rebellion than a political revolt. After the mutiny was ended, the arrogant attitude of the ruling Britons merely salted the wounds left by this unsuccessful revolution which has come down in history as a mutiny. India, it appeared, was considered too base even to be a colony that would be "colonized" ; it was to be a colony that would be exploited, and only that. The British sought raw materials, the protection of consumers' markets, and trade monopolies through political and military control of the country. And in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries as well as during the major part of the nineteenth century, such conquests were not costly, save in lives lost. It is true that the imperial government of India spent far more than it got, but, on the other hand, private interests made huge fortunes and these capitalists more or less made up the ruling clique at home. We of the twentieth century find it hard to see the necessity of political control of the market. In the contemporary world, we know that political control does not bring in all the trade, but only a part of it, a part which might be secured without military conquest. Not only was such a thought lacking in "home countries" until the end of the nineteenth century, but even its validity was at stake then ; in those days a nation secured economic monopoly through its political control. We now know that since 1880 governments as well as peoples have spent more on colonies than

they have earned from them, that the late-comers like Germany, Italy, and Japan are entering upon an unsound enterprise, in which the British, the French, and the Dutch were successful during an era when it was possible to be successful. Today we know that just as there will be no new millionaires in the United States which has exhausted its frontiers, so also there will be no new paying empire in a world which has explored its last frontier of "backward areas." But this knowledge of modern economics should not let us believe the propaganda to the effect that colonies never paid. India paid the British handsomely. The East India Company dealt out such fabulous dividends that the price of its stock rose to \$32,000 a share.

1. BRITISH SUPERIORITY

To the Indian people, the Anglo-Saxon self-confidence, its quiet assumption of superiority, was far more unpalatable than any economic exploitation or military defeat. Indian culture in 1750 was at its lowest ebb, as shaky as the tottering Mogul Empire. This sad state of affairs made its inevitable impression on the zestful newcomer, not that he was in need of any excuse to build up his faith in himself. He despised not only the Indian, but also the Eurasian and the "country-bred" Anglo-Indians. His preposterous arrogance was born of his unthinking assumption that a culture superior in some ways was bound to be superior in all ways. He gave evidence of his native provincialism when he passed judgment upon the rightness of one civilization in comparison to another.

This superior attitude of the West, exemplified by British bureaucrats, has indeed boomeranged. The East took, or was forced to take, some of the very best things from western civilization. But the self-sufficiency of the West has prevented a parallel recognition of the universal value of some of the finest achievements of the East. The East is the richer for its knowledge of the West; it now has its own heritage as well as the best of Europe and America. The West is poorer; it has refused to learn. In India, we have a mischievous proverb which says: *We hold yours and mine in common, but what is mine belongs to me alone.*

The British attitude of regarding everything native to India as inferior has done a great deal of harm to the peoples of the country. The British came as rulers, but they presented India with the unsolved problems of the West and drew the people into the confusion of their own unrest. Through the external mastery of arms and commerce they opened up India to the internal scientific and intellectual and moral problems of European civilization. The method was defective from the start. Any development of the inner spiritual elements of western life in India was held back by military mastery. Western culture came to India in the form of little favors granted to the ruled by the rulers ; and, of course, whatever was introduced in this way left its deep and sinuous trail of bitterness and resentment. The pride of the Indians was hurt, and if they did not burst into open rebellion, they went instead into the underground of the mind, where they sought to bring together and to cherish all the more those traditions which were challenged by the alien rulers.

The British handled the most intricately civilized institutions of ancient India in the same bland manner they used in dealing with the simple mores of primitive tribes. They made English the language of India and tried to teach rudiments of chemistry and physics in their schools. The magic of English and science not only failed to produce the expected results, but gave the rulers rather dismal results. It produced such curiosities as that of Sanskrit, and even vernacular tongues, being taught to Indians in English. English, the foreign language, was the medium used in all college courses and in most of the high-school training of Indians, with the result that many students knew more about Shakespeare than about Kalidasa. Indian students had a detailed knowledge of centuries of English history, but knew nothing of their own history. This unnatural method naturally gave a biased slant to the Indian mind ; an Indian sociologist could feel more at home writing a thesis on the condition of mill-hands in Manchester than writing about the workers in the Ahmedabad mills. Indian people felt enslaved not only to an alien people but also to an alien culture ; they saw the tallest among them humiliated by the petty underlings of a sovereign overseas. Not so

conscious of the political and economic issues, the masses were nevertheless aware of affronts to their centuries-old culture. Half amused and half indignant, they listened to the missionaries of the ruling race abusing the Hindu gods; they saw churches rise where their temples once stood. The high caste, the privileged, noted that the *Mahabharata* was being replaced by the *Iliad* on the shelves of places of learning. The Sanskrit pandit had to learn an alien tongue to get a job. The aristocrat, with a deep sense of humiliation, had to give up the costume of his forebears and dress in the European fashion. The Brahmin and the Untouchable, the caste and the outcaste, the mass and the class, all alike felt that every insult to their culture was an affront to Mother India.

There is another sign that the failure of India's westernization was caused by the faulty way in which it was handled. For one thing, from the Battle of Plassey (as a result of which Clive became the Baron of Plassey) to the so-called Sepoy Mutiny, that is from 1757 to 1857, British missionaries dominated the field of education in India. In 1857 the universities of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras were established. New universities and university training of Indians followed. All these institutions were patterned on the British system. Thus India has been exposed to organized western influence for over three hundred years—longer than any other oriental or any African country. And yet India is outwardly the least westernized of these lands. Housewives in Iran, China, and Japan may wear the skirt and coat of the West, but Indian women cling to their exquisite saris. The fez has been replaced by the hat in Iran and Turkey, but the only thing which has replaced India's traditional turban is the Gandhi cap. The more the missionaries reviled Hinduism, the more they revived it.

For all these reasons, there dawned in India an era of "national education," a direct challenge to India's enforced westernization—and one might note in passing that this kind of challenge has never achieved similar proportions in any other Asiatic country at war against modernization. Swami Shradhanand and other Aryasamagists, who believe in the reform of Hinduism from within, took the lead in this direction and founded several national-education

schools. Under Gandhi's lead, schools of higher learning were established in such strategic places as Ahmedabad, Bombay, Wardha, and Benares. But the father of the movement for educational reaffirmation of Indian culture was the poet Rabindranath Tagore who had modeled his school on the ancient pattern of the gurukula. The whole institution was much like the one symbolized in Henry Thoreau's *Walden*.

2. MISSIONARIES: THE STRANGE ALLIES OF IMPERIALISM

Imperialists were only one of the two groups which did their best to peddle western civilization to unwilling Indians. The other group consisted of their strange allies, the missionaries, who preached the western way of life along with the Gospel. Religious feeling is an intimate experience in any land, but especially in India. A challenge to one's religion is a deep thing; it shakes the very roots of one's being. It was inevitable, therefore, that the advocates and proselytizers of a new faith would arouse the profoundest feelings of hatred and resistance among the Hindus and the Mohammedans and the Sikhs and the Parsis and the Jains and the Buddhists.

A more understandable reason for India's resentment against the missionary encroachment also existed. The Indians believed that there was a definite bond between the politicians of the ruling race and the religionists. In fact, the resentment against the missionary which is evident wherever nationalism has made inroads in Asia has always been founded on the belief that more often than not he is an outrider of imperialism. History shows that imperialists have always followed in the wake of the missionaries, or *vice versa*. Although the missionary movement dates back to 1790, it is the nineteenth century which will go down in history as the century of Christian missions. It is no mere coincidence that it was the nineteenth century which saw the zenith of the power and prestige of western nations in the East. In the time of Empress Victoria, the global empire manipulated from London had one square mile out of every four of all the land of the world under its banner, and one

person out of every five of the whole human race as its "subject." It was through this world-wide protection of the British imperialists and their French and Dutch satellites that the peddlers of spiritual wares escaped the tropical sun of native wrath. It is perhaps for this reason that most missionaries have been opposed to the growth of nationalism among "natives." They have been such ardent apologists of imperialism that they put British bureaucrats to shame.

In the case of India, the reason is clear. Even American missionaries have had to mortgage their right of free judgment and free conscience to the British before they were allowed to enter India. The American public is, inexplicably, kept in the dark about this. No missionary from any land can enter India without giving a written guarantee to the British that he will do nothing to impair the interests of the British Empire. This means that even when missionaries find that the British treatment of the Indians is unfair, un-Christian, and evil, they must keep quiet, to placate the powers that be. Now and then there are noble examples of defiance, such as Bishop Frederick B. Fisher of Detroit. But he was thrown out of India.

The oath that American missionaries to India must swear to is "to do nothing to, or in diminution of, the lawfully constituted authority of the country." This is often justified under the convenient Christian theory of rendering unto Caesar that which is his. But that is a particularly repugnant doctrine to the Hindus who firmly believe that even Caesar must submit to God. How can pantheistic Hindus respect a belief that to Caesar are to be rendered things that are Caesar's, that the powers that be are ordained by God, that Christ's kingdom is not of this world? It is sheer religious opportunism in their eyes, a desperate and deft move to placate the worldly and the mighty. India can never understand the European conflict between the Church and the State, because it has always accepted God's presence in everything. After all, what is Caesar's and which is God's? Two enlightened American missionaries, J. Holmes Smith and Ralph Templin, could not agree with the

accepted distinction. "We had not been long in India," they wrote to the viceroy, "before we discovered that many of our senior missionaries, and the vast majority of our Indian Christian friends as well, considered it as intended to make us pro-Government, even in relation to the noble, non-violent effort of the current nationalism to induce in that Government a change of heart. We recalled the story of the Irishman who, when told to be neutral in the war, exclaimed, 'Neutral? Against whom?'" This protest ran into a familiar pattern; the government approached the mission board and the mission board "encouraged" the two missionaries to come back to the United States.

The missionary is more of a problem to the orient than the orient is to the missionary. The very concept of the "mission" implies a superiority complex as well as an impulse of self-righteousness. In other fields such an impulse is tolerable, but in the realm of religion and the spirit it seems very strange to the Hindu. To the Hindu philosopher, nothing is more irreligious than a holier-than-thou attitude—an attitude which is necessary to provide the driving force of evangelism. It is forgivable to insist on *one* God, but to insist upon *The* Prophet and *The* Law is, to the Hindu, intellectually wrong. The assertion of Louis XIV that "I am The State" seems quite innocent when compared to the assertion that "I am The Law." According to Hinduism, quite to the contrary, Truth is one, though there are many approaches to it. Like the center of a circle, it can be reached from a million different points. That is why Hindus have never organized a missionary movement of their own and never could understand when others did so. Christianity has not made any noticeable impression on India up to this day, in spite of the fact that it has secured millions of converts. Most of these have been "Rice Christians" and according to mission boards themselves, nine per cent. of these converts have come from the Untouchables who were more anxious to better their social and economic position than to solve any inner problem.

There were still deeper reasons for the antagonism aroused by missionaries in India—an antagonism which definitely contributed its share to the total distrust of the

West. These reasons are to be found in the type of Christianity and the nature of the missionaries exported, not only to India but to the whole orient. It was not the legend of Christ, the fundamental elements of which had their roots in the Aryan religious philosophy of India, which was brought to Hindustan. Neither was it that early Christianity which had been partly influenced by Buddhist teachings. Christianity had undergone several transformations before it went East. The Greeks debated about it; the Romans had organized it into a basis of an all-powerful state. When a group of German princes and cities lodged a protest against an edict of the Diet of Speyer in 1529, Protestantism was born. The later movements in western Europe which rejected the authority of the Roman Catholic Church were primarily the assertion of conservatism against catholicism or universalism. Protestantism was becoming exclusive, developing antagonistic feelings. It was losing its vast, early capacity to incorporate new ideas and was beginning to resist reforms. Moreover, it developed a tendency to align itself with the ruling classes of the nation, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries. Eventually Protestantism emerged as the religious aspect of modern western European civilization: at once the source and the result of nationalism, democracy, and capitalism. The Christianity exported to the East became a highly modern version even of Protestantism, a vehicle for the spread of ideas developed in western Europe and for the transplanting of European, but chiefly British, civil institutions. There were some differences between the approach of the Catholic missions and Protestant missions, and also there were denominational differences among the Protestant missions. But by and large it was Anglo-Saxon Christendom that came to the East. As the greatest imperial power, England set the overseas model for the French and Dutch. In the same way Anglo-Saxon Christendom provided the keynote for other missions: Christian bias wedded to Anglo-Saxon self-righteousness. Outsiders were outsiders and they could have little hope here or in the hereafter unless their souls were saved in time. In other words, not only the political and military bureaucrats, but even the missionaries became White Sahibs whose presence throughout the East made Asiatics conscious of their humiliation.

3. THE WAYS OF THE WHITE SAHIB

The White Sahib East of Suez, who has become the symbol of western imperialism in the orient, has to be studied and analyzed if the feelings of Asia are to be understood by westerners. Without doubt he is one of the profoundest causes of the revolt of Asia against the West. He has performed a dual role—as a white master in the East and as an interpreter of India and the orient to America and Europe in the days of his retirement. He is better known to Americans in the latter role, and so I shall dwell on it at somewhat greater length.

Who is the typical White Sahib of India, elected by some curious means to interpret the East's "land of mystery"? For many years his lectures to sympathetic and often crowded audiences in the United States have been a skillful blend of glamor and horror. Perhaps you do not visualize him immediately, although he is America's chief source of information about the land of Suttees, Salt Marches, and snakes; but to me he is a living entity, who stalks through my daytime routines and disturbs my dreams. He is as vivid to me as Rhett Butler or David Copperfield or the Satan of Milton's lost-and-found paradise. Only a composite figure in these pages, in the flesh he is more important than any fictional character; for he is the spokesman for India, who may affect the lives and fortunes of one-fifth of the human race in so far as those lives and fortunes can be influenced by the opinions and understanding of the rest of the world.

Let us try to draw a life-sized pen-and-ink portrait of him; if we succeed it will be the first time it has been done for he has eluded all previous efforts at description. To start with, the White Sahib of India is not exactly like the Old China Hand; for the latter is as frequently an American or Frenchman or Italian as he is an Englishman. But the English have carefully seen to it that the White Sahib of India, with rare exceptions, is a Britisher. Doubtless once in a long while he takes the form of an American missionary or a Standard Oil manager, but such foreigners are in India only on sufferance of the British. The White

Sahib of India, again, is unlike the Taipan of Shanghai, who is apt to be anything except an Asiatic or African and who is mainly a trader. The White Sahib, even if he is a trader, is definitely a member of the "ruling race" and generally an Englishman. Thus, while the Taipan created a hybrid cosmopolitan culture in Shanghai, the White Sahib created a strictly Anglo-Indian culture in Bombay, Calcutta, Simla, and Delhi. The Tunas Besar of the Singapore Club was merely a second-rate version of the White Sahib of the Bombay Yacht Club.

If the White Sahib happens to be an English missionary, he will some day rejoin his people in Sussex and enliven polite Sunday evening gatherings with the doggerel which, he says, has saved a thousand Hindu souls :

*Once upon a time, a Hindu boy was drowning,
And he prayed to Vishnu to come to his rescue ;
And Vishnu got ready to rescue him.*

*Meanwhile, the boy prayed to the great god Shiva,
" O, Lord, come and save me."
So Shiva mounted his bull.*

*Sinking rapidly, the boy then prayed to Brahma,
And to Krishna, and to Rama, and to
All the three hundred and sixty million gods of India.*

*And each thought the other would go to the boy's rescue,
So that all gods stayed where they were.
And the waves took the Hindu boy away.*

We Christians have but one Christ to whom to pray

He may be an agent of the Manchester Textile Mills, putting his company's cloth within the reach of the half-naked fakirs, as many of the potential three hundred and sixty million customers as possible. Or he may be offering them quinine pills to cure their malaria. Or he may be selling them Sen Sen to add bouquet to that pungent chew, the highly flavored Indian pan. At any rate, he is in India to "shake the pagoda tree" and to collect all the ripe rupees which fall into his pith helmet. Odd moments find him cursing the climate from bar to bar in India's big cities, never mixing with an Indian save for business deals, finally returning to Surrey to tell tales about lions that he never

saw and a caste system which he never experienced. Or "he" may be some unremarkable Englishwoman, who has taught drawing in the Calcutta Art School for sixteen years and who, in reply to a question about Indian art, will ask airily : "Is there an Indian art ?"

More often than not he is a Scottish banker, an English Tommy in the Indian Army, or a civil servant helping to make up that "steel frame" of empire over which Lord Birkenhead liked to exult. If he is a civil servant, he is a product of England's "public school" system ; in addition, he must be an English Brahmin from Oxford or Cambridge. It is granted that some of them begin their Indian careers like knights in shining armor, with an urge to serve India and in turn to serve England. But time passes, and only the perfect, gentle knight is able to carry on in a setting, a world of sharp realities, which changes him overnight from a minor figure to a prominent official with the power of life and death over thousands of human beings. He must be a strong soul indeed to resist the corrupting influence of great power. Besides, he is faced by the jaundiced social attitude of his seniors, the prevailing myths of the "white man's prestige," and by the servile attitude of some Indians themselves ; eventually the man who started out as a civil servant is apt to regard himself as a military master.

Even at that, he would be exceptional ; for he is far more likely to start out across the Mediterranean with the Englishman's feeling of self-righteousness and the Christian's strong prejudices. That has been his characteristic attitude from 1830 onwards, and even before that ; for as early as in 1817 Sir Thomas Munro was protesting, "Foreign conquerors have treated the natives with violence, but none has treated them with so much scorn as we ; none has stigmatized the whole people as unworthy of trust, as incapable of honesty, and as fit to be employed only where we cannot do without them."

To the White Sahib, India is the "Land of Regrets," in which he has had to spend years of self-imposed exile—"the best years of his life"—to earn a "small salary," which in reality is the best salary that any civil servant in the world gets. But it is worth doing, he consoles himself,

because a "pension" is to be his when at long last he returns home to live happily ever after. The sentiment is nobly expressed in Leyden's "Ode to an Indian Gold Coin."

The Sahib hates India's damned climate, he hates the smell of India, he despises the half-naked Hindus and the uncouth Mohammedans, he looks down upon the Eurasian and the second generation Anglo-Indian, and even feels insulted when these are called Anglo-Indians. Though he becomes a distinct caste in a land of castes, he is apt to dwell upon the injustices the Hindus mete out to each other in their caste system.

The Sahib surrounds himself with other Sahibs in his office and his hours of leisure, which are quite long and frequent, are spent in air-conditioned club houses to which only Europeans are admitted. There he consumes his whisky and soda; he knows that a long drink is properly called *buda-peg* while a small drink is called *chchota-peg*. He knows how to say *Badmash* (scoundrel) when the "boy" is not quick; in fact he knows every blue twist of our vernacular, but that is all that he knows of the language of the land he is paid to serve.

The Indian "first settlers," families with centuries of tradition behind them, frozen by caste and purdah notions, have their own pride and prejudices. In consequence, the Indian aristocracy has never placed a lamp in the window to guide Europeans to Hindu homes; the Tagores, the Nehrus, the Wadias, the Ozas, the Maliks, and the Shastris have seldom exerted themselves to study at close range the strange breed so rudely grafted upon the tree of India. Denied entree to the best homes in India, many an American correspondent, in spite of his democratic attitudes and lively curiosity, has had to be satisfied with the White Sahib's club house as the only diversion on tropical evenings. And here it is that he has picked up "authentic information" on Indian affairs.

The Sahib, either as an official, business man, or soldier, is a bird of passage; to him all India is a "station" and he invariably plans to build his home in England. Once in a while he throws together a bungalow in which to live—an architectural monstrosity of the kind known as "dak

bungalow Gothic"—but with the sure knowledge that another Sahib who is coming some day from England to replace him will buy it from him.

There is an old saying about the White Sahib, usually credited to an Englishman who felt proud of his fortitude and recently rephrased for a musical comedy: "Only mad dogs and Englishmen go out in the noonday sun in India." As a matter of fact, few Indians have observed Englishmen on the pavements at unseasonable hours. Confidentially, the Sahib enjoys a long siesta after lunch, while an Indian "boy" crouches outside his room creating soft and soothing breezes with a huge fan. If further proof is needed, here is Winston Churchill's description of the daily routine in the Indian Army: "Before eleven o'clock all white men were in shelter. We nipped across to luncheon at half-past one in blistering heat and then returned to sleep or read till five o'clock."

The Sahib does defy the tropical sun if he is out hunting big game as a guest of a Maharajah in the jungles of Kathiavard. Then he dons a polo hat, puts on khaki shorts and a polo shirt, picks up his rifle, and along with the Maharajah, deposits himself in a well-covered niche where the lion could never reach him. Thereupon the barefooted and unprotected hunters of India raise a din around the lion's den and maneuver that king of beasts into a spot where the Sahib can get a good shot. It is, often enough, a perilous pastime for the native beaters, who never walk off with photographs of the kill.

When a Sahib is asked what reforms he has introduced during the course of his eighteen years of officialdom, he is usually ready with a detailed answer. By the time his office ended, he will say, he had started "village councils" in three of his three hundred villages, had himself picked "honest" men to head those councils, and things looked quite hopeful. "But, dash it, I had to leave just when I hoped to make great improvements." Then he goes on to tell about a lion hunt in his best anecdotal style, "Now when I was in Sitapur . . ."

In short, the White Sahib, unimpeachable authority on India, hates everything Indian while he is in the country.

He has nothing to do even with Indians educated abroad, though both might have attended Balliol. He misses England and tries to bridge the gap by out-Englishing the Britishers back home; he dresses for dinner even in that tropical climate and, in consequence, suffers unpleasantly. The ultimate tragedy, however, is that, when he is home on his last long leave, he misses India bitterly; he sighs for all he had formerly despised. The spicy curries, the comfortable bungalows, the profusion of servants, the trappings of authority—yes, he tries to recall even the smell of India. And people back home begin to avoid him and his stock stories about lions and dancing girls. In India he was a White Sahib, a Chchota Sahib, a Bada Sahib, or even a Lat Sahib; but in South Kensington he is a nonentity; and people resent his unconscious attempt to govern them, a form of behavior hard to discard after years in India. A retired Sahib becomes a wallah flower among his own people. Kipling, after six years in India, was horrified to note in England that "white women stood and waited on one behind one's chair. It was all whirling outside my comprehension."

If the Sahib is an official in the Indian Army, he lives in northern India for years. Then, of course, he knows India's Northwest Frontier and makes the professional acquaintance of the unruly Afridis in the Khyber Pass, where the mere sight of a shiny brass button is enough to bring out the Khyber minute men. He also knows other garrison towns of India and, on his vacations, moves in the exclusively European society of India's famous hill stations. When he returns to England or visits America, he can present only the infinitesimal part of India with which he has been quite familiar—the cantonment India, that is, the India of the army stations. But on the basis of his acquaintance with this small and inorganic segment of Indian life, he will make large generalizations about Indian culture, politics, and religions. If he is clever, he sticks to his military experience, boasting about hair-raising adventures in the Khyber Pass which in reality were made possible by native troops. If he is an even greater spellbinder, he sells a story to Hollywood in which a Gary Cooper type of lanky British officer figures as the protector of the lives of three hundred and sixty million people.

How can he be regarded as an authority on India or even on British rule in India when he has had neither the training nor the inclination to understand those ancient peoples and their institutions? Let us not do him the injustice of picking him at his worst. Let us pick him at his best, and imagine him to be a subaltern, like Winston Churchill, of imagination, genius, nobility, honor, trust, and fidelity to duty. Do not forget that he is paid by the Indian treasury for his services; yet Churchill admits he went to India to try his "luck" with the Malakand Field Force. He lived in a "palatial pink and white bungalow with deep verandahs wreathed in purple bougainvillea." All one had to do, he says, was to "hand over your clothes to the dressing boy, your ponies to the syce, and your money to the butler. Each of these ministers entered upon his department with experience and fidelity."

While in India, Churchill, along with the rest of his kind, had had only one concern in life. "Our really serious purpose in life now," he writes, "could be expressed in one word—Polo. It was upon this, apart from military duty, that our interest was concentrated."

The Sahib may be one who writes books. He may even, during his expatriation in India, study Sanskrit and translate India's sacred books into English. Max Muller and Sir William Jones were two in ten thousand; their imitators have done more harm than good. Every now and then some ambitious soul has set out to study one of the vernaculars of the country or to write a book on provincial customs. About half of these books are actually ghost-written by Indians, while a majority of the remaining half attempts in one way or another to discredit the Indian people and Indian religions and to glorify, by contrast, their own religion and culture.

That the Sahib can still follow the lead of Rudyard Kipling is more probable than one thinks; he may not have Kipling's genius and his powers of expression, but the results are much the same. One could ask him to emulate Sir Edwin Arnold or E. M. Forster or Louis Bromfield, but that would be asking in vain; for it is easier to fit into the pattern of Kipling than into that created by the others.

The Kiplingesque attitude is an attitude of superiority, of disdain toward the "lesser breeds." It is the attitude of most of the White Sahibs. Kipling had a mission; he felt called upon to interpret that stirring phenomenon, British Rule in India. That is also the thing that most Sahibs, even when retired, feel called upon to do. Kipling knew only the India of the cantonments and Anglo-India; most Sahibs, having no contact at all with the real India, know even less about our country. Kipling drew all his Indian characters as "flat" stock figures, stereotypes, and not as individual human beings; the Hindu wife, the Mohammedan bandit, the Tibetan lama, the Indian thug, the Untouchable, the Maharajah, but not Shanta, Ahmed, Surdas, Kadu, and Bhimo. However, he drew his Europeans and his country-bred characters like Kim—in the round. To him and to all his followers, India forms a colorful background for the escapades of Europeans and Americans, who are the real heroes and heroines of the stories.

Most Sahibs have a similar view of Indians; the Indians in their eyes are stereotypes, such as the Indian servant and the dancing girl, the Hindu swami, the Pathan money-lender, the nationalist, the bootlicker, never human beings with distinctive personalities. To such Sahibs, the whole of India is a canvas on which can be depicted the exploits of the ruling race. And, just as the Kiplings can never truly serve India while they are in office, so they fail to serve as interpreters of India in their later years.

This high-lighted picture is drawn without any desire to launch a campaign of complaint at this late date. It is presented here because unless the White Sahib is seen through Indian eyes, it is hard to grasp how great a source of irritation he has become to the Asians. Not only that. Even the various nationalist movements in Asia, and their subsequent merger into a general revolt of Asia against western arrogance, have sprung up as a reaction to the White Sahib mentality of Europeans. It is not only the great masses, but also the privileged groups who have reacted violently against such mastery, and the leadership of India has not escaped the peculiar and lingering sensations caused by sad personal experiences with the White Sahib. Let us listen to stories told by Gandhi and Nehru, no less.

In his *The Story of My Experiments with Truth* Gandhi relates a typical experience suffered by many a sensitive Indian. "I had heard," said he, "what a British officer was like, but up to now had never been face to face with one.

"My brother had been secretary and adviser to the late Ranasaheb of Porbandar before he was installed on his gadi [throne], and hanging over his head at this time was the charge of having given wrong advice when in office. The matter had gone to the political agent who was prejudiced against my brother. Now I had known this officer when in England and he may be said to have been fairly friendly to me. My brother thought that I should avail myself of the friendship, and putting in a good word on his behalf, try to disabuse the Political Agent of his prejudice. . . .

"I could not refuse him, so I went to the officer much against my will. . . . But I sought an appointment and got it. I reminded him of the old acquaintance, but I immediately saw that Kathiawad was different from England; that an officer on leave was not the same as an officer on duty. The Political Agent owned the acquaintance, but the reminder seemed to stiffen him. . . . Nevertheless I opened my case. The sahib was impatient. 'Your brother is an intriguer. I want to hear nothing more from you. I have no time. If your brother has anything to say, let him apply through the proper channel.' . . . But selfishness is blind. I went on with my story. The sahib got up and said: 'You must go now.'

"'But please hear me out,' said I. That made him more angry. He called his peon and ordered him to show me the door. I was still hesitating when the peon came in, placed his hands on my shoulders and put me out of the room.

"The sahib went away as also the peon, and I departed fretting and fuming. . . .

"Sir Phirozeshah Mehta happened to be in Rajkot at this time, having come down from Bombay for some case. . . . So I sent him the papers of my case, through the vakil who had engaged him, and begged for his advice. 'Tell Gandhi,' he said, 'such things are the common experience of many vakils and barristers. He is still fresh from England,

and hot-blooded. He does not know the British officers. If he would earn something and have an easy time here, let him tear up the note and pocket the insult. He will gain nothing by proceeding against the sahib, and on the contrary, will very likely ruin himself. Tell him he has yet to know life.' ”

In the development of his personality, Gandhi regards this experience at the hands of a White Sahib as “The First Shock,” and he adds, “This shock changed the course of my life.”

Nehru has similar testimony to offer: He writes, “I listened to the grown-up talk of my cousins without always understanding all of it. Often this talk related to the overbearing character and insulting manners of the English people, as well as Eurasians, toward Indians, and how it was the duty of every Indian to stand up to this and not to tolerate it. Instances of conflicts between the rulers and the ruled were common and were fully discussed. It was a notorious fact that whenever an Englishman killed an Indian he was acquitted by a jury of his own countrymen. In railway trains, compartments were reserved for Europeans, and, however crowded the train might be—and they used to be terribly crowded—no Indian was allowed to travel in them, even though they were empty. Even an unreserved compartment would be taken possession of by an Englishman, and he would not allow any Indian to enter it. Benches and chairs were also reserved for Europeans in public parks and other places. I was filled with resentment against alien rulers of my country who misbehaved in this manner; and, whenever an Indian hit back, I was glad.”

Nehru also recalls an experience that occurred to him in 1919, after the Amritsar Massacre. “Toward the end of that year,” he writes, “I travelled from Amritsar to Delhi by the night train. The compartment I entered was almost full, and all the berths, except one upper one, were occupied by sleeping passengers. I took the vacant upper berth. In the morning I discovered that all my fellow passengers were military officers. They conversed with each other in loud voices which I could not help overhearing. One of them was holding forth in an aggressive and triumphant tone,

and soon I discovered that he was Dyer, the hero of Jallianwala Bagh, who was describing his Amritsar experiences. He pointed out how he had the whole town at his mercy and he had felt like reducing the rebellious city to a heap of ashes, but he took pity on it and refrained. He was evidently coming back from Lahore after giving his evidence before the Hunter Committee of Inquiry. I was greatly shocked to hear his conversation and to observe his callous manner. He descended at Delhi station in pyjamas with bright pink stripes, and a dressing gown."

THE TURNING POINT AT TSUSHIMA

1. CHINA FOLLOWS IN TOGO'S WAKE
2. THE AWAKENING OF THE INDIES
3. INDIA'S ASIATIC MENTOR
4. AFFRONTS FROM AMERICA

THE TURNING POINT AT TSUSHIMA

THE turning point in East-West relationships occurred on the twenty-seventh of May, 1905. It was a day of reckoning between the East and the West. The ocean stage was set off the island of Tsushima and the actual combatants, locked in a show of strength which had more than their respective forces at stake, were the Imperial Russian Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy. When the abrupt finale was reached at dusk under the gray sky, the Japanese Admiral Togo had vanquished the Russian Admiral Rojestvensky. The West was astounded. The East was astounded too, but in a different way. For the first time in recent centuries an Asiatic power had emerged triumphant from a battle against a western one.

The naval engagement at Tsushima came dramatically after a full year's sparring at Port Arthur between the ships of the Mikado and those of Nicholas II, the Czar of All the Russias. It was at Port Arthur, in the year 1904, that Japan for the first time challenged a European power. Their treacherous technique of warfare, later repeated at Pearl Harbor, was based on a surprise attack. No word of warning had been issued and the declaration of war came after the attack had been made. But the struggle dragged through the long winter and it was during that protracted siege that the Nipponese navy, like an agile mongoose, weakened the Russian cobra. When the contact between the two navies was finally made on that May day, the outcome was just as swift as it was inevitable. According to Lord Fisher, "Within twenty minutes the action was decided. . . . So it was that Togo won that second Trafalgar; he

did what is technically known as 'crossing the T,' which means he got the guns of his fleet all to bear, all free to fire, while those of the enemy were masked by his own ships. One by one Rojestvensky's ships went to the bottom. . . ." The annihilation of the Russians was complete. When Togo had time to count the toll, it was found that the Russians had suffered total casualties of ten thousand men, while the Japanese total casualties amounted to one thousand. Only 117 Japanese were killed in action, while the number of Russians killed reached 4,830. Wonder of wonders! Togo had destroyed the entire Russian armada, banishing Russian might from the seven seas, at the cost of three Japanese torpedo boats. The Battle of Tsushima went down in history as the major naval battle between Trafalgar and Jutland.

In the record book of the internal growth of Japan as a world power, the victory at Tsushima marked the climax of the Periclean Age of the Meiji. Togo's life spanned the entire course of that era and he became the symbol of Shinto nationalism. He was born in 1847, six years before Commodore Perry forced his entrance into the Japanese rock garden if not into the Japanese home. By the time of his death, Japan was a world power, pushing ahead in a world dominated by western civilization but not at home in it. In the meantime, Japan's double life looked like Togo's biography writ large. When the two forces at war within Japan emerged more and more clearly, Japan was launched on a hypocritical existence. Moreover, when the pair of horses began to drag the Japanese chariot forward at breakneck speed, the driver fatalistically let go of the reins. Bushido, the code of the noble warrior, was teamed with modern technology, the Samurai code with power politics. This unhappy juggling act spared Togo, personally, and Japan, nationally, the growing pains which India and China were undergoing in the struggle toward a deeper and a natural evolution.

Togo typified the Japanese brand of westernism. He went to England in 1871 to study naval science and became known as "Johnny Chinaman." He worked his way up to the command of the Imperial Navy. His hair and beard were

bristly and gray by the time he made history at Tsushima. Although he ruled his men and ships with iron discipline, his historic exhortation was, "Let every man do his duty!" He displayed the Nelson touch, scorning the safety of the conning tower, always standing on the exposed bridge, and emerging unharmed when people around him dropped dead. A legend of immunity grew up about him. After his great victory, his old friends in England sent him a bust of Nelson, carved out of wood and copper from the old *Victory* herself, and later he received a lock of Nelson's hair with the request for a lock of his own hair in exchange. He was the one man privileged to carry a stick in the presence of the Emperor. He became a popular figure in the United States, and when he paid triumphant visits the peoples of America and England hailed him as they would a hero of their own.

In the eyes of the outside world, Togo symbolized Japan's rise from Perry to parity. Japan now was recognized as a great power, and although it had dared to oppose a western nation, not a single European or American country raised a finger in protest. On the contrary, there was a distinct display of friendliness toward the erstwhile oriental hermit who proved to be such an apt pupil of the West. Perhaps it was in guilty appreciation of all the concessions that western powers had acquired in China after Japan exposed the impotence of the Flowery Kingdom in 1894—a victory whose major spoils, save for Formosa, went to the West. In any event, as an ally in the Far East, Japan was preferred to the sluggish Slav in the Winter Palace. American statesmen expressed the pro-Japanese sentiment of their people through benevolent neutrality, and some of them went even further in giving tacit recognition to a Japanese Monroe Doctrine in the Far East. Four days after Togo's victory over Rojestvensky, President Theodore Roosevelt wrote to Baron Kaneko: "No wonder you are happy! Neither Trafalgar nor the defeat of the Spanish Armada was as complete—as overwhelming. . . . As Commander Take-shita left my office this morning the Secretary of the Navy, looking after him, said, 'Well, there goes a happy man. Every Japanese, but perhaps above all every Japanese naval man, must feel as if he was treading on air today.'" Japan became the Asiatic protégé of the western world, and at

times its slant-eyed oriental darling. And the picture remained substantially the same until another Roosevelt occupied the White House and new sea battles were being fought.

What was more epoch-making, Japan became the favorite of Asia. It was to a stunned Asia that banner headlines broke the news of Togo's feat at Tsushima. The hypnotic spell of the mental association between the white man and military rule was shattered once and for all. It could be done, thought the Asiatic-in-the-street. It could even be done by him in his own country, he repeated. All eyes were focussed on Japan, for guidance, for inspiration, for leadership. Japan had proved to be a master of modern tools and techniques, and so it assumed the form of a model for westernization in the eyes of Asians. Japan, having overcome one of the arrogant and unassailable adversaries of the West, promised to be a teacher in the art of dealing with alien rulers.

Most Asiatic countries, which up to then had followed their separate paths, began to find common cause with Japan.

1. CHINA FOLLOWS IN TOGO'S WAKE

The Russo-Japanese war produced its greatest effect in China. In the light of recent events, the statement may sound fantastic. Many well-meaning scholars, both Chinese and American, in pursuit of more immediate understanding have sought to conceal this historic truth. And yet, the tragic fact remains that when Japan became the favorite of Asia, it was given its warmest reception by the Chinese. Only two years after Togo's historic victory, in 1907 to be precise, Chiang Kai-shek, the heroic generalissimo who at present is leading his people's epic struggle against the forces of the Mikado, found himself in Japan. There he studied military science for three years, and it was there that he met his master, Sun Yat-sen, the Father of the Chinese Revolution. It was also in Japan that he joined a group of Chinese revolutionaries which conspired, under the patronage of high Japanese officials, to overthrow the Manchu regime at Peking. Strange as it may sound today, one of that early group of revolutionaries stationed in Japan was Wang Ching-wei, at present a Japanese puppet ruler.

In 1911 Dr. Sun Yat-sen, known as the George Washington of China, succeeded in ending the Manchu dynasty, the rule of aliens from the north who for almost three hundred years had held the Middle Kingdom. It was then that the Chinese Republic was born and Dr. Sun became its first president the following year. But a most significant factor in the coup, and one often deliberately ignored, was the part played by the Japanese. The role of the Japanese during the Chinese Revolution was somewhat similar to that of Lafayette and France during the American Revolution. It was in Yokohama that Dr. Sun had sought refuge after the abortive Canton coup of 1895, and there his main protection against the spies and would-be assassins of the Empress Dowager had been high-ranking Japanese friends. His friendship with the Japanese Premier Ki Inukai was deep and enduring, and his friendship with Toyama of the Black Dragon was often valuable. Even during the successful Revolution of 1911, Dr. Sun's military adviser was the Japanese Yamada and he received indirect as well as direct assistance from the Japanese military. Most of the war lords of China, moreover, had been trained in Japan.

Japan, accordingly, was partly instrumental in transforming Marco Polo's Cathay into modern China. This record stands out in bolder relief when viewed against the background of history. In spite of the fact that China had for a long time been exposed to western influences, Japan succeeded in replacing the European powers as China's politico-military teacher. Among the first westerners to contact China were the New England sailors who drove around the Horn in search of Canton tea. In the middle of the nineteenth century came the Opium Wars, as the result of which western naval and military superiority forced its way into reluctant China. On its heels came the gospel of Christ, and capitalism, and modern science. The West also exported to China its own civil wars, between nineteenth-century religion and science, between twentieth-century imperialism and Marxian socialism. The humanism of Confucius and super-humanism of Gautama the Buddha were challenged by the worldliness of science and the other-worldliness of Christianity.

The change did not go as deep in China as might have been expected. After four hundred years of organized Christianity, only about one Chinese in a hundred has been converted. The Catholic missions scored the greatest success, but they failed to make any large impression upon the life of China because their recruits came from the masses. The Protestant missionaries, on the contrary, in contrast to their work in India, were successful in converting many members of the ruling families. But the semi-enlightened ruling families of China were striving to strengthen the state in order to enable people to westernize at will, instead of being forced to it by foreigners. Their eyes were focussed on the little people across the East Ocean.

Japan not only was a late arrival in China but had a further disadvantage in winning over the Flowery Kingdom. After all, it had defeated and humiliated China in 1894 and, as a result, had given aid and comfort to the western powers. The results were rather strange. According to Ku Hung-ming, "exceedingly great fear fell upon the literati of China" who promptly began to imitate Japan in getting westernized. By an ironic twist of history, Japan was instrumental not only in securing greater concessions in China for the western powers, but also it was helpful in raising the prestige of western civilization in the eyes of fellow Asiatics.

Japan's later popularity with China was achieved in the face of even deeper and greater Chinese grievances. It was a full partner of other imperialist powers and demanded its share of Chinese booty at each turn of events. In the wake of Commodore Dewey's Philippine adventure at the turn of the century came what is called the "scramble for concessions." That was followed by Secretary of State John Hay's dispatch which for the first time enunciated the Open Door Policy; The Nine Power Treaty of 1922 was based on this policy. It was a policy which merely sanctified China's practice of serving several masters, Japan among them. A further insult was offered in the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910.

In spite of this black record, Japan had a stronger appeal for China because the record of the western powers was blacker still. It was considered the lesser of the two evils,

if only because its insults did not cut the Chinese to the quick as the white man's did. The westerners injured more deeply the five-faced pride of China—racial, cultural, political, military, and international. Cruellest of all cuts was the unfamiliar western notion of racial superiority, which reached its heights of hallucination in theories about “the yellow peril” and “the rising tide of color.”

There is that famous story of the signpost at the Bund Garden of the International Settlement of Shanghai. Allegedly, it read: “Dogs and Chinese not allowed.” Many have disputed the accuracy of the account and some have suggested that there were two separate signs, one saying, “Dogs not allowed,” while the other, without any reference to the first but placed in its neighbourhood, said “Chinese not allowed.” Whatever the truth of the matter, the sentiment was so typical of the white men in China that millions of Chinese believed the story. Under the form of foreign settlements the western world had forced on China the humiliation of extraterritoriality. And when the white man was immunized from the Chinese justice under the doctrine of separate law courts for Europeans and Americans, (a practice long known in India too), he had simply legalized his rash and unthinking assumption of racial superiority.

Even at the more democratic hands of Americans, the Chinese were subjected to abasement. The contemporary surge of pro-Chinese sentiment in the United States seems to have shortened the memory of publicists, both American and Chinese. It is now believed by some that Americans have always cherished the Chinese in their midst, while they have disliked the Japanese; that Americans always regarded the Chinese as honest and civilized, while they felt the Japanese to be crafty upstarts. Nothing could be further from the truth about America before the “China incident.” It was the Japanese who were regarded as gentlemen and who were given “gentlemen's agreements.” Hollywood's criminal of the East was Chinese and not Japanese in those days. The Russian proverb that there are only two kinds of Chinese—those who give bribes and those who take them—had become an accepted part of American folk-knowledge.

Here is some of the official and documentary evidence. "Treason is better than to labor beside a Chinese slave," declared the Manifesto of the Workingmen's Party of California on October 16, 1876. The Republican Party's national platform of the same year echoed that feeling. In 1884, the Democratic national platform showed that the Democratic Party could not lag far behind in the race to insult the Asians. The most revealing expression of national feeling was contained in the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in *Li Sing vs. U. S.* in 1900. "The testimony," it said, "of Chinese persons is attended with great embarrassment arising from the loose notions entertained by witnesses of the obligation of an oath."

It was the holier-than-thou attitude that the Chinese, along with other Asians, faced both at home and abroad. In India's case it was Kipling's "East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet."

In China's case it was Bret Harte's

. . . I wish to remark,
And my language is plain,
That for ways that are dark
And for tricks that are vain,
The beathen Chinees is peculiar . . .

Apologists have maintained, with varying degrees of justification, that both Kipling's "Ballad of East and West" and Bret Harte's "Plain Language," from which the above is quoted, have been greatly misunderstood. But they miss the point. The important thing is that it is these very lines that have gained currency and not the nobler sentiments expressed by others; these are the thoughts which had general approval and acceptance.

Small wonder, then, that the racial attitudes of white men inspired a defensive racial consciousness among non-white nations. Even in the case of China, which had varied and valid grievances against Japan, there developed a consciousness of a common cause with Japan.

Who has a better right to speak on this subject than the founder of the early Chinese Republic, Dr. Sun Yat-sen? "Our Eastern Hemisphere," wrote Dr. Sun, "possesses

an island kingdom [empire] which might be named the England of the Orient. That nation is Japan. Japan, too, developed from one race called the Yamato race. . . . At the end of fifty years of reforms they have grown to be the strongest nation of Asia at the present day [1924], on a par with the nations of Europe and of America. Europeans and Americans," added Dr. Sun, "dare not despise them." And then he expressed his desire to remake China in the Japanese image by declaring, "Japan is a good example for us to follow if we desire the greatness of China."

With a reflective pause, Dr. Sun cast a glance on the past: "Let us compare the Asiatics with the Europeans. Formerly the belief prevailed that only the white people possessed intelligence and ability. They monopolized everything. We, Asiatics, thought that there was no way of acquiring their assets for bringing our nations into wealth and power. Therefore with regard to that question, not only we, Chinese, but all the Asiatic nations had lost heart. In late years Japan has suddenly risen and has become a first-class power in the world for wealth and strength. Since Japan was able to become wealthy and powerful, infinite hopes have sprung forth in the various peoples of Asia. We realize that formerly the prestige of Japan was not greater than that of Annam [French Indo-China, under Japanese rule at present; with an Indian as Mayor of Penang] and Burma today; now Annam and Burma cannot be compared with Japan. . . . At the Conference held at Versailles by the Powers for the peace of the world, Japan sat as one of the five Great Powers [the Big Five]. In matters pertaining to Asia all the Powers consulted Japan, who was considered as the leader."

After surveying the historic role of Japan, Dr. Sun drew out the moral, not only for his country, China, but for the whole of Asia, in the following words in *The Tripis Demism*: "All this proves that what the White race can do, Japan can do too. . . . Because Asia possesses today a strong Japan, the White race dares no longer despise the Japanese nor any other Asiatics. Since Japan rose to power, not only does the Yamato race rank among the first, but all the other Asiatics have attained a higher international status. Formerly the belief prevailed that we could not do

what the Europeans did, but now that the Japanese have learned from Europe, we know that we, too, are able to learn from Japan. After we have learned from and become like Japan"—Dr. Sun forecast with vision of the China that was to be under Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang Kai-shek—"It will be evident that in later years we may learn again and become like Europe."

It would be a mistake of the first magnitude, however, to picture Sun Yat-sen as an adulator of Japan. He was simply paying tribute to Japan's contributions toward restoring racial and continental pride. He was also drawing lessons from the example of Japan and assuring his and Asia's downcast people that there was reason to take heart. For his vision did not end with giving the Chinese struggle a Japanese orientation; he went further and worked for an All-Asia orientation of the various national movements. In fairness one should here point out that this is also a peculiar Japanese device for making Asiatic countries conscious of each other. Wrote Dr. Sun: "In Asia all the weaker and smaller races, Japan excepted, are oppressed by the mighty, and endure manifold sufferings. As they suffer from the same evil [and here he introduced the idea of a common cause and a common menace], they naturally console one another, but a day will surely come when they will unite in order to resist oppressive nations."

Next to Japan and Turkey, India was uppermost in Dr. Sun's mind when it came to relating the Chinese movement to the common Asiatic front. He wrote, "And yet, if India, which is already a subject country, could practice non-cooperation under Gandhi, how much more could our China do so since for the time being she is not yet a subject country."

The Pan-Asia feeling was merely brought into the open by Japan; there already was a sound psychological base for it throughout the whole of Asia. "Asia for the Asiatics" was a convenient answer to the western slogan of "the white man's burden." Nor was pro-Japanese feeling confined to Sun Yat-sen and his period. A Pan-Asia Conference was held at Nagasaki in Japan which was attended by the representatives of most Asiatic countries, including China. Vincent Sheean notes in his article in the New York

Herald-Tribune for November 30, 1941, that even "in the early years after 1927 he [Chiang Kai-shek] was by no means an enemy of the Japanese," and one should remember in this connection that Korea and Manchuria were already annexed by Japan at this time. The Kuomintang, according to Vincent Sheean as well as according to general report, had powerful pro-Japanese elements from 1928 to 1936, up to the very eve of the Sino-Japanese war. Sheean even found "pro-Japanese sentiment in high government places" during his visit to China in 1941. It was only in 1938-1939 that the united front of all the Chinese parties was organized, some time after the outbreak of the war.

This historical analysis should not reflect in any way on Chinese devotion to democracy or China's zeal to wipe out the last vestige of Japanese oppression. My desire has simply been to show that underneath this global war are being fought several wars that are sometimes mutually contradictory; that there are various cross-currents of loyalty and ambition in the minds of us all who have at present arrayed ourselves in the vast, uneasy, two-sided struggle; that we should understand these underlying forces to be able to deal with them and prevent discord when the need arises.

2. THE AWAKENING OF THE INDIES

Apart from Japan, China, and India in the Far East, which have already made their mark on the mind of western mankind, what about the area known as southeast Asia? Its peoples so far have been much less articulate, but what role are they likely to play in a new world order wherein the East might be pitted against the West or be working with it in a global union? What about its westernization, its favorable or unfriendly attitudes to the slow and enforced process of westernization? When did a positive nationalism take roots there, and what are its distinctive earmarks from the point of view of East versus the West?

To begin with, it is an entirely tropical region. It is blessed with a productive distribution of rainfall and it has rich and varied vegetation. The most important thing about it is its geographical location—it furnishes a two-way passage. It faces the Pacific Ocean on the one side and yet,

on the other side, it is able to keep track of the Indian Ocean. It is the hopping off point between the Australian and Asiatic continents, but its peoples are more influenced by Asiatic trends than by Australian forces. The Australians have failed to cross over this southeastern Asiatic bridge of land and islands, mainly because of the exclusive White Australia policy and secondly because it is the desert-like, unpopulated expanse of their continent which is close at hand rather than the few large cities and populated areas which make up the Australia that counts.

Torn during its geological past periods into a bewildering complex of islands and peninsulas, and spread out into arms of the seas and island coasts, the land becomes increasingly fragmentary as one goes south and west. In the middle of the area is the Malay Peninsula, which in turn points toward the Malay archipelago. In the west are the large islands of Sumatra, Borneo, and Java, of which Borneo alone is larger than Germany and Great Britain combined.

One of the important political units in this area is Netherlands India or Dutch East Indies. Next to India, it is the most valuable colony in the world, wealthy enough in raw materials to be the envy of any nation. It provided, until the Japanese occupation, a third of the world's rubber supply; it also furnished one-fifth of the world's tin output and one-nineteenth of its petroleum. It held the world monopoly over quinine and in kapok also it was virtually the earth's sole producer. It is rich also in sugar, palm oil, tobacco, copra, tea, and spices.

The westernization of the East Indies is unique inasmuch as the teachers were not Anglo-Saxon. The Dutch have little of the color and race consciousness of the Anglo-Saxons. Except for certain little imitations of the British, on whose tolerance they existed as a world power, they followed their own genius and struck a new note in colonization. As a result, there have been more inter-racial marriages in the East Indies than in any other comparable area in Asia, and there has grown up a powerful bloc of Eurasians who are accepted as equal to Europeans under the liberal regime of the Dutch. They are the leaders in the nationalistic movement there.

The Dutch have been different from the Anglo-Saxons also in making a special and superior kind of paternalism the keynote of their colonial policy. It was not until the opening years of the twentieth century that, with their system of "gentle compulsion," they tried to introduce western civilization. Some western scholars maintain that Dutch paternalism has worked in the East Indies. They point to the relative lack of political turmoil there and attribute it to the fact that the natives were made of the most "bovine material" and that the Dutch hit upon the happy notion that the ideal subject people should be "contented cows." This is a curiously arrogant western piece of reasoning. The Dutch have not succeeded at all, as it became evident during the Japanese onslaught on the Indies. The truth is that the "subject people" were unable to marshal a struggle as organized as that of India or China or that of the Middle East. They have, furthermore, few spokesmen in America and Dutch propagandists are seldom challenged on their one-sided story.

Nor should it be assumed that the Dutch are the altruists among an otherwise unscrupulous group of colonizers. The Indies have become almost the bread and butter of Holland. It has been calculated that from one-in-five to one-in-ten Hollanders has a direct or indirect economic interest in the Indies. The Indies bring to Dutchmen living in Holland, two hundred million florins in direct gains and one hundred and twenty millions in indirect profits annually.

Although the struggle for national life in the Dutch East Indies had not reached the proportions of the movements in India or China, it had become a formidable factor even before the fall of Singapore. There were dozens of uprisings which called for stern oppressive measures. The victory of Togo had its deep influence on the psychology of the Indonesians as well. Representatives from Java attended the first Pan-Asiatic Congress at Nagasaki in 1926 where a constitution of a League of Asiatic Peoples was adopted. Japan was ready to make use of the growing Pan-Asia consciousness. It officially sponsored "The Light of Asia," a film made in India depicting the life of Lord Buddha and sent it around various countries of the Far East. This film had tremendous success in the Dutch East Indies. The

dense population of Java was particularly ripe for upheaval. The period from December, 1926, to February, 1927, seethed with revolts and counteractions. There was also a comic-opera mutiny aboard the runaway armed cruiser *De Zeven Provinciën*. The revolt against the Dutch, which had as its background the revolt against enforced westernization, was first led by the Boedi Oetomo (Glorious Endeavor) movement. Then came Sarikat Islam, and since there are around fifty to sixty-six million sons of the Prophet in that part of the area, Pan-Islamism was added to Pan-Asianism.

The national movement among the peoples of British Malaya has been weaker than that among the people of the Dutch East Indies. Its weakness springs from the region's peculiar ethnic heritage. The consciousness of kind, a basis of nationalism, is still in its formative stage. The native Malays, moreover, have been driven to the hinterland as the more aggressive Chinese emigrés have taken over larger cities and economically valuable areas.

In sharp contrast is the case of French Indo-China. The Annamese, who are eighty per cent of the population, are politically alert and they have often echoed the trends of neighboring India. In 1930, for example, they staged a military rebellion which synchronized with Gandhi's Salt March. They demanded complete independence of Indo-China from France.

Siam is radically unlike any other country in this area. For one thing, it is the only country in the Far East, excluding Japan, which has been able to withstand the onslaught of western powers and maintain its political independence. The royal dynasty, which bears numerous Sanskrit names, ruled the country almost autocratically until December 10, 1932, when a bloodless palace revolution in Bangkok ushered in a new and more democratic constitution. Since then, Siam has become Thailand and has pursued its own path—that of following closely the foreign policy of Japan. The Japanese helped build up Siam's military might and turned the country into a pivotal area for Japan's eventual war against the West.

Underlying the various nationalistic struggles in these smaller countries of the Far East is the interesting question

of the leadership in that area. There was a time when Japan was regarded as the unquestioned guide. But then came the rise of the Chinese as they successfully resisted Japanese invaders. This led western thinkers like Vincent Sheean to such overenthusiasm that they proclaimed China as the sole leader of the reorganized Asia. Although China has played and is bound to play a great role in the resurgence of the Far East, to regard it as the lone leader is to disregard many important factors as well as to initiate an unnecessary controversy. The influence of the Bengal revolutionist, for one thing, cannot be doubted in Burma. Burma has generally looked westward and not China-ward. Whatever little political consciousness there was in British Malaya was engendered by Indian and Burmese workers who were evangelists of Indian nationalism. So also in Indo-China. In fact the verdict was: "Indian nationalism is a gigantic upsurge that will carry a half dozen other native populations with it." The Indonesians of the Dutch East Indies have followed the Congress movement in India even more closely. They have changed their political platform from that of Dominion status to that of complete independence, in accordance with changing attitudes in India. They have adopted Gandhi's non-cooperation tactics and have advocated the Indian slogan of *Swadeshi* (local goods). The peoples of Indo-China, Thailand, Malaya, and Indonesia are racially closer to the Chinese than to the Indians. And yet in various stages of their history, Hindu thought and the Hindu view of life have completely supplanted the Chinese. In Siam, to take but one example, Hindu culture reigned supreme and the Siamese language became a partial version of Sanskrit. In the wake of Hindu religion and culture and arts and architecture came Islam to the Far East, also by way of India. Until twenty years ago all the Far East, including China, looked to India. But, with the rise of the Kuomintang, a partnership gradually formed between India and China, so far as the aspirations of the smaller eastern nations were concerned. The Chinese waged their heroic fight, first against western imperialism, then against the Japanese imperialism. But their new popularity was constantly offset by antagonism created by wealthy Chinese emigrés throughout southeast Asia. In view of the present closer outright

collaboration between India and China, it seems likely that southeast Asia will look to Indian-Chinese leadership for some time to come. There is an even more potent reason for this. East Asia solidarity should be regarded as only a first step toward Asiatic solidarity. And the Far East has relatively been far from the mind of the Near East. India must play a strategic role of coordinating the great far-eastern Buddhist arm of Asia with the great near-eastern Mohammedan arm of Asia. As the mother of Buddhism and as the nation which has the largest Moslem group of any country, she is well fitted to do it. History has ordained that India and China should work together in the making of history.

3. INDIA'S ASIATIC MENTOR

The emergence of Indian nationalism was a direct reply to political and economic exploitation by the British. The element of racial and cultural affirmation contained in the movement was a defense reflex aimed at the arrogant White Sahib and his philosophy and behavior. The struggle up to this point was strictly private, Indians pitted against their English rulers. The injustices suffered by Indian nationals, along with the Chinese and Japanese and Near Eastern nationals, in the United States and in Canada and in Australia and South Africa, gave the first impetus to enlarging the circle. It began to dawn on the Indian mind that they were not alone, either as sufferers or as resisters. There was a common menace, they felt, and perhaps a common objective to be developed.

India's was a nationalist struggle, directed against the alien authority but unconnected with freedom movements in other lands of the orient. But with the new consciousness of kind, it began to be clear that although the various peoples of Asia faced a diversity of foes, all these aggressors could be grouped in one convenient and large category known as the western powers. It was at this point that the notion of East versus West came into being, and it was at this moment that the turning point in East-West relationship took place—Togo's victory. In the early months of World War II—in fact as early as December, 1939—I took every opportunity to impress upon the American mind, through press and

radio and platform, the vital significance of this past event which began to cast its lengthening shadow after Pearl Harbor. I urged that the situation in the Near East, in the Middle East, and India, and even in China, be interpreted in the invisible light of the deep impact made by this happening on the mind of Asia. I gave some idea of Japanese propaganda, of the inter-continental twist—based on color—it was bound to take when they felt ready. I raised my feeble voice in warning that even Japanese military strategy would be founded on this broad base of ill will between East and West, in pleading that the Japanese be anticipated in their diabolical plan and that the wind be stolen from them by official actions which demonstrated a changed mentality of the West and called for equality for the Asiatic peoples. But mine was a cry in the wilderness. Few paid any attention. But what a mistake it was not to realize the seriousness of it all! I think the carelessness, especially among those who had some vision of the Japanese plan, was born of a belief that the Nipponese had small chance of success even if they tried the technique. But they failed to realize that the East-West history of three centuries was working in behalf of the Japanese. Mars bestowed a boon on the Japanese in 1905; Togo's victory did two things: it created an All-Asia consciousness and it gave courage to the Asians.

Oriental eyes were opened to their own potentialities. With the connection between world supremacy and the white race broken for the first time, pioneer nationalists in India went forward with much-needed self-confidence.

Even Mahatma Gandhi, much later, to be sure, gave a back-handed compliment to Japan when he said, "You know what has happened in Japan—a country which I do not regard as essentially great—but which is regarded as great in Asia in that it has successfully challenged the supremacy of the Western nations."

Most Asiatics were dreaming of the day when a people who had seemed so arrogant would be humbled. They vicariously and even morbidly enjoyed the thought that insults to the West were administered in Japan by fellow Asiatics. The most reassuring factor to India's political realists, however, was the conception of an Asiatic island empire pitted against a European island empire. To them,

Japan above all was the natural enemy of Great Britain, for they knew even in those days that the aspirations of the former and the vested interests of the latter ran counter to each other. Sooner or later there was bound to be a clash between the two island empires, and India, they felt, would benefit in the upheaval.

Japan seized the opportunity offered by the changed Indian outlook. India's struggle against Great Britain was regarded as part of the wider struggle of Asia against the West. In this struggle, all Asiatic countries were to cooperate under the guidance of Nippon. This activity on the political front has lately been supplemented by a Buddhistic revival in all the countries of the Far East and especially in India. In recent years literature has poured into India, pointing out that Buddhism is but a restatement of Hinduism, that both great religions had Brahminic traditions and mythology in common. Emphasis was put on the fact that the cultural affinity among Buddhist nations had grown with time and that the day had come when it should be put to some practical use.

Japan's Pan-Buddhism drive has had a special appeal for the militant India-for-the-Hindus group in India. They appear to have found in Japan an answer to their rivals, the communalist Mohammedans. The extra-territorial allegiance of sundry Muslim leaders has always perturbed those Hindus who desire to maintain the territorial integrity of India when the British have withdrawn. The pact among the Muslim powers of the Near East and Afghanistan (the Sa'adabad Pact of 1939 between Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and Iraq) caused considerable anxiety to these leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha (a communal organization of the Hindus, comparable in outlook to the Muslim League and different from the All-India Congress which is national in outlook). The activities of the Fakir of Ipi on the Northwest Frontier of India and the consequent unrest in the tribes of Waziristan had alarmed even those Hindu leaders who otherwise were above such considerations.

While the Mohammedans were looking across Hindu Kush toward Afghanistan and Arabia, these Hindu leaders were apparently directing their attention across the Indo-Chinese border to Japan. The militant wing of the Hindu Mahasabha wanted to create a Pan-Buddhist bloc as a bul-

wark against Pan-Islamism. They dreamed of a Pan-Buddhist bloc, composed of Japan, India, China, Siam, Cambodia, Java, Burma, Tibet, and Ceylon, dominating Asia by overwhelming the Islamic bloc of Afghanistan, Persia, Egypt, Arabia, Iraq, and Turkey. A similar drive had been reported to be gaining impetus in Siam, the pivot of the eastern Asiatic balance of power. Militant Hindu leaders appeared to be ready to pay the price for this dream by granting Asiatic hegemony to Japan.

To Japan, on the other hand, Pan-Buddhism propaganda was nothing more than a tactical move. The whole Asiatic policy of Japan has been motivated only by her desire to disturb the established balance of power in the East and to take advantage of the Asia-for-the-Asiatics feeling for its own expansionist aims. Japan was even backing the Pan-Islamic movement, a paradox inexplicable except in the light of Japan's opportunism. The Japanese in conjunction with the Italians had been maintaining propaganda agencies in Iran and Arabia. They went so far as to open offices in Shanghai to alienate Chinese Muslims from the nationalist front.

Then Thailand began to imitate Japan in establishing cultural relations with India. A Siamese Goodwill Mission went to India to tour the country. At Bombay it was greeted by Dr. M. R. Jayakar, a judge of the Federal Court, who in his welcoming address included Thailand in that region of eastern Asia dominated by Indian cultural and religious influence.

But to get back to the Rising Sun's influence over India, it must be made clear that Japan's cultural onslaught was wedded to an intensive offensive on the economic front. By 1930, Japan was supplying sixteen per cent of India's total imports. India had become a tempting market for Japan. In spite of the fact that Britain had a sort of monopoly on the import trade of India, the Japanese began to sell their goods not only attractively, but also at an incredible cheapness. They cut prices to such an extent that they could undersell Indian manufacturers of boots and shoes, buttons, tiles, toys, hosiery, umbrellas, and toilet articles.

The Japanese influence in India came into its own just before the Sino-Japanese war started in 1937. For one

thing, the number of Indian students going to Japan had been increasing yearly and by 1936 Japan claimed that the number of Indian students in her universities was second only to that of Great Britain—and the importance of foreign-educated students in Asia's new life should never be minimized. More and more Japanese poets, philosophers, and artists came to India. When Yone Noguchi came to India, he was received by all the important leaders, including Gandhi and Tagore, and fêted all over the country. At the same time, Hindu celebrities and writers visited Japan.

Financiers of India were also watching Japan closely and some of them made important deals. The late Mr. Saklatwala, the Parsi tycoon, shifted his millions from India and invested them in Japan. Then there was the subtle movement to bring Buddhistic learning back to India from Japan. More Buddhist temples and monasteries were opened in India in the last decade than in the preceding century.

Japan so deluded some Indian leaders that they could not understand the Chinese policy of preferring western powers in rebuilding the country. Even in the summer of 1937, when the Sino-Japanese war began, some Hindu leaders in India and most of the Indian revolutionary patriots living in Japan were critical of China's failure to understand "the true motives" of Japan.

For instance, let us look at the activity of Raja Mahendra Pratap, a great Indian revolutionary patriot in the past who is now an exile in Japan. He has roamed across every land in the world as a revolutionary and a fugitive. Young nationalists were thrilled by the legends of his international adventures. Pratap is the sort of dreamer and adventurer who would have been a minor empire-builder had he been born in England at the time of Clive. But now there is a price on his head and he has to pass his time dreaming about an ideal World Federation which will organize the globe into cultural zones. According to his plan, the entire area from Japan to Tibet would fall within what he calls the Golden Land, while India would with the Near East make up the Aryan Land. And this is what he had to say about the Chinese struggle as late as February, 1940 :

"Mr. Wang Ching-wei is a great leader. We have faith in him. And if he has also got the support of the Japanese

government, well, there is not much left to make his central government completely successful. But if I were Mr. Wang Ching-wei, I would ask Prince Konove to come out to Tsingtao to lead the administration of the entire Golden Land. . . . So long as the Golden Army is not organized to defend the Golden frontiers, Japanese troops may be stationed at Tientsin, Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Hainan Island. We should establish the Golden Federation in our entire Golden Land—from Japan to Tibet and from Mongolia to Kwangtung."

Let us take another example to reveal Japanese influence upon Indian opinion, this time from an Indian writer living in India. As late as October, 1940, this is what Mr. J. M. Ganguli had to say in *The Indian Social Reformer*: "As regards this Monroe Doctrine, which America justifies on all grounds, including territorial safety, if Japan enunciates a similar doctrine for the East, America shakes a threatening mailed fist at her. The *status quo* in the East must not be disturbed—America says to Japan with undisguised threat of armed opposition in her voice; which means, in effect, that far-off France can own extensive territories in Indo-China, England can possess Hong Kong and an empire in Australia and New Zealand, Holland can keep the East Indies, America can fly her flag over the Philippines, not to mention almost every European Power retaining 'concessions' in China, but a non-white country must not protest, or aspire to dominate even in its own neighbourhood, or think of extending its political influence and territorial limits." In fairness to Mr. Ganguli, however, it must be pointed out that his outburst was more a protest against the inconsistencies of white imperialism than it was an espousal of Japan's leadership. And in fairness to the excellent paper from which this quotation is taken, it must be stated that its editor, Mr. Natarajan, is opposed even to "continentalism."

4. AFFRONTS FROM AMERICA

Personal affronts caused by British arrogance in racial and religious matters were bound to have profound effects upon Indian leaders as well as Indian people. They rejected anything that was English, and since everything western

was Angrezi or English to the masses, they rejected anything that was western. America was one great exception in the western family of nations ; many Americans in India behaved more considerately. But the unhappy experiences of their countrymen who went to the United States deepened their distrust of all westerners. Racial overtones were added to an already aggravated East-West problem.

There can be no doubt that the immigration policies of the United States, along with those of Canada and Australia, have contributed seriously to the ill feeling that now exists between Asiatics and westerners. The story of Indian emigration to the United States is a minor one in so far as numbers are concerned, but its racial and national implications have been far-reaching. It was not until 1899 that America took up the racial classification of immigrants, about ten years before the Boxer Rebellion in China brought a number of Sikh soldiers into contact with American soldiers. The Sikhs were told grand and glorious tales about America's riches. In 1910, Indian emigration to the United States reached its high point with the coming of the comparatively small number of 1,782 souls. Steamship companies had showered the Punjab with literature that told of gold to be found in San Francisco gutters ; their efforts launched what is sometimes called in California " the tide of turbans." Actually, it was a tiny stream, never a tide. The number of Hindus in the United States never exceeded the twenty-thousand mark and today there are fewer than four thousand Indians in America. When they arrived in large numbers before 1917, they generally came down from Canada, and drifted southward to the rich valleys of California. Most of them were Sikhs, popularly known in California as Rag Heads, who had behind them valuable experience in the culture of sugar cane, corn, cotton, and melons. They were like birds of passage, who drifted from place to place as the seasons changed, from San Joaquin Valley to Sacramento and the Imperial Valley. They were recognized as industrious workers and skillful farmers. They distinguished themselves even at the arduous task of asparagus cutting, and their fine hands were seen at work over melon and cotton crops in the Imperial Valley. Fresno was full of praise for their handling of fig orchards and vineyards. They

were indispensable in the rice land around Sacramento. They were thrifty and enterprising, and many of them soon passed into the landowning class. Fifty thousand acres of rice land in California were operated by the expatriated Sikhs by 1918. Since they were never a menace to the people who had come to California before them, they were popular with the local residents. But there were other orientals whom Californians wished to exclude. The Chinese Exclusion Act was introduced in 1882; the Japanese were next on the list, and when the Alien Land Act was passed, Indians were included, for discretion's sake, along with the Japanese. Finally, there was the Immigration Act of 1917 with its "geographical delimitation" clause. Since then the tiny stream of turbans has been stopped once and for all. The quota system established in 1924 did not ease the matter as it was based on the principle of eligibility to citizenship, and only two years before Indians had been deprived of their right to American citizenship.

The Hindu's fight for citizenship rights in the United States is a story of irrational discrimination and prejudice. According to Section 2169 of the United States Revised Statutes, "aliens being free white persons and aliens of African nativity and African descent" are eligible to citizenship by naturalization. The people of India, especially high-caste Hindus, are of the Caucasian race according to all available ethnological data and until 1923 their right to citizenship was not questioned. But by a process of legislating through the courts' interpretation of a law, Hindus were deprived of their right in 1923. It was done in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of *U. S. vs. Bhagat Singh Thind* (261 U. S. 204). Many felt that the decision was influenced by the current international political situation. It was ironic to Indians that Justice Sutherland, a Canadian-born naturalized American citizen, rendered the decision; without reference to anthropology, ethnology, or history, he said, in effect, that "free white persons" did not apply to Indians because they do not look white to the man in the street. It is because of such treatment at the hands of Americans, British, Canadians, Afrikanders, and Australians that Indians as well as other Asians fail to become very alarmed and shocked by the race ideas of the Nazis.

A REVOLUTION BACKFIRES

1. MISTAKES AT MARCO POLO BRIDGE
2. TAGORE VS. NOGUCHI
3. THE TWO COLOSSUSES OF ASIA
4. NEW ALIGNMENTS IN THE NEAR EAST
5. PROBLEMS OF PAKISTAN

A REVOLUTION BACKFIRES

THE projected revolt of Asia backfired when Japan attacked China in the summer of 1937. Japan had committed acts of aggression against China in the past, but they were small-scale actions and in remote regions and they did not arouse much serious criticism in Asia. The first shot fired at the Marco Polo Bridge, however, echoed in most Asiatic countries. With one characteristically reckless stroke, Japan destroyed the structure it had built with the help of history and with the misguided support of shortsighted westerners. The dreamed-of revolution against the West became instead a civil war. What had begun as the rise of a united Asia against the tyranny and exploitation of western powers developed into a mortal struggle among Asiatic countries themselves.

1. MISTAKES AT MARCO POLO BRIDGE

For most Indians the stark facts of the Sino-Japanese war changed the entire picture; they brought home to the Indian people the realization of how one eastern neighbor can treat another when imperialistic ambition gets its hold on a people. Even the Indian leaders who formerly put their credence in Nippon's slogan of Asia-for-the-Asiatics have come to realize that so far as Japan was concerned it merely meant Asia-for-the-Japanese. Pan-Buddhism also suffered a sudden death when one Buddhist nation attacked another, and the heroic resistance of Chinese Mohammedans to Nippon's armies under the leadership of General Pai Chung-hsi, Moslem leader, disproved the Japanese claim that they had emancipated the Mohammedan population of China and had their consequent grateful support. These events,

together with the unwritten code of mutual aid among suffering peoples, ushered in another phase of nationalist India's Far Eastern policy—that of friendship with China. In fact, it was China's presence on the democratic side of the battle that prevented an actual clash between East and West.

It was easy for India to make the change. All through history India and China have been devoted to each other. India admired Japan at a time when there was no deep conflict between China and Japan and because China admired Japan in those days. The cultural relationship between India and China has been a long, intimate, and involved one; it began with the eastward spread of Buddhism from the country of its origin. Sponsored by Emperor Asoka in the third century B.C., Buddhist monks went to China, Siam, Cambodia, Sumatra, and Java to spread the gospel of Gautama the Buddha. The Far East returned the compliment, as it were, in the form of the Chinese travelers who visited the royal courts and religious shrines of India.

These travelers, at various intervals in the first nine centuries of the Christian era, came to India by six more or less regular routes—old trails which have become suddenly highly important in connection with the Burma Road, the newer India Road, and other military roads for which Chinese, Indian, and American engineers began to prepare the blueprints in 1942. The old routes were: the Tash-kourghan Route; the Karakoram Route; the T'ien-shan Route; the Tibet-Nepal Route; the Yunnan-Burma Route, which approximated the route of the Burma Road; and the Sea Route. These were the perilous roads and trails used by Fa Hsien and Sung Yun, Hsuan Tsang and I Chang. As a result of the visits of such travelers, according to Chinese scholars of the day, Chinese music during Sui and T'ang periods, the pagoda architecture, painting in the Wang Wei and Wu periods, sculpture of the Loyang and Tat'ung caves, drama during Wei and Tsin dynasties, literature of Sui and T'ang periods, astronomy and the calendar as used by Buddhist teachers, were all greatly influenced by India. Buddhist scholars even made a vain effort at the phoneticization of the Chinese language by introducing thirty-six characters. India also owed a great deal to China.

The first relations between India and China must be older than the Christian era ; they must go back to the time when history was not being recorded. For instance, such elements of everyday life in the orient as the domestic fowl, the water buffalo, and rice might have come to China from India hundreds of years before the first Chinese empire, while India must have imported from China silk, cotton fabrication, and the bamboo.

During recent times, the Chinese republican movement under Sun Yat-sen and the Indian national movement under Gandhi have kept a close watch on each other and have derived solace and inspiration from each other. When Japan went berserk in China with a reign of terror and atrocities, anti-Japanese feeling began to mount rapidly in India and was soon crystallized in action. This came to such a point that the Japanese poet Noguchi, who had enjoyed a triumphant tour of India not long before, entered into a lengthy and vigorous correspondence with Indian leaders, especially with the Indian poet Tagore. Harindra Chattopadhyaya, a poet of the younger generation, responded to Noguchi's overtures with these lines :

*The day of song has passed you by ;
Your color an Imperialist red,
Your poet's truth becomes a lie
You grow an enemy of men.*

2. TAGORE VS. NOGUCHI

The remarkable Tagore-Noguchi correspondence lays bare the tormented soul of Asia. I believe that this correspondence will go down in the history of Asia as classic, especially Tagore's part in it. In it, while facing the cross-roads, Asia was trying to look into the future, as it were. Because these letters seem to me to be so important, so well and interestingly developed, and also because they are virtually unknown in the western world and even in China, I am presenting the full original text.

It was in July, 1938, that Noguchi wrote his first letter to Tagore, who was then living at his forest-school near Calcutta. Naguchi's mastery of the English language is open to question, but I think it wise to retain his original style,

even at the risk of including statements not altogether intelligible. Noguchi began "Dear Rabindranath" and went on to say :

"When I visited you at Shantiniketan a few years ago, you were troubled with the Ethiopian question, and vehemently condemned Italy. Retiring into your guest chamber that night, I wondered whether you would say the same thing on Japan, if she were equally situated like Italy. I perfectly agreed with your opinion and admired your courage of speaking, when in Tokyo, 1916, you censured the westernization of Japan from a public platform. Not answering back to your words, the intellectual people of my country were conscious of its possible consequence, for, not only staying as an unpleasant spectacle, the westernization had every chance for becoming anything awful.

"But if you take the present war in China for the criminal outcome of Japan's surrender to the West, you are wrong, because, not being a slaughtering madness, it is, I believe, the inevitable means, terrible it is though, for establishing a new great world in the Asiatic continent, where the 'principle of live-and-let-live' has to be realized. Believe me, it is the war of 'Asia for Asia.' With a crusader's determination and with a sense of sacrifice that belongs to a martyr, our young soldiers go to the front. Their minds are light and happy, the war is not for conquest, but the correction of mistaken idea of China, I mean Kuomintang government, and for uplifting her simple and ignorant masses to better life and wisdom. Borrowing from other countries neither money nor blood, Japan is undertaking this tremendous work single-handed and alone. I do not know why we cannot be praised by your countrymen. But we are terribly blamed by them, as it seems, for our heroism and aim.

"Sometime ago the Chinese army defeated in Huntung province by Hwangho River, had cut from desperate madness several places of the river bank; not keeping in check the advancing Japanese army, it only made thirty hundred thousand people drown in the flood and one hundred thousand village houses destroyed. Defending the welfare of its own kinsmen or killing them,—which is the object of the Chinese army, I wonder? It is strange that such an atrocious inhuman conduct ever known in the world history

did not become in the west a target of condemnation. Oh where are your humanitarians who profess to be a guardian of humanity? Are they deaf and blind? Besides the Chinese soldiers, miserably paid and poorly clothed, are a habitual criminal of robbery, and then an everlasting menace to the honest hardworking people who cling to the ground. Therefore the Japanese soldiers are followed by them with the paper flags of the Rising Sun in their hands; to a soldierly work we have to add one more endeavour in the relief work of them. You can imagine how expensive is this war for Japan. Putting expenditure out of the question, we are determined to use up our last cent for the final victory that would ensure in the future a great peace of many hundred years.

"I received the other day a letter from my western friend, denouncing the world that went to Hell. I replied him, saying: 'Oh my friend, you should cover your ears, when a war bugle rings too wild. Shut your eyes against a picture of your martial cousins becoming a fish salad! Be patient, my friend, for a war is only spasmodic matter that cannot last long, but will adjust one's condition better in the end. You are a coward if you are afraid of it. Nothing worthy will be done unless you pass through a severe trial. And the peace that follows after a war is most important.' For this peace we Japanese are ready to exhaust our resources of money and blood.

"Today we are called under the flag of 'Service-making,' each person of the country doing his own bit for the realization of idealism. There was no time as today in the whole history of Japan, when all the people, from the Emperor to a rag-picker in the street, consolidated together with one mind. And there is no more foolish supposition as that our financial bankruptcy is a thing settled if the war drags on. Since the best part of the Chinese continent is already with us in friendly terms, we are not fighting with the whole of China. Our enemy is only the Kuomintang government, a miserable puppet of the west. If Chiang Kai-shek wishes a long war, we are quite ready for it. Five years? Ten years? Twenty years? As long as he desires, my friend. Now one year has passed since the first bullet was exchanged between China and Japan; but with a fresh

mind as if it sees that the war has just begun, we are now looking the event in the face. After the fall of Hankow, the Kuomintang government will retire to a remote place of her country; but until the western countries change their attitude towards China, we will keep up fighting with fists or wisdom.

"The Japanese poverty is widely advertised in the west, though I do not know how it was started. Japan is poor beyond doubt,—well, according to the measure you wish to apply to. But I think that the Japanese poverty is a fabricated story as much as richness of China. There is no country in the world like Japan, where money is equally divided among the people. Supposing that we are poor, I will say that we are trained to stand the pain of poverty. Japan is very strong in adversity.

"But you will be surprised to know that the postal saving of people comes up now to five thousand million *yen*, responding to the government's propaganda of economy. For going on, surmounting every difficulty that the war brings in, we are saving every cent and even making good use of waste scraps. Since the war began, we grew spiritually strong and true ten times more than before. There is nothing hard to accomplish to a young man. Yes, Japan is the land of young men. According to nature's law, the old has to retire while the young advances. Behold, the sun is arising, be gone all the sickly bats and dirty vermins! Cursed be one's intrigue and empty pride that sin against nature's rule and justice.

"China could very well avoid the war, of course, if Chiang Kai-shek was more sensible with insight. Listening to an irresponsible third party of the west a long way off, thinking too highly of his own strength, he turned at last his own country, as she is today, into a ruined desert to which fifty years would not be enough for recovery. He never happened to think for a moment that the friendship of western countries was but a trick of their monetary interest itself in his country. And it is too late now for Chiang to reproach them for the faithlessness of their words of promise.

"For a long time we had been watching with doubt at Chiang's program, the consolidation of the country, because the Chinese history had no period when the country

was unified in the real meaning, and the subjugation of various war-lords under his flag was nothing. Until all the people took an oath of co-operation with him, we thought, his program was no more than a table talk. Being hasty and thoughtless, Chiang began to popularize the anti-Japanese movement among the students who were pigmy politicians in some meaning because he deemed it to be a method for the speedy realization of his program; but he never thought that he was erring from the Oriental ethics that preached on one's friendship with the neighbours. Seeing that his propagation had too great effect on his young followers, he had no way to keep in check their wild jingoism, and then finally made his country roll down along the slope of destruction. Chiang is a living example who sold his country to the west for nothing, and smashed his skin with the crime of westerrization. Dear Rabindranath, what will you say about this Chiang Kai-shek?

"Dear poet, today we have to turn our deaf ears towards a lesson of freedom that may come from America, because the people there already ceased to practice it. The ledger-book diplomacy of England is too well known through the world. I am old enough to know from experience that no man is better than others, while one country being no more worse than others. Though I admit that Japan is today ruled by militarism, natural to the actual condition of the country, I am glad that enough freedom of speaking and acting is allowed to one like myself. Japan is fairly liberal in spite of the war time. So I can say without fear to be locked up that those service-crazy people are drunken, and that a thing in the world, great and true, because of its connection with the future, only comes from one who hates to be a common human unit, stepping aside so that he can unite himself with Eternity. I believe that such a one who withdraws into a snail's shell for the quest of life's hopeful future, will be in the end a true patriot, worthy of his own nation. Therefore I am able not to disgrace the name of poet, and to try to live up to the words of Browning who made the Grammarian exclaim:

"'Leave Now for dogs and apes! Man has Forever.'"

In sharp contrast is Tagore's reply.

"I am profoundly surprised by the letter that you have written to me; neither its temper nor its contents harmonise with the spirit of Japan which I learnt to admire in your writings and came to love through my personal contacts with you. It is sad to think that the passion of collective militarism may on occasion helplessly overwhelm even the creative artist, that genuine intellectual power should be led to offer its dignity and truth to be sacrificed at the shrine of the dark gods of war.

"You seem to agree with me in your condemnation of the massacre of Ethiopia by Fascist Italy but you would reserve the murderous attack on Chinese millions for judgment under a different category. But surely judgments are based on principle, and no amount of special pleading can change the fact that in launching a ravaging war on Chinese humanity, with all the deadly methods learnt from the West, Japan is infringing every moral principle on which civilisation is based. You claim that Japan's situation was unique, forgetting that military situations are always unique, and that pious war-lords, convinced of peculiarly individual justification for their atrocities have never failed to arrange for special alliances with divinity for annihilation and torture on a large scale.

"Humanity, in spite of its many failures, has believed in a fundamental moral structure of society. When you speak, therefore, of 'the inevitable means, terrible it is though, for establishing a new great world in the Asiatic continent'—signifying, I suppose, the bombing on Chinese women and children and the desecration of ancient temples and Universities as a means of saving China for Asia—you are ascribing to humanity a way of life which is not even inevitable among the animals and would certainly not apply to the East, in spite of her occasional aberrations. You are building your conception of an Asia which would be raised on a tower of skulls. I have, as you rightly point out, believed in the message of Asia, but I never dreamt that this message could be identified with deeds which brought exaltation to the heart of Tamer Lane at his terrible efficiency in manslaughter. When I protested against 'Westernisation' in my lectures in Japan, I contrasted the rapacious Imperialism which some of the *Nations* of Europe were cultivating with the ideal of

perfection preached by Buddha and Christ, with the great heritages of culture and good neighbourliness that went to the making of Asiatic and other civilisations. I felt it to be my duty to warn the land of Bushido, of great Art and traditions of noble heroism, that this phase of scientific savagery which victimised Western humanity and had led their helpless masses to a moral cannibalism was never to be imitated by a virile people who had entered upon a glorious renaissance and had every promise of a creative future before them. The doctrine of 'Asia for Asia' which you enunciate in your letter, as an instrument of political blackmail, has all the virtues of the lesser Europe which I repudiate and nothing of the larger humanity that makes us one across the barriers of political labels and divisions. I was amused to read the recent statement of a Tokyo politician that the military alliance of Japan with Italy and Germany was made for 'highly spiritual and moral reasons' and 'had no materialistic considerations behind them.' Quite so. What is not amusing is that artists and thinkers should echo such remarkable sentiments that translate military swagger into spiritual bravado. In the West, even in the critical days of war-madness, there is never any dearth of great spirits who can raise their voice above the din of battle, and defy their own war-mongers in the name of humanity. Such men have suffered, but never betrayed the conscience of their peoples which they represented. Asia will not be westernised if she can learn from such men: I still believe that there are such souls in Japan though we do not hear of them in those newspapers that are compelled at the cost of their extinction to reproduce their military master's voice.

"The betrayal of intellectuals' of which the great French writer spoke after the European war, is a dangerous symptom of our Age. You speak of the savings of the poor people of Japan, their silent sacrifice and suffering and take pride in betraying that this pathetic sacrifice is being exploited for gun running and invasion of a neighbour's hearth and home, that human wealth of greatness is pillaged for inhuman purposes. Propaganda, I know, has been reduced to a fine art, and it is almost impossible for peoples in non-democratic countries to resist hourly doses of poison, but one had imagined that at least the men of intellect and imagination

would themselves retain their gift of independent judgment. Evidently such is not always the case ; behind sophisticated arguments seem to lie a mentality of perverted nationalism which makes the ' intellectuals ' of to-day go blustering about their ' ideologies ' dragooning their own ' masses ' into paths of dissolution. I have known your people and I hate to believe that they could deliberately participate in the organised drugging of Chinese men and women by opium and heroin, but they do not know ; in the meanwhile, representatives of Japanese culture in China are busy practising their craft on the multitudes caught in the grip of an organisation of a wholesale human pollution. Proofs of such forcible drugging in Manchukuo and China have been adduced by unimpeachable authorities. But from Japan there has come no protest, not even from her poets.

" Holding such opinions as many of your intellectuals do, I am not surprised that they are left ' free ' by your Government to express themselves. I hope they enjoy their freedom. Retiring from such freedom into ' a snail's shell ' in order to savour the bliss of meditation ' on life's hopeful future, ' appears to me to be an unnecessary act, even though you advise Japanese artists to do so by way of change. I cannot accept such separation between an artist's function and his moral conscience. The luxury of enjoying special favouritism by virtue of identity with a Government which is engaged in demolition, in its neighbourhood, of all salient bases of life, and of escaping, at the same time, from any direct responsibility by a philosophy of escapism, seems to me to be another authentic symptom of the modern intellectual's betrayal of humanity. Unfortunately the rest of the world is almost cowardly in any adequate expression of its judgment owing to ugly possibilities that it may be hatching for its own future and those who are bent upon doing mischief are left alone to defile their history and blacken their reputation for all time to come. But such impunity in the long run bodes disaster, like unconsciousness of disease in its painless progress of ravage.

" I speak with utter sorrow for your people ; your letter has hurt me to the depths of my being. I know that one day the disillusionment of your people will be complete, and through laborious centuries they will have to clear the

debris of their civilisation wrought to ruin by their own war-lords run amok. They will realise that the aggressive war on China is insignificant as compared to the destruction of the inner spirit of chivalry of Japan which is proceeding with a ferocious severity. China is unconquerable, her civilisation, under the dauntless leadership of Chiang Kai-Shek, is displaying marvellous resources; the desperate loyalty of her peoples, united as never before, is creating a new age for that land. Caught unprepared by a gigantic machinery of war, hurled upon her peoples, China is holding her own; no temporary defeats can ever crush her fully aroused spirit. Faced by the borrowed science of Japanese militarism which is crudely western in character, China's stand reveals an inherently superior moral stature. And today I understand more than ever before the meaning of the enthusiasm with which the big-hearted Japanese thinker Okakura assured me that *China is great*.

"You do not realise that you are glorifying your neighbour at your own cost. But these are considerations on another plane; the sorrow remains that Japan, in the words of Madame Chiang Kai-Shek which you must have read in the *Spectator*, is creating so many ghosts. Ghosts of immemorial works of Chinese art, of irreplaceable Chinese institutions, of great peace-loving communities drugged, tortured, and destroyed. 'Who will lay the ghosts?' she asks. Japanese and Chinese people, let us hope, will join hands together, in no distant future, in wiping off memories of a bitter past. True Asian humanity will be reborn. Poets will raise their song and be unashamed, one believes, to declare their faith again in a human destiny which cannot admit of a scientific mass production of fratricide.

"P.S.—I find that you have already released your letter to the Press; I take it that you want me to publish my answer in the same manner."

A month later Noguchi wrote to Tagore again.

"Your eloquent letter, dated Sept. 1st, was duly received. I am glad that the letter inspired me to write you once more.

"No one in Japan denies the greatness of China,—I mean the Chinese people. China of the olden times was great with philosophy, literature and art,—particularly in the T'ang dynasty. Under Chinese influence Japan started to build up her own civilization. But I do not know why we should not oppose to the misguided government of China for the old debt we owe her people. And nobody in Japan ever dreams that we can conquer China. What Japan is doing in China, it is only, as I already said, to correct the mistaken idea of Chiang Kai-shek; on this object Japan is staking her all. If Chiang comes to senses and extends his friendly hands for the future of both the countries, China and Japan, the war will be stopped at once.

"I am glad that you still admire Kakuzo Okakura with enthusiasm as a thinker. If he lives to-day, I believe that he will say the same thing as I do. Betraying your trust, many Chinese soldiers in the front surrender to our Japanese force, and join with us in the cry, 'Down with Chiang Kai-shek!' Where is Chinese loyalty to him?

"Having no proper organ of expression, Japanese opinion is published only seldom in the west; and real fact is always hidden and often comouflaged by cleverness of the Chinese who are a born propagandist. They are strong in foreign languages, and their tongues never fail. While the Japanese are always reticent, even when situation demands their explanation. From the experiences of many centuries, the Chinese have cultivated an art of speaking, for they had been put under such a condition that divided their country to various antagonistic divisions; and being always encroached by the western countries, they depended on diplomacy to turn a thing to their advantage. Admitting that China completely defeated Japan in foreign publicity, it is sad that she often goes too far, and plays trickery. For one instance I will call your attention to the reproduced picture from a Chinese paper on page 247 of the Modern Review for last August, as a living specimen of 'Japanese Atrocities in China: Execution of a Chinese civilians.' So awful pictures they are,—awful enough to make ten thousand enemies of Japan in a foreign country. But the pictures are nothing but a Chinese invention, simple and plain, because the people in the scenes are all Chinese, slaughterers and all.

Besides any one with commonsense would know, if he stops for a moment, that it is impossible to take such a picture as these at the front. Really I cannot understand how your friend-editor of the modern Review happened to published them.

“It is one’s right to weave a dream at the distance, and to create an object of sympathy at the expense of China. Believe me that I am second to none in understanding the Chinese masses who are patient and dilligent, clinging to the ground. But it seems that you are not acquainted with the China of corruption and bribery, and of war lords who put money in a foreign bank when their country is at stake. So long as the country is controlled by such polluted people, the Chinese have only a little chance to create a new age in their land. They have to learn first of all the meaning of honesty and sacrifice before dreaming it. But for this new age in Asia, Japan is engaging in the war, hoping to obtain a good result and mutual benefit that follow the swords. We must have a neighbouring country, strong and true, which is glad to co-operate with us in our work of reconstructing Asia in the new way. That is only what we expect from China.

“Japan’s militarism is a tremendous affair no doubt. But if you condemn Japan, because of it, you are failing to notice that Chiang’s China is a far more great military country than Japan. China is now mobilizing seven or eight million soldiers armed with European weapons. From cowardice or being ignorant of the reason why they had to fight, the Chinese soldiers are so unspirited in the front. But for this unavailability you cannot foregive Chiang’s militarism, if your denial is absolute and true. For the last twenty years Chiang had been trying to arm his country under the western advisers; and these western advisers were mostly from Italy and Germany, the countries of which you are so impatient. And it should be attributed to their advice that he started war; though it is too late to blame the countries that formally provided him with military knowledge, it is never too late for him to know that the western countries are not worthy of trust. There is no country in the world, that comes to rescue the other at her own expense. If you

are a real sympathizer of China, you should come along with your program what she had to do, not passing idly with your condemnation of Japan's militarism. And if you have to condemn militarism, that condemnation should be equally divided between China and Japan.

"It is true that when two quarrel, both are in the wrong. And when fighting is over, both the parties will be put perhaps in the mental situation of one who is crying over spilt milk. War is atrocious,—particularly when it is performed in a gigantic way as in China today. I hope that you will let me apply your accusation of Japanese atrocity to China, just as it is. Seeing no atrocity in China, you are speaking about her as an innocent country. I expected something impartial from a poet.

"I have to thank you that you called my attention to the 'Modern intellectual's betrayal of humanity,' whatever it be. One can talk any amount of idealism, apart from in reality, if he wishes, and take the pleasure of one belonging to no country. But sharing patriotism equally with the others, we are trying to acquit the duty of our birthright, and believe that it is never too late to talk Heaven when immediate matter of the earth is well arranged.

"Supposing that we accept your advice to become a van-guard of humanity according to your prescription, and supposing that we leave China to her own will, and save ourselves from being a 'betrayal of the intellectuals,' who will promise us with the safety of Japanese spirit that we cultivated with pairs of thousand years, under the threat of communism across a fence. We don't want to barter our home land for an empty name of intellectuals. No, you musn't talk nonsense! God forbid!

"Admitting, that militarism is criminal, I think that if your humanity makes life a mutilated mud-fish, its crime would never be smaller than the other. I spent my whole life admiring beauty and truth with one hope to lift life to a dignity, more vigorous and noble; from this reason, I knelt before the Kalighat, Calcutta, because Kali's smeared face in madness, with three wild eyes, promised me with a forthcoming peace. And also at Elephanta Island; near

Bombay, I learned from the Three-headed Siva a lesson of destruction as inevitable truth of life. Then I wrote :

*Thy slaughter's sword is never so unkind as it appears.
Creation is great, but destroying is still greater,
Because up from the ashes new Wonder take its flight.*

"But if you command me to obey the meekness of humanity under all the circumstances, you are forgetting what your old Hindu philosophy taught you. I say this not only for my purpose, because such reflection is important for any country.

"I wonder who reported to you that we are killing innocent people and bombing on their unprotected towns. Far from it, we are trying to do our best for helping them, because we have so much to depend on them for co-operation in the future, and because Bushido command us to limit punishment to a thing which only deserves it. It was an apt measure of our Japanese soldiers that the famous cave temples of the 5th century in North China were saved from savage repacity of the derated Shinese soldiers in flight. Except madame chiang with frustrated brain, no one has seen the 'ghosts of Chinese institutions and art, destroyed.' And if those institutions and art, admitting that they are immemorial and irreplaceable, had been ever destroyed, it is but the crazy work of Chinese soldiers, because they want to leave a desert to Japan. You ought to know better since you are acquainted with so many Japanese, whether or not we are qualified to do anything barbarous.

"I believe that you are versed in Bushido. In olden times soldiery was lifted in Japan to a status equally high as that of art and morality. I have no doubt that our soldiers will not betray the tradition. If there is difference in Japanese militarism from that of the west, it is because the former is not without moral element. Who only sees its destroying power is blind to its other power in preservation. Its human aspect is never known in the foreign countries, because they shut their eyes to it. Japan is still an unknown existence in the west. Having so many things to displease you, Japanese militarism has still something that will please you, if you come to know more about it. It is an excusable existenc

for the present condition of Japan. But I will leave the full explanation of it to some later occasion.

"Believe me that I am never an eulogist of Japanese militarism, because I have many differences with it. But I cannot help accepting as a Japanese what Japan is doing now under the circumstances, because I see no other way to show our minds to China. Of course when China stops fighting, and we receive her friendly hands, neither grudge nor ill feeling will remain in our minds. Perhaps with some sense of repentance, we will then proceed together on the great work of reconstructing the new world in Asia.

"I often draw in my mind a possible man who can talk from a high domain and act as a peace-maker. You might write General Chiang, I hope, and tell him about the foolishness of fighting in the presence of a great work that is waiting. And I am sorry that against the high-pitches nature of your letter, mine is low-toned and faltering, because as a Japanese subject I belong to one of the responsible parties of the conflict.

"Finally one word more. What I fear most is the present atmosphere in India, that tends to wilfully blacken Japan to alienate her from your country. I have so many friends there, whose beautiful nature does not harmonise with it. My last experiences in your country taught me how to love and respect her. Besides there are in Japan so many admirers of your countrymen with your noble self as the first."

Tagore's magnificent answer to Noguchi's second letter ended the discussion. He wrote :

"I thank you for taking the trouble to write to me again. I have also read with interest your letter addressed to the Editor, *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, and published in that journal.* It makes the meaning of your letter to me more clear.

*The following is the text of the letter referred to :

"DEAR EDITOR,

"Dr. Tagore's reply to my letter was a disappointment, to use his words, hurted me to the depths of my being. Now I am conscious that language is an ineffective instrument to carry one's real meaning. When I wanted an impartial criticism he gave me something of prejudiced

"I am flattered that you still consider it worthwhile to take such pains to convert me to your point of view, and I am really sorry that I am unable to come to my senses, as you have been pleased to wish it. It seems to me that it is futile for either of us to try to convince the other since your faith in the infallible right of Japan to bully other Asiatic nations into line with your Government's policy is not shared by me, and my faith that patriotism which claims the right to bring to the altar of its country the sacrifice of *other* people's rights and happiness will endanger rather than strengthen the foundation of any great civilization, is sneered at by you as the 'quiescence of a spiritual vagabond.'

"If you can convince the Chinese that your armies are bombing their cities and rendering their women and children homeless beggars—those of them that are not transformed into 'mutilated mud-fish,' to borrow one of your own phrases—, if you can convince these victims that they are only being subjected to a benevolent treatment which will in the end 'save' their nation, it will no longer

bravado under the beautiful name of humanity. Just for a handful of dream, and for an intellectual's ribbon to stick in his coat, he has lost a high office to correct the mistaken idea of reality.

"It seems to us that when Dr. Tagore called the doctrine of 'Asia for Asia' a political blackmail, he relinquished his patriotism to boast quiescence of a spiritual vagabond, and wilfully supporting the Chinese, is encouraging Soviet Russia, not to mention the other Western countries. I meant my letter to him to be a plea for the understanding of Japan's view-point, which, in spite of its many failures, is honest. I wonder whether it is a poet's privilege to give one whipping before listening to his words. When I dwelled on the saving of the people of Japan at the present time of conflict, he denounced it as their government's exploitation 'for gun running and invasion of a neighbour's hearth and home.' But when he does not use the same language towards his friend China his partiality is something monstrous. And I wonder where is his former heart which made us Japanese love him and honour him. But still we are patient, believing that he will come to senses and take a neutral dignity fitting to a prophet who does not depart from fair judgment.

"Living in a country far from your country, I do not know where Dr. Tagore's reply appeared in print. Believing that you are known to his letter, I hope that you will see way to print this letter of mine in your esteemed paper.

Yours sincerely,
YONE NOGUCHI."

be necessary for you to convince us of your country's noble intentions. Your righteous indignation against the 'polluted people' who are burning their own cities and art-treasures (and presumably bombing their own citizens) to malign your soldiers, reminds me of Napoleon's noble wrath when he marched into a deserted Moscow and watched its palaces in flames. I should have expected from you who are a poet at least that much of imagination to feel, to what inhuman despair a people must be reduced to willingly burn their own handiwork of years', indeed centuries', labour. And even as a good nationalist, do you seriously believe that the mountain of bleeding corpses and the wilderness of bombed and burnt cities that is every day widening between your two countries, is making it easier for your two peoples to stretch your hands in a clasp of ever-lasting good will?

"You complain that while the Chinese, being 'dishonest,' are spreading their malicious propaganda, your people, being 'honest,' are reticent. Do you not know, my friend, that there is no propaganda like good and noble deeds and that if such deeds be yours, you need fear no 'trickery' of your victims? Nor need you fear the bogey of communism if there is no exploitation of the poor among your own people and the workers feel that they are justly treated.

"I must thank you for explaining to me the meaning of our Indian philosophy and of pointing out that the proper interpretation of Kali and Shiva must compel our approval of Japan's 'dance of death' in China. I wish you had drawn a moral from a religion more familiar to you and appealed to the Buddha for your justification. But I forget that your priests and artists have already made sure of that, for I saw in a recent issue of 'The Osaka Mainichi and The Tokyo Nichi Nichi' (16th September, 1938) a picture of a new colossal image of Buddha erected to bless the massacre of your neighbours.

"You must forgive me if my words sound bitter. Believe me, it is sorrow and shame, not anger, that prompt me to write to you. I suffer intensely not only because the reports of Chinese suffering batter against my heart, but because I can no longer point out with pride the example of a great Japan. It is true that there are no better standards prevalent anywhere else and that the so-called civilized peoples of the

West are proving equally barbarous and even less 'worthy of trust.' If you refer me to them, I have nothing to say. What I should have liked is to be able to refer them to you. I shall say nothing of my own people, for it is vain to boast until one has succeeded in sustaining one's principles to the end.

"I am quite conscious of the honour you do me in asking me to act as a peace-maker. Were it in any way possible for me to bring you two peoples together and see you freed from this death-struggle and pledged to the great common 'work of reconstructing the new world in Asia,' I would regard the sacrifice of my life in the cause a proud privilege. But I have no power save that of moral persuasion, which you have so eloquently ridiculed. You who want me to be impartial, how can you expect me to appeal to Chiang Kai-Shek to give up resisting until the aggressors have first given up their aggression? Do you know that last week when I received a pressing invitation from an old friend of mine in Japan to visit your country, I actually thought for a moment, foolish idealist as I am, that your people may really need my services to minister to the bleeding heart of Asia and to help extract from its riddled body the bullets of hatred? I wrote to my friend:

" 'Though the present state of my health is hardly favourable for any strain of a long foreign journey, I should seriously consider your proposal if proper opportunity is given me to carry out my own mission while there, which is to do my best to establish a civilised relationship of national amity between two great peoples of Asia who are entangled in a desolating mutual destruction. But as I am doubtful whether the military authorities of Japan, which seem bent upon devastating China in order to gain their object, will allow me the freedom to take my own course, I shall never forgive myself if I am tempted for any reason whatever to pay a friendly visit to Japan just at this unfortunate moment and thus cause a grave misunderstanding. You know I have a genuine love for the Japanese people and it is sure to hurt me too painfully to go and watch crowds of them being transported by their rulers to a neighbouring land to perpetrate acts of inhumanity which will brand their name with a lasting stain in the history of Man.'

"After the letter was despatched came the news of the fall of Canton and Hankow. The cripple, shorn of his power to strike, may collapse, but to ask him to forget the memory of his mutilation as easily as you want me to, I must expect him to be an angel.

"Wishing your people, whom I love, not success, but remorse."

This astonishing exchange of letters does not call for much commentary. They speak for themselves clearly and completely. The perverted thinking of Noguchi, his apologies for the spirit of aggressive Japan, damn him forever in the eyes of honest men. But Tagore rises to the occasion like the prophet and great man he was. Through him speaks East at its best, and through him also is heard the free spirit of a great artist.

3. THE TWO COLOSSUSES OF ASIA.

From that point on, there was no question as to where India's sympathies lay. And soon enough, anti-Japanese feelings were underscored by definite pro-Chinese actions. Chinese leaders were invited to attend the Indian National Congress and were welcomed throughout India. A China House was opened at Tagore's international university.

Crystallizing the temper of the Indian people, Congress strongly condemned Japanese aggression and pledged all possible aid to China. With the Moslem League and the Indian Red Cross, it formed the China Aid Committee. July 7, 1938, was declared China Day, commemorating the anniversary of the outbreak at Lukouchiao. Relief funds for China were collected and Japanese goods were boycotted. Wharf coolies at the docks took an oath never to load or unload any merchandise from Nippon. Surgeons and truckloads of medical supplies were sent to China in her hour of need. The British Government of India stood idly by, but India's boycott of things Japanese became more successful and more telling than that of any other country in the world, except, of course, China.

The attitude taken by the British Government of India was typical of England's Far Eastern policy in those years. The aim of British policy was the preservation of the *status*

quo in eastern Asia. A strong and independent China was certain to be a great factor in the evolution of a strong and independent India. In helping Japan by their inaction or half-hearted measures the British may have been helping themselves. Imperial Japan might have offered a better bargain to the British than nationalist and triumphant China and India.

The British fears for India may have been partly responsible for the British failure to help China in connection with the Burma Road. The Chinese Government depended more and more on western backdoors for essential war supplies. The improvised road from Chungking to the Burmese border via Kunming was then one of the only two important routes of reinforcement from outside. This road touched Lashio in Burma where there was a railway connection with Rangoon. When the Chinese request for extending that railway from Lashio to the Chinese border was rejected by the British Government, Indian nationalists began to distrust British intentions toward China and decided to get in touch with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek directly with a view to Indo-Chinese collaboration.

The Chinese Government was making its way westward as the Japanese bombed and blockaded China's eastern seaboard. China drew more and more into herself, into her complex and tremendous interior and she looked more and more to India across the mountains.

The Burma Road had become increasingly vital to China. Indian leaders were quite swift to denounce Great Britain when the latter decided to close the road temporarily. Although a few Burmese objected to its reopening, their criticism, according to *New Burma*, was inspired by a desire to check the influx of Chinese refugees. And in the month of March, 1941, engineers were already prospecting a new supply line for China which would run across some of the highest mountains in the world to Sadiya in Assam, India, from Ningyuan in southern Sikang.

With this development came one of the most realistic promises of permanent peace, not only in the Far East, but in the whole of Asia—the possibility of nearly one-third of the world's people working together in the form of an Indo-Chinese alliance to preserve the peace of the Pacific area.

A strong and independent China with a strong and independent India can be the unconquerable guardians of Asia.

Perhaps symbolic of this emerging alignment was the visit of Nehru to China in August, 1939. On the eve of the second World War, the inheritor of Gandhi's crown of thorns met China's great Generalissimo. He was accorded the largest official welcome ever given to a foreigner there. As if to give their ironic benediction, two Japanese planes appeared in the sky and began to drop bombs. The great Indian and the great Chinese continued their conference in an air raid shelter; common obstacles had drawn them together even more closely.

This handclasp of two good neighbors was later to be imitated by various Chinese missions sent to India. To counteract Japanese propaganda, the Reverend Tai Hsu Sayadaw headed a Goodwill Mission to India in 1940. His Holiness Tai presented to the Mahabodhi Society in Calcutta a silver pagoda from the Generalissimo as a token of China's good will. And to the Indian National Congress was delivered the following message from Chiang Kai-shek: "May the Indian and Chinese people entertain mutual affection, mutual understanding, and mutual respect that will last to eternity."

And yet it was not until February, 1942, that other nations, especially those of the western world, were suddenly and forcefully brought to the realization that such a far-reaching alignment was taking place, an alliance which indicated that the old imperial order as well as the political hegemony of the West were at an end at long last. It was then that the Generalissimo, with his celebrated wife, paid a visit to India. Here was a man who was not only an Asian leader, but the recognized head of a great Asiatic power, making direct overtures to the leaders of another and good-neighborly Asiatic country. Until then relationships among Asiatic nations had been indirect—each had to follow a detour and pass through London before it could get to the other. There were always the "good offices" of the British to reckon with. But the revolutionary Chiang threw all aside when he personally befriended India's unofficial leaders. Then came his outright demand, as one of the Big Four of 1942, that changed the course of history in a manner that

it will take years to appreciate fully. He said "Without waiting for any demand on the part of the Indian people, as speedily as possible give them real political power so that they will be in a position to develop further their spiritual and material strength. The Indian people thus would realize that their participation in the war was not merely to aid anti-aggression nations . . . but also the turning point in their struggle for their own freedom."

To those who were still empire-minded and yet alert in England, Chiang's bold statement came as a slap on the face. An Asiatic nation had thrown the British out of Peiping, Tientsin, Hankow, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Borneo, Malaya, Singapore, Burma, and New Guinea. Their military prowess, unchallenged for three hundred years, had vanished in the East. Now came another Asian leader, a Chinese war lord, who had the courage and right to advise the mighty British Raj on how to behave in Asia. Britain's political sagacity was laid open to question, and through an official channel.

Meanwhile China's leader met India's unquestioned voice and laid the foundation of personal friendship which would be a keystone in the structure of reborn Asia. The Chiangs and Mahatma Gandhi met in Calcutta. Within an hour of Gandhi's arrival at the palatial mansion of the mighty G. D. Birla, millionaire supporter of Congress, the Generalissimo and his wife left Government House and called upon the Mahatma. What was conceived of as a courtesy call was turned into a prolonged heart-to-heart meeting by Gandhi.

"I would not think of asking you to come to the Government House," said Chiang about to get up. "We could come again, after you have had your meal and rest."

"But," Gandhi protested promptly, "I have had my meal on the train in order to give you the whole of my time here, and I would suggest, if it were not inconvenient to you, that you stay here, have an Indian meal with us, and we can then talk until the minute of my departure. We can thus save the time of going to and coming back from Barrackpore."

The Chinese guests stayed on and they showed great interest in the theory and practice of Gandhi's "war without

violence," as well as in Gandhi's spinning wheel which the Mahatma operated while the talks went on.

"You will have to teach me this," said Madame Chiang.

"Come to Sevagram," Gandhi invited her, "and I shall teach it to you. Let the Generalissimo leave you here as his ambassador, and I shall adopt you as my daughter."

Meanwhile, the official interpreter was interpreting the Generalissimo. "But surely ours is not a formal talk," Gandhi objected good-naturedly. "Why should not Madame Chiang interpret you?"

"Now, now, Mahatmaji, that is devastating," she said. "Now I know why everyone succumbs to you. My husband is most taxing. Whenever there is something very difficult to interpret, some delicate nuance of his thought to be conveyed, I must interpret him. But for one year I have been having an easy time asking the official interpreter to do it for me."

Gandhi burst out with his characteristic laughter and with a twinkle in his eyes replied: "That means that you are a faithless wife."

"But surely he did not marry an interpreter, he married a woman," she retorted. When Gandhi renewed his invitation to stay on in India, she said, "Who knows! We may be back here sooner rather than later. And after all Calcutta is only twelve hours from Chungking."

"Then you will pay me a monthly visit," said Gandhi as he bade them goodbye. Before he left for the station, the Madame called, "Where's my spinning wheel, where's my wheel?" By mistake it had been taken to the station. "You shall have it," said Gandhi. "I'll send it on to you from the station."

"I have met too many men to succumb to anyone," she said after Gandhi had left. "But the Mahatma has captivated me."

"The Chinese sail in the same boat with us," was the observation of Gandhi.

4. NEW ALIGNMENTS IN THE NEAR EAST

The suggestion that India may play the coordinating role between the Far East and the Near East takes us to a survey of the Asiatic region closest to Europe. As Japan

managed to attract the major part of world attention in the Far East, so did Turkey in the Near East. These represented the two geographic extremes of Asia, easternmost Japan and westernmost Turkey. Although India and China can be thought of as the mainstay of Asia, there is no denying the fact that for a large part of recent times Japan has led the Far East while Turkey has led the Near East. These leaders of eastern Asia and western Asia respectively are warlike nations. Both have proved to be masters of surface westernization of their lands and peoples. Both have, at various stages, succeeded in defeating the West at its own game of war. Japan and Turkey, furthermore, have been two great Asiatic countries who managed to withstand encroachments of the West and to maintain their national independence. As a consequence, they have been respected not only among their fellow Asiatics, but also in the white man's world where the language of force is spoken. Both started with indifference to the West, passed through a stage of speedily adopting the process of westernization and militarization, and ended as champions of a purely Asiatic interdependence. One based its appeal on Pan-Buddhism; the other was taken as the symbol of Pan-Islam, even against the wish of Kemal Atatürk. And yet neither of them could achieve social and racial equality with the western world; one remained the "yellow rat," the other the "unspeakable Turk." As a result, both emerged as pioneers in the revolt of Asia.

Although it had been exposed to the West for more than a century, it was not until 1918 that the real change began in Turkey. The strength of the West had been felt by Turkey much earlier; in 1774 Turkey felt the first sting of defeat at the hands of a westernized Russian army. Around 1908, it began to send students abroad to European universities. At the end of the World War I, Sultan Vahid-ud-Din was humiliated by the victorious West under the Treaty of Sèvres. The leaders of thought in Turkey felt the need for drastic change.

It was at this point that Turkish reformers took courage from the example of Japan. Then ensued a period of interchange between the two adventurers in westernization. It was this collaboration that cut down the mental distance

between East Asia and West Asia which, until then, had indeed been formidable. A permanent exposition of articles of Japanese manufacture and workmanship was opened at Constantinople in 1926—four years after Kemal Ataturk's victory over the Greeks. Closer trade relations were established. Since Russia helped both Sun Yat-sen and Kemal, there was a surge of Chinese-Turkish reciprocity also. Sun Yat-sen received widespread official as well as popular sympathy and recognition in Turkey. Under the guidance of Dr. Alfred Sze, Chinese diplomat in Turkey, many Chinese students went to Turkey to study the secret of the latter's success. And India maintained a firm and friendly relationship with Turkey, despite the disappointment felt by Indian Moslems at Kemal's dissolution of the caliphate.

The Turkish attitude toward the West and Christianity is typified by the following statement of Djelal Noury: "It is a mistake to call the modern European and American civilization a Christian civilization; that is, a civilization brought about by Christianity. The Christian religion adjusted itself to the movements in Europe, and was saved out of the old static condition, so much so that today there is little resemblance between the religion taught by Jesus and modern Christianity. . . . Ultimately it was the new ideas that gave to Christianity a new color."

The implications are clear. "The new ideas" that go a long way to making up what is known as modern Europe can be shared by all, even non-Christians, without undergoing deep religious and traditional changes. Not only that. The acceptance of those new ideas was imperative for the survival of the East, with its distinctive life. Kemal himself gave characteristic expression to such a thought in his famous Six Days' Speech of 1922: "Gentlemen, it was important to remove the fez, which sat on our heads like a symbol of ignorance, of fanaticism, of hatred against progress and civilization, and in its place to put the customary hat, headdress of the entire civilized world [West, as contrasted to the backward orient] and to show thereby, among other things, that no difference in manner of thought existed between the Turkish nation and the great family of civilization."

His was a process of self-imposed westernization in certain techniques and in outward behavior in order to guard the political interests of Asia. King Amanullah tried the same reforms in Afghanistan but he failed when Islamic traditionalism turned against him in the revolt headed by Bach-i-Saqao. But Reza Shah Pahlevi in Iran and King Faisal in Iraq had greater success. The Egyptian Wafdists—under Mustafa Nahas Pasha kept in close touch with the Congress movement in India. Amine Youssef Bey notes that Gandhi “spoke very highly of the late Zaghloul Pasha whom he considered the father of all nationalist movements in the East, including India.”

Some political aspirants in Egypt have from time to time attempted to launch a campaign for Pan-Islam under a revived caliphate, at whose head would be the royal house of Egypt. But a great majority of Egyptians have been more interested in Pan-Arabism than in Pan-Islam; so have the Iraqis, the Syrians, and the peoples of Trans-Jordan, while Turkey has no liking at all either for Pan-Islam or for the caliphate. Moreover, Saudi Arabia, which might be the decisive factor in all this, has thrown its weight on the side of the Pan-Arab movement. There are about fifty million Arabs who inhabit the area between the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic. The focus of attention for them is the “deep desert” which contains the Mohammedan holy of holies, Mecca. And over this area, comprising Nejd and Hedjaz, rules King Ibn Saud. Hence it is known as the Saudi Arabia.

This six-foot tall, typically desert Arab is now sixty-three. Ibn Saud is a man of few words, and is the leader of the Mohammedan Puritans known as the Wahabis. Although a Moslem can have only four wives at a time, Ibn Saud is allowed to enter into as many marriages as he wishes and he is known to have married some one hundred fifty times. He rules his people with an iron hand and makes them accept the Koran literally. He has become the symbol of the Pan-Arab movement. It is through Pan-Arabism, among other things, which looks somewhat askance at the Indian Moslems, that the Moslem League which advocates Pakistan faces a rude awakening. Apart from that, India and the Near Eastern Mohammedan world have known each other for a long time and cordially.

India's awareness of the Near East was, to say the least, stimulated when the Nazis revived, with more threat than the Kaiser, the *Drang nach Osten*. Churchill had warned that the Nazis would come knocking at the "gates of India." Throughout India there was increasing talk of the cities of the Near East—Kabul, Teheran, Baghdad, Cairo, Suez, Aden, Riyadh, and Istanbul. Men like Mohammed Zahir Shah of Afghanistan, Ibn Saud of Arabia, Reza Shah Pahlevi of Iran, Amir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan, and Inanue of Turkey were in the public eye with Gandhi and Nehru. It was natural enough. Indian Mohammedans describe themselves as a minority. But eighty million followers of the Prophet live in India and there has been no crisis in the world of Islam, political or spiritual, which has not touched India deeply. Even the Hindu majority has always felt a peculiar kinship with the Near Eastern Mohammedan world. Persian was the court language in India until the British supplanted it with English; and many Hindus and Mohammedans adopt Persian as their second language.

5. PROBLEMS OF PAKISTAN

With a world crisis threatening and with talk of Pan-Islam and Pan-Arabism throughout the Mohammedan world, the problems of Pakistan, which calls for the formation of a Moslem federation of northern India, became specially acute. India's friendly approach to the Near Eastern countries of Asia had assumed semi-official status at the Ramgarh session of the All-India National Congress. A delegation of Egyptian Wafdists had been present there in the capacity of observers. But the religious rivalries of India have complicated the picture ever since. Jinnah's Pakistan plan, which would mean the dismemberment of India, has thrown a monkey wrench in the development of relations between India and the Near East.

In 1938, Jinnah, president of the Moslem League, played his trump card. Speaking before the one hundred thousand Mohammedans who attended the annual session of the League at Lahore, he advocated the long-dreaded proposal of partitioning the country into a Hindu India and a Moslem India. Jinnah even predicated "the peace and

happiness of the people of this sub-continent" on the country's division into "autonomous national states."

The proposed Moslem federation would include the present Northwest Frontier Province, the Native Hindu State of Kashmir (predominantly Moslem in population, but ruled by a Hindu Maharajah), and the Punjab, and would stretch eastward as far as the Burmese border, embracing the rich provinces of Bengal and Assam in its triangle. The city of Lahore, according to Jinnah, would be the capital of this Moslem state.

This undoing of India's natural topography is excused by what the Moslem League calls "the basic principle": "Geographically contiguous units shall be demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Moslems are numerically in a majority, as in the northwest and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute 'Independent States' in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign." Even such powers as "defense, external affairs, communications, and customs" are to be independent of the policies of the remaining Indian mainland. Now so far as the contiguous areas of the Northwest Frontier Province, the State of Kashmir and the Punjab are concerned, Jinnah has merely resurrected the older Mohammedan dream of Pakistan. The idea of turning India's northwest territory into a Mohammedan Empire is quite old. In the discourses of Sir Muhammed Iqbal, the greatest Moslem poet of modern times, Pakistan was conceived as the first step toward re-establishing Pan-Islam in Asia and southern Europe. But, by including the Provinces of Bengal and Assam in the proposed Moslem federation, Jinnah has gone the visionary Iqbal one better.

The idea of Pan-Islam spread through the Mohammedan world in the last years of the nineteenth century. It was not until 1933, however, that Chaudhrie Rahmat Ali coined the term "Pakistan." The whole philosophy was belittled in Mohammedan quarters, which held that the movement was contrary to Islam's "spirit of expansion." When Pan-Islam was halted by the abolition of the caliphate, Pakistan was also blighted. And so it remained until Jinnah modernized

it and some professors at the Aligarh Moslem University gave it quasi-logical blessings.

Nationalist India perceives the hidden dynamite in Jinnah's idea. The very impracticability of the partition plan, the nationalists realize, necessitates endless and fruitless discussions and parleys, while the larger issue of national independence is sidetracked. And the impasse is bound to postpone the establishment of any Asiatic bloc.

The fast-changing temper of the Moslem League made even the British feel like a Frankenstein lorded over by a creature of his own making. Actually several British statesmen have found it necessary to protest against vesting the Moslem minority with the power to veto India's political progress.

More violent were the reactions of the Hindu Mahasabha. Firmly opposed to territorial revision of India, it has time and again warned against a "Mohammedan conspiracy in northern India" and has assigned to Jinnah a role similar to that of Konrad Henlein during the Sudetenland crisis.

Supported by the Hindu Mahasabha, the Hindu ruler of the Native State of Kashmir could successfully resist any Moslem encroachment upon his sovereign rights. The martial Sikhs of the Punjab, traditionally hostile to the Mohammedans are also bound to join forces with the Hindu Mahasabha and the Maharajah of Kashmir, for they are themselves a minority pitted against another large minority, and the Punjab has been their homeland since the birth of Sikhism.

Perhaps it is this knowledge of the inherent rivalries of different religious communities which prompts Jinnah to suggest "plans for two Indias—Moslem and Hindu—which are as unlike as Germany and France." I think he will be disappointed if he ever comes face to face with the great dissimilarity between Pakistan and Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan, or Pakistan and Turkey. Yet sooner or later he would have to join his Mohammedan federation with them, if his dream of Pan-Islam were to come true.

The Mohammedan countries at the moment are nationalistic in their outlook. Time and again Moslem statesmen in such Mohammedan countries as Turkey, Egypt, and Iraq

have sympathized with the Indian National Congress rather than with the All-India Moslem League. The late Kemal Pasha was an outspoken critic of many Indian Mohammedan leaders, and he denounced the caliphate movement in India. The Egyptian Wafdists sent a delegation to the annual session of the Indian Congress on the eve of the war. In 1914, many Moslem countries arrayed themselves against each other to prosecute a war initiated by rival European powers. Despite the fact that the Turkish Caliph issued a formal summons to a Holy War at the outbreak of the first World War, the Indian Moslems themselves remained loyal to the British and fought against Turkish Moslems. Likewise, the Arab Moslems proclaimed a war against the Turkish Mohammedans.

Moreover, the experience accumulated in the international field since the first World War is apt to make one wary of any partition plan. The Wilsonian doctrine of the "self-determination of peoples" has had some dire results. The Versailles "Balkanization" of Europe subordinated two important factors which make a successful modern state in this aggressive world. These two needs, baldly stated, are, first, a sufficiently large and more or less naturally fortified geographical unit as a "place in the sun" and, second, a sound relationship between the geographical area and the national economy. The price for the neglect of these two needs has been paid in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Poland, and Greece.

The Indian peninsula has such natural boundaries as to be the envy of other nations. Surrounded on three sides by the sea and on the fourth by the insurmountable ranges of the Himalayas and the Hindu Kush, India is a perfect geographical whole, equipped with ideal natural frontiers. A large country, almost as rich in natural resources as the United States and Russia, India can have a more or less self-sufficient economy. To partition it would be to set aside what nature and history have so generously endowed. It would be national suicide.

The greatest difficulty in the path of Pakistan, however, would come from the masses, both Hindu and Moslem. For "Autonomous national states" cannot be created save through a large-scale reshuffling and rehabilitation of the

peoples. And people have their roots, deep roots, in their place of birth. They have economic ties wherever they have been making a living. Home-loving people have been known to make their exodus in the past, but only under unbearable oppression. To make Pakistan possible, tens of millions would have to be on the move for decades to come, tens of millions uprooted from the place of their birth and living. And Jinnah would replant them through the agencies of persuasion and planning, not at the point of the bayonet. The idea does not hold water. There have been many anguished cries against the idea from the Mohammedans themselves. Many of the most influential Mohammedan leaders and organizations are opposed to Pakistan.

Greater forces than Pakistan are blowing up like benevolent storms. The attitude taken by the Near Eastern Moslem countries towards China's war for survival, is most reassuring. More important is the fact that Moslems of the Near East almost to a man feel that Arab nationalism is more important than Mohammedanism in the shaping of their future.

HEARTBEATS OF THE HEARTLAND

1. ARTERIES OF THE HEARTLAND
2. CONTINENTAL REGIONALISM
3. LAND LOGIC FOR THE AIR AGE
4. THE COLOR LINE

HEARTBEATS OF THE HEARTLAND

It was a western theorist who thought of the great central land mass of Eurasia as a Heartland and who said, "Who rules the Heartland . . . commands the world." Historic forces were pounding out new forms of life in the Heartland when Chiang Kai-shek conferred with Nehru in Chungking and, later, with Gandhi in Calcutta.

Nehru summed the situation up when he said: "We know well that Europe, though the smallest of continents, is today great. We know also that many of her countries have had brilliant periods of history. . . . It would be foolish not to recognize the greatness of Europe. . . . But it would be equally foolish to forget the greatness of Asia. We are apt to be taken in a little by the glitter of Europe and forget the past. Let us remember that it is Asia that has produced great leaders of thought who have influenced the world perhaps more than anyone or anything elsewhere—the great founders of the principal religions. . . . How times have changed! But they are changing again even before our eyes. History usually works slowly through the centuries, though sometimes there are periods of swift change and break-ups. Today, however, it is moving fast in Asia, and the old continent is waking up after her long slumber. The eyes of the world are upon her, for everyone knows that Asia is going to play a great part in the future."

By one of the strangest ironies of history, Indian and Chinese leaders were being aided, in their effort to make Asia once more proud and self-reliant, by theories developed in the West for the sole purpose of western expansion over the entire globe. They were working, as it were, with the blessings of political thinkers and military geniuses of England, Germany, and the United States. Perhaps they

themselves would not otherwise have realized precisely what world forces they were setting into motion with their informal neighborly talks; certainly the millions of their followers would not have known. The actions were theirs, but the slogans, schemes, and strategy were provided by western thinkers. The use of theories of scientific geography for political ends has developed tardily, even in the West. But now that they are widely known and discussed in Europe, the Asian leaders did not look like dreamers to the rest of the world when they laid the foundations of an eastern bloc.

"My own picture of the future," Nehru has declared, "is a federation which includes China and India, Burma and Ceylon, Afghanistan, and possibly other countries. If a world federation comes, that will be welcome." Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has reciprocated Nehru's feelings in a letter to him. "I am firmly convinced," the Generalissimo wrote, "that the question whether the future world order will be worked out of the present chaotic state of affairs, depends upon the outcome of a united struggle of our Asiatic peoples." These younger warriors have received a sort of endorsement from the Mahatma, who said, "I can have no ill will against the Russians who have done great things for the proletariat. The Chinese sail in the same boat with us." The West could not fail to feel a certain anxiety when it beheld these developments taking place on that central ground considered so important in the latest of geographic and military findings.

These are the people who are blowing the breath of life into the Heartland, which up to now has not been functioning so well. The concept of the Heartland, which now dominates a major part of Nazi thinking in the military and political fields, was evolved, curiously enough, by an English geographer, Sir Halford J. Mackinder. In order, in the first place, to grasp and then maintain the mastery of the world, the nation which aspires to conquer must feel the "demographical necessity" of possessing the Heartland. But nations, like individuals, are apt to think of the world with themselves at the center. Individuals tend to have an egocentric view of the world, while countries tend to look at a nation-centric map of the globe. It was for this

reason that Mackinder conceived of eastern Europe as the Heartland; his German follower, Karl Haushofer, was able to go a step further and think of the Eurasian continent as Heartland. His demarcation of Heartland includes most of Russia, a narrow fringe of China, most of the Near East, half of Middle East, and a part of northern India. Such a blueprint presents Russia, now master of Heartland, as the antagonist who must be conquered by the nation seeking to rule the world. It was in Russia, history records, that Napoleon's dream of a world empire battered itself into semi-coma. It is in Russia today that the Hitler idea of global mastery has met its greatest challenge.

In the philosophic and far-seeing minds of Indian and Chinese thinkers, Haushofer's vision of a Eurasian Heartland is bound to be given some oriental trimmings. "A large space maintains life," said Friedrich Ratzel, father of *Geopolitik* which later under the energetic influence of Haushofer, became the earthy credo of the Nazis in their nihilistic revolution. India, China, and Russia, three of the six largest countries in the world, form a contiguous triangle and thus furnish a great enough aggregation of the earth's space to be the center of gravitation. Out of the 57,510,000 square miles of the entire land surface of the globe, these three countries spread over 13,534,945 square miles. In other words, the great Triangle of India, China, and Russia occupies a little more than one-fourth of the earth's land surface. This does not include smaller Asiatic countries; Asia, even without Russia, is the largest of continents.

Their mighty concentration of population is even more imposing. India is 386,000,000 strong, according to the 1941 census, while China has about 458,000,000 people. Thus India and China together have three-fifths of the world's entire population; and, if 192,695,710 Russians are added to their strength, the Great Triangle of the world contains many more than 1,000,000,000 human beings, half of the human race. If Russia were not included the remaining smaller Asiatic countries could far outweigh the loss; for Asia, excluding Russia, has a population of 1,350,500,000 people. Thus the Heartland of Indian and Chinese endeavor would be somewhere near the juncture of the three great countries. Some so-called visionary has said that the future

of the world will be decided on the plateau of Tibet. Well, Tibet may be high in the clouds, but the mighty bulk of land around it is earthy enough, and Tibet is the soaring and inspiring summit of the highest mountains in the world, the Himalayas. The three giants of Eurasia may still uncover a Shangri-la. Also, fortunately, matter is in tune with the spirit of the Heartland; the body of the Heartland is equally well able to give life to the common but yet unborn soul of the Great Triangle. That is, India, Russia, and China are respectively the second, third, and fourth richest countries in the world in raw materials. Even industrially, Russia is already full-grown while India is the eighth among the industrialized nations of the world.

1. ARTERIES OF THE HEARTLAND

The Heartland of Eurasia is merely a vision inspired by space, by a vast contiguous land mass. It will not throb to life until it is supplied with the arteries of a system of overland communications, roads, especially railroads. Up to then it will remain a blueprint etched in the world's mind. It is a concept that is in direct opposition to the theory of sea power; for it is written in terms of land-based power. This power has to be exceedingly mobile, and therein lies the vital role of the iron horse. As Ernest Marquardt of the German Ministry of Transportation observes: "The railroads are best suited for mass transportation due to their large and efficient transport units. Requiring little service and providing a maximum of speed and safety, they are almost entirely independent of season and weather." The fate of the projected triangle of Russia, India, and China will largely depend not only on the internal transportation systems of these respective countries, but also on the interstate transportation web. There will have to be overland, preferably railway, connections between Russia and India, India and China, and China and Russia. These will furnish the triangular arteries of the Heartland of Eurasia.

The past century and a half has been a maritime period. The maritime powers of the West, who dominated Asia, naturally regarded sea routes as all-powerful and all-important. They did not think beyond. Even when the continents of North America and Australia were being opened up by the

railroad builders, the empire makers of the maritime powers did not make the effort of exploring the limitless inland spaces of Asia in the trail of the iron horse. Imperial Russia, half-Asiatic itself, was alone in reaching overland to the foot of the Himalayan ranges and the landlocked plateaus of hinterland Asia. But the West looked on Asia as a sprawling mass of countries to be penetrated from the sea coast, with Britannia ruling the waves and guarding the sea lanes from Suez to Aden, from Shanghai to Singapore.

Empire builders of land-based powers, however, have for decades past dreamed of blazing overland steel trails to the riches of India and China. Recently, Germany's renewed interest in the *Drang nach Osten* marked a most serious attempt on the part of a western power to expand eastward into central Asia by the overland route. This has driven such maritime powers as Great Britain and the United States to establish efficient overland connections between Russia and China on one hand, and Russia and India on the other.

So far, the scene has been presented from the viewpoint of the westerner, but it is even more necessary to look on the problem with the eyes of the East. The fact is that the countries concerned—India, China, and Russia—themselves turn the conflicting and unrealized dreams of the Nazis and the British to their own advantage. The projected routes of overland offensive can as easily become a network for defense. India and China are geographically connected, and the Burma Road and the newer India road have brought these two countries even closer together. Railroad tracks now run from Iranian ports to Alma Ata in the Kazakh Soviet Republic; Japan's closing the Burma Road is bound to speed up the construction of other channels of communication and penetration across southwestern China. There exists another link between Russia and China: the Trans-Siberian Railroad has carried the Soviets to the shores of the China Sea and the Sea of Japan.

Internally, India has over 42,000 miles of railroads—the fourth largest railway system in the world. This vast system has railheads in Burma in the east, in Baluchistan in the west, and in the Northwest Frontier Province, where the iron horses are restlessly waiting at the barrier until

India is free to choose its allies and do its share in the vitalization of the Heartland.

Being a free country and now a great industrial power, Russia has been able to take initiative in this direction. Even Czarist Russia was conscious of the road and railroad possibilities of Eurasia. It built 20,000 miles of railroads between 1890 and 1913, and the Trans-Siberian and Trans-Caspian Railroads stand as its monuments to the development of the inner continent. Since then, under the Soviet regime, the road mileage has been more than doubled. Strategic railroads link European Russia with Tashkent and Merv, Kushka and Ashkabad, and thus with the Afghan and Persian borders where the tracks can easily be extended to India. In other words, the existing systems can be further developed into a transcontinental network which will connect India and China with Europe and Russian Eurasia along the old caravan routes. In still other words, political life can be given to the Great Triangle by building roads around the sea into Turkestan and from there across the Oxus into Afghanistan and India, on the one hand, and over Badakhshan—the roof of the world—into Sinkiang on the other. Automobile highways, fanning out on either side of these mammoth iron tracks along the trails used by Alexander, Genghis Khan, Timur Lane, and Nadir Shah, could supplement the next development of railroads in Eurasia, and give blood to the Heartland.

2. CONTINENTAL REGIONALISM

Throughout the orient the growing interest in a regional federation of Asiatic countries is as much an answer to a deeply felt need from within, as it is to pressure from without. Like many other extremes of the Asiatic temper at the moment, the craving for a continental bloc of Asiatic peoples and of their governments is, partly at least, a defense mechanism. It is Asia's answer to the various challenges of the West. If some quarters do not like the trend, they should look to the West for the causes of it. Just as the various national movements in Asia are partly defense movements, lacking the vicious aggressiveness of European nationalism, so also the Asiatic interest in regionalism is to some extent a defense measure.

India unquestionably will be among the first to put a limit on her self-rule, to accept any super-national policy based on a just world order, to join a true league or federation of nations. But such a world order must first be made possible and real. India cannot, however, live in a vacuum while a real new order is being created in this self-destroying world of ours. Neither can China, nor Russia. And the smaller countries of Asia certainly cannot. They must think of the next best thing. Continental regionalism is clearly emerging as the next step out of the chaos of the two wars. For years the United States of America has had acknowledged leadership in the Western Hemisphere under the Monroe Doctrine. A German author on *Geopolitik* has stated, "The Monroe Doctrine is the first declaration in international law which speaks of an area and establishes for it the principle of non-intervention by spatially foreign powers." One should also remember that some of the early political leaders of the United States were skilled cartographers and surveyors. Friedrich List, who coined the expression *Lebensraum*, was a friend of Henry Clay and a thorough student of the works of Alexander Hamilton. Continental regionalism was a creation of the American mind; the Japanese were apt pupils of the Americans when they shouted their battlecry of a "New Order in East Asia" and backed it by force of arms.

To forestall Japanese hegemony over Asia the most practical immediate step is for the western powers to recognize Chinese-Indian leadership in the orient. It would be far more reassuring to the world if the emerging Asiatic regionalism were firmly held in the friendly hands of India and China.

Now that Great Britain and the United States have declared that they are "prepared promptly to negotiate a treaty providing for the immediate relinquishment of extra-territorial rights" in China—"rights" have been a century-long source of humiliation to China—a first important step has been taken. But Asiatic regionalism provides a vision of many other profound changes in East-West relationships. It calls for a complete answer to the doctrines of "the open door," "freedom of the seas," "the white man's burden," "the lesser breeds," to the immigration policies of South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand.

Such old grievances inspire the Asiatic peoples to huddle together for common protection and in a common crusade. Even in the present dangerous war, during which Asiatic countries have become comrades in arms with western powers, fresh insults to Asia's dignity have been offered, new injuries added to the list. Despite the fact that China has fought more gloriously and tenaciously than most western nations, it is not yet recognized as an equal of the Anglo-American powers. And many of the contemporary debates about the coming peace and the new world order show no great change in the Anglo-Saxon psychology of superiority. The roots of evil are deep; the remedy will probably have to be as drastic as shock therapy. Clarence Streit's Union Now seems to Asiatics to be a resurrection of the ideas of Cecil Rhodes. In particular, his later plan of Union Now with Britain can be seen in no other light than as a challenge to Asia reborn, which not only has discovered that it can fight as well as the West but has proved it to the world. The movement in behalf of India's union now with China is a direct answer to Streit's union now with Britain. The relations of smaller Asiatic countries—Korea, Siam, Japan, Burma, Ceylon, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Egypt—to the Sino-Indian union would resemble the relations of smaller European and South American countries to the Anglo-American powers.

Mr. Streit's proposals reflect the uneasiness of the outnumbered Anglo-Saxon at the prospect of a *real* union based on the honest principle of proportional representation. What would happen if India and China were to be included on equal footing? Nothing less than the end of Anglo-Saxon domination of the world. In Mr. Streit's proposed Senate every population unit of 25,000,000 would be represented by two senators. Under this arrangement, China would elect 36 senators, India 31, United States 12, and the United Kingdom 4, while two each would represent Australia, Canada, Eire, New Zealand, and South Africa. In the proposed alternative of a one-house congress, and under the plan of one representative for every 5,000,000, China would have 90 members, India 72, the United States 28, and the United Kingdom only 11. Well, it is not a prospect which pleases the Anglo-Saxon heart. The best plan from the

Anglo-Saxon point of view, would be to include India and China out, and that is what Mr. Streit proposes to do. But you cannot prevent Asiatics from holding a union card in the Asiatic branch. It is one thing to have an exclusivistic union, but quite another to demand a closed shop.

Then there is the plan calling for a long armistice at the end of the war during which an Anglo-American alliance is supposed to police the world. Whether or not an Anglo-American alliance will be powerful enough to police every street corner in Timbuctoo, especially if other nations choose to be hostile, the project comes as a direct insult to Asiatics who have done their share in this war. Moreover, it might be well to be more realistic about a plan of global policing through years and years of peace. The A. E. F. had to travel 3,000 nautical miles during the last war. The A. E. F. has to travel 12,000 nautical miles during this war, to Rangoon and Calcutta and Suez by way of the Cape. An A. E. P. (police) would have to travel many more thousands of miles, to every nook and cranny of the world. If, wisdom is the better part of valor, it would seem a good idea to share the responsibility somewhat to give Asiatic countries the privilege and power of taking care of their own region at least, thus removing some of the unpleasant features of a plan so enthusiastically presented by many Anglo-Saxons. It must be said here that the words of Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, should be taken more literally by enthusiasts. Mr. Welles is realistic enough to propose that "the maintenance of an international police power" will be the undertaking of all the United Nations until a permanent system of general security is established.

Disturbing thinking with respect to post-war planning comes from another direction. It comes from those who are anxious to want to turn the clock back, abandoning present world alliances, and reviving the disastrous nineteenth-century idea of a concert of powers, the balance of power. Even such an eminent professor as Nicholas J. Spykman, America's archbishop of geopolitics, advocates this policy. The only variation he wants in the traditional game of balance of power is that America govern it in place of Europe. England is thought of as the major lieutenant of the United States. Henry Luce's "American Century" is

perhaps a more eloquent exercise on the same theme. "Consider the twentieth century," he says. "It is our century. It is ours not only in the sense that we happen to live in it but ours also because it is America's first century as a dominant power in the world." In so far as the American Century calls for world leadership by the United States instead of by Europe, it is indeed a step forward. The Americans are a younger people and more truly idealistic, and their hands, too, are relatively cleaner. Europeans are too engrossed in their ancient blood feuds and are likely to remain so for some time to come. And yet Asia cannot accept American world leadership and be self-respecting at the same time. If need be and if the West persists in its old habits, Asia too can play the balance of power game, and its clear answer will be, as it should be, an Asiatic bloc to be reckoned with as a whole and not in its national parts. It is true that any plan for continental regionalism will be what Frederick Schuman calls "an uneasy equipoise of force" bound to cause periodic wars. Regions could combine to fight each other. But the real justification of an Asiatic federation lies in its defensive character; it is by no means the ideal plan that the Asiatics can think of; it is largely an answer to the arrogant West which even now is still unwilling to undergo a real change of heart. There are internal difficulties in such a plan which would also have to be faced. Perhaps a region will not act as expected; perhaps there is not yet enough preparation for an Asiatic federation. But no people or group of peoples would ever have translated its dreams of greatness into reality if it had gambled only on a sure thing. A fifty-fifty chance is the sound and realistic estimate of any good plan's hope of success.

On the positive side, there is the sanction of geopolitics, this pseudo-science lifted to prominence by the events of World War II. Space has proved to be power. While none of the smaller countries were able to withstand Hitler's bombers and panzer divisions or Japan's Zeros and jungle warriors, China and Russia have more than succeeded in holding their own against the monster machines of modern warfare. Productive capacity, self-sufficiency in raw materials, and spatial conditions for a defense in depth have emerged as the greatest assets in fighting modern

defensive warfare and all three of these factors call for large-sized states or larger regional groupings. Lord Curzon's stratagem of buffer states has been outmoded and recent events have thrown us back to geographic determinism. "Ministers come and ministers go," says Nicholas John Spykman, "even dictators die, but mountain ranges stand unperturbed. . . . Geography is the most fundamental factor in the foreign policy of states, because it is the most permanent." Unlike politics, which makes strange bed-fellows and is thus the most variable factor in human affairs, geography is the least variable. "A large space maintains life," said Friedrich Ratzel, and India, China, and Russia have large enough spaces to maintain their lives in this aggressive world if they know how to use them. "The very struggle for existence," adds the same German geographer, "means struggle for space." A Eurasia politically integrated by the Great Triangle of India, China and Russia will have won its struggle for existence if it holds on to its space. Eurasians should heed the warning of Von Bulow: "As long as there is anything to divide or to take, there will be wars." Eurasia should be so bound together within the great triangle of India, China, and Russia that it will offer nothing to divide, nothing to take. The lust for power of the ambitious outsider should be met with the solid phalanx of the bloc.

3. LAND LOGIC FOR THE AIR AGE

A continental regionalism is gradually taking the place of the balance of power as well as of the system of empires. The process has been intensified by the changing nature of technology, both in peace and war. Above all, it is air power which is serving as the greatest force in the development of continental regionalism.

Eugene Staley summarizes the three technological phases of modern civilization, following the pattern suggested by Lewis Mumford: "Eotechnics, or the dawn age of modern technics, stretched roughly from the year 1,000 to the latter part of the eighteenth century. It was a water-wind-and-wood complex. The express mail coach on land and the perfected sailing vessel on the sea were its highest achievements in the field of travel and transport. Paleotechnics dominated the nineteenth and early twentieth

centuries. It was a coal-and-iron complex, and produced the steam railway and the steamship. Neotechnics, of which we have been experiencing the beginnings since the late nineteenth century, is an electricity-and-alloy complex. It has produced radio communication, the modern automobile, the Diesel-electric streamlined train, and the airplane."

The age of neotechnics demands neotechnics in diplomacy and foreign policy; the airplane makes necessary a new political map. For changes in man's techniques have throughout history involved corresponding changes in man's politics and in the earth's power areas. "History has been made," remarks Robert Strausz-Hupé, "between latitudes of twenty degrees and sixty degrees north latitude." That is, civilizations, until fairly recently, were products of moderate climates. Among the early cultures were the Chinese civilization, which flourished in the moderate climate of the Yangtse valley and the Indian empire of Asoka, which prospered in the moderate climate of the Gangetic delta; there were the civilizations of Egypt and Mesopotamia, after which came the steady northward drift of culture and power areas. Finally the steamboat was developed and, with it, the British Empire, marking Europe as the center of political gravity. But civilization went further west, and there came into being the pomp and circumstance of the United States of America, putting an end to the unitary rule of western Europe. The center of gravity shifted and continued to shift with the growth of nationalism in Asia and with the emergence of Japan as a world power. The hunchback Homer Lea clearly saw all this years ago when he said: "That the British Empire now encircles the world has been due not so much to the old valor or the old spirit of the race as to the fortuitous circumstance that for the last several centuries the British Islands have been the strategic center of the world. It is now the shifting of this center, or rather the breaking-up of it into several non-Saxon centers, that constitutes the source of British political disintegration. If it is lost, the supremacy of the Saxon is at an end."

The story does not end with the steamship and the railroad, however. The latest chapter is filled with pages written by air power. The electrifying lessons of the second

World War teach us that the day of small, completely sovereign national states is gone; air power has made inevitable the unification of continents. In addition, the nations of various continents, if not of the entire world, are becoming more and more interdependent, through the ever-increasing universality of accepted or rejected ideologies, a process greatly enhanced by developments in the field of communication. In the past, empires were the pattern of unification, and such empires did constitute bulwarks against aggression from without, even if they were not always guarantees against exploitation from within. But the good old days of empire were founded on centuries of sea power; the genius of sea power has been to insure overseas and maritime groupings. The power of small states like Venice and the Netherlands, and even of England and Japan, went unchallenged only during the maritime centuries. More and more, however, air power is emerging as a formidable rival, even perhaps the final victor, and the genius of air power is to nurture consolidations based on land connections. Small islands developed armadas in the past; large space will develop great armadas in the future—the airplane thrives on space.

Sea power sought to encompass far-flung regions with networks of bases and supply lines. Its displays of strength came from the periphery, from coasts and harbors. But such attacks from the periphery are things of the past if the land mass has enough air power. Continental peoples in possession of air power can forever hold back a maritime force seeking to control large spaces from a position on the perimeter. The airplane, on the other hand, is at its best when it operates from a central land base across contiguous areas. It has, in consequence, produced better conditions for a land power.

There is something very earthy about the soaring eagle, strange as it may seem, just as there is something very watery about the floating whales of ships. The airplane has ushered in the era of land power and of continental regionalism. Not only has the airplane lifted wars from the surface of the earth into a third dimension; it has also proved that fleets can hardly reach enemy shores which are guarded by soaring eagles. Even "carrier-based planes," observes

Major Alexander P. de Seversky, "would be like so many clay pigeons for land-based air power." He is inspired to a vision of eagles pouncing on their prey when he thinks of airplanes attacking battleships. It is likely, therefore, that even America and Britain cannot clasp hands across the seas any more. They will be better off on their respective continents. This would be salutary for England anyway which too long has regarded the European continent as more distant even than India and, in doing so, has in the past created many difficulties.

Spatially connected large land masses will have an advantage even if the battle is one of air armadas. A nation attacked from the air will require a roof or canopy of air power. Only land-based air power can provide such a protective umbrella and prevent the bombings which would otherwise reduce cities to rubble. De Seversky notes that the greatest change that air power has wrought in the course of human conflict is that "It can strike at an enemy nation *as a totality*, reducing that nation to helplessness without the time-honored preliminaries of invasion and mile-by-mile conquest." But here too the advantages of large land areas are as apparent as they are in connection with water-borne invasions. It is harder to bomb China into helplessness, as the Japanese have found out, than it is to knock out Belgium. The technique of concentrated bombing, as revealed in England and in Europe, has underscored the need for spreading out the industrial plant of a nation, and only the large land mass, such as Russia and the United States can do this successfully.

All this is a happy augury that continental regionalism will emerge, and that for various reasons Asia will be among the first to insist upon it. One of the drawbacks of the now defunct League of Nations was that its structure made it possible for great powers to ignore small nations. But small nations, protected by their respective regional federations, cannot be overlooked if continental groups are to sit *en bloc* at world councils. Another drawback of the League of Nations was that for example, Poland sat in on questions pertaining to far-off Manchuria. Confusion was created by the lack of knowledge of local issues. Regional groups gathered together in a world order can avoid such mishaps.

The question is one of a World Commonwealth which various regional federations would join for common purposes. If the Eurasian Heartland does not materialize, there can be two eastern groups: the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and an Asiatic Federation. The other two would be the Pan American Union and the European Federation.

Such a World Commonwealth, formed by the four continental regions, would be more easily attainable than a universal federation in which individual nations were members. Regional grouping would furnish the very much-needed stepping stone to the ideal of a world state with legal and police power over inter-continental disputes. Moreover, these various regional federations need not be mutually exclusive; Australia, for instance, could be a member of both the Asiatic Federation and the Pan American Union.

We are talking, of course, about the next best thing. The noblest ideal is the one held by great seers of Asia and the West, that of a world community organized in a world state, with no national barriers against international commerce and travel, with an international bill of rights patterned after the American Bill of Rights. If that world community ever comes, Asia will welcome it.

4. THE COLOR LINE

Inner forces of Asia are not alone in fostering the idea of an Asiatic Federation. Frustration and aggravation at western arrogance have played their role in furthering the thought. Among these challenges from without, none has been more provocative than the western assumption of racial superiority.

Racism in Asia has been spread by three strong peoples who happened to be military powers as well: the German Nazis, the Anglo-Saxons, and the Japanese. Let us start with the Japanese since their appeal is totally different from that of the Anglo-Saxons and the Nazis. The Japanese have rallied Asia behind a negative and defensive racism; both the Nazis and the Anglo-Saxons have obligingly provided abundant material from which the Nipponese could fashion grievances.

The main weapon of Japanese propaganda is the racial discrimination practised by the white people. Violent attacks on the white man's attitude are poured into the ears of Asia day after day by short-wave radio, by pamphlets showered from the sky, and by refugees who bring back harrowing tales of the evils of the British and the chivalry of the Japanese. Asiatics, according to their self-appointed Japanese tutors, have no hope of receiving justice or equality from white men. They point to the British record in India. They point to the fact that Chinese sailors, who had risked their lives in the cause of the United Nations, could not, until very recently, even walk the streets of New York on shore leave. They recall that Chinese children, citizens of the United States, cannot go to the same school as white children in the State of Mississippi. They do not tire of telling Asia of the United States laws which bar Filipinos, their own subjects, from citizenship. They have detailed and plentiful stories about the treatment of Negroes in the United States, and they give hair-raising accounts of American lynchings.

The Japanese are not really very clever at this type of propaganda, but they do not have to be very clever since they are dealing with people who have had vivid and shameful personal memories of encounters with the British and the French and the Dutch and the Americans in Asia. The Japanese record is blacker than any white man's, and yet they have a ready audience; it is a law of human nature that makes the petty thief who picks one's pocket on the street seem more dangerous than a distant cutthroat. "Asia for the Asiatics" has therefore become an appealing battle-cry in spite of the vile and horrible mouth that utters it. It was Chinese Confucius, who advised: "Do not ignore a good word because of the bad mouth it comes from." It is true that all Asiatics hate Japanese aggression against their fellow Asians. But the fact remains that the Indians are also opposed to the British, the Indo-Chinese to the French, and the Javanese to the Dutch. Although none of them would like to see a yellow overlordship taking the place of the white overlordship in Asia, they do want Asia for Asiatics, for themselves, that is. And when all is said and done, and when the tumult and the shouting subside, there will be certain negative contributions of the Japanese that history will

record. By their hideousness they made China relatively popular in the West. By their greedy designs on Hindustan they made the issue of Indian freedom a problem of the United Nations.

In a different way, the German Nazis have aided the formation of a defensive racism in Asia. No amount of their praise of the "honorary yellow Aryans" can hide the fact that Hitler's is an uneasy alliance with Nippon. For, as Graf Reventlow records, "Hitler once used the phrase: to liberate Germany he would make a pact with the devil himself." That Hitler considers Japan a devil without even a devil's originality is apparent in the following passage from *Mein Kampf*. "Suppose Europe and America would perish and any further Aryan influence on Japan would cease: Japan's development in science and technique would continue only for a very short time. It would take no more than a few years for the well to dry up. . . . Its present culture would grow numb and sink back into the sleep from which the Aryan wave of culture rudely awakened it seven decades ago. Thus, just as the contemporary Japanese achievements owe their existence to Aryan sources, it was foreign influence and foreign spirit that created Japanese culture in the days of old."

This is no less a warning to the whole of Asia than it is to the honorary yellow Aryans. For the Chinese are even below consideration so far as Hitler is concerned, and of Indians he has this to say: "England will lose India only if it either falls victim to racial degeneration within its own administration machinery, or if it is compelled to by the sword of a powerful enemy. Indian rebels will, however, never achieve this. . . . Entirely aside from the fact that, as a German, I would, despite everything, still far rather see India under the English than under some other rule."

There speaks no friend of the Asians, and this Hitler, Asians rightly surmise, must feel acutely uncomfortable in the company of his yellow comrades. He is admittedly an admirer, even an imperial pupil, of the British. Whenever he can, therefore, he is bound to try to reach a compromise with the Anglo-Saxons and to try to lead them into a common crusade against the tide of color. He is sure to strain every nerve to bring about a deterioration of the ideological

alignment of tyranny versus democracy in order to launch a titanic struggle between East and West on racial grounds. The Russians are orientals to him and one of his political mentors, Spengler, has included the Slavs in the category of colored races. And the Asians have seen enough of Anglo-Saxon racists, sometimes in very high places, to make them honestly wary. They cannot be sure what alignments would take place before the war is over, or will occur when the peace comes.

Asiatic distrust of the Japanese and the Nazis inevitably suggests to Americans that Asia turn to the Anglo-Saxons for aid and comfort. And yet they do not, and the Anglo-Saxons wonder why. They wonder in vain because they above all people have lost the healthy habit of introspection and self-examination; they are so dead certain they are right. They feel above suspicion. It never occurs to the typical Anglo-Saxon that he should seek out the causes which turns the rest of the human race against him, despite its knowledge of the revealed and far more sinister depravity of the other side—the Axis partners. He fails for example to realize that in racial pride and discrimination, the Nazis are merely imitating the Anglo-Saxon. The Nazis, on the one hand, may proclaim doctrines of racial superiority in a brash and bold way and the Anglo-Saxons, on the other, may not. Is that because the Anglo-Saxon is so sure of himself that he can withdraw quietly into his centuries-old shell, needing no further self-defense? Does the parvenu Nazi have to convince himself by repeating the doctrine to himself over and over again, and by shouting it from the house-tops? Or is it the German need for a thoroughgoing efficiency and systematization?

Asia has seen more of the Anglo-Saxon than of the German. Race prejudice in its discriminatory form is not to be found among Asiatic peoples, with all their castes and religions, and so they have come to hate the discriminating Anglo-Saxon.

One would expect the Anglo-Saxon to have purified himself in the holocaust he has faced in defense of what he calls democracy. But do we still need proof of his unwillingness to change soon enough to help those who suffer at his hands? There is still talk about the English race and

the English-speaking peoples. Churchill's first Washington speech ended on the resounding note: "The British and American peoples will for their own safety and the good of all walk together side by side in majesty, justice, and peace." Asiatic peoples have had enough sad experience to look dubiously upon any such majestic march.

The white man is the world's problem number one. He has tended to draw into more and more limited circles, to exclude larger and larger segments of humanity from his fold. The Germans are not alone in looking down upon the Slavs; Russia has been at least partially excluded from the white man's preserve. The white man has made it amply clear to the South European and South American that they do not quite belong. Of course, Africans are beyond the pale.

This rigid exclusiveness begins to resemble a death throe. The last fifteen years of the eighteenth century and the whole of the nineteenth century belonged to Anglo-Saxon Christendom. But the twentieth century is the turning point, and the white man stands today challenged and dangerously outnumbered as a result of his own failure in democracy. In his eyes, most of the world is colored; this colored world has come to the point where it ceases to view the prospect with dismay. If the white man insists upon being the world's great problem child, the rest of humanity may get accustomed to the idea.

Will the world divide according to the color line? The answer rests with how the white man behaves in a world he has done so much to change. There is no race problem save in the mind of the white man. He has created it and if he does not undo his ghastly handiwork others will help him to. The war will end, we trust, with the defeat of the Nazis and the Japanese; Chinese and Indians may even contribute heavily to the defeat of those dark forces. But the problem will not then be solved; it goes deeper. There may come another war, in which the allies of today will be found on the other side—yes, the Chinese and Indians and Russians. "If attitudes remain unchanged," warns Pearl Buck, "... the barrier will not only not be broken down but it will grow higher and higher and the end will be a war between East and West in which the

Chinese will not be on our side. Asia is determined to have freedom." The final struggle, if it unhappily comes, will be between the white man's unwillingness to give up his superiority and the colored man's unwillingness to endure his inferiority. Disastrously outnumbered by his own system of self-shrinkage, the white man would have to engage in an endless and almost inconceivable process of barbarous annihilation to restore the balance. It has been the white man's will to include in the ranks of the colored peoples 1,134,500,000 Asians, 155,500,000 Africans, 170,000,000 Russians, millions of South Americans, and ten out of every hundred Americans.

It is possible that a racial war might already have been in the making had it not been for the Nazi monstrosities which sent the colored world reeling back from an even more diabolic racism, and for the Japanese crimes which brought China into the camp of the United Nations and aroused India's sympathy.

According to Franz Boas, one of the greatest anthropologists of our time, "the claim that any type represents a pure race, essentially different from all others, to all members of which pertain the same characteristics, is quite untenable. . . . Much less have we a right to speak of biologically determined superiority of one race over another." Thus actually there is no scientific basis for the world division along racial lines. Let me stress that it is only the white man's inability to perceive his fellow men in the real light that has created this gravest issue. "Racism as a basis of social solidarity is against the cultural interest of mankind," Dr. Boas further says. "It is more dangerous than any of the other groupings because according to its claims the hostile groups are biologically determined, and therefore permanent, while all the other groupings change with the change in cultural pattern." An end should be put to senseless strife about racial matters. One could wish that every white man would subscribe to the views of Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt who said: "The day of the white man's burden is over. Henceforth we must treat all races with respect as equals. And we as individuals must set the example here in this country today and not allow prejudices to run riot."

There is no rational basis for an East-West division along racial lines. There is no racial solidarity in Asia; an overwhelming majority of the Indian people belong to the so-called white race, according to all anthropological and ethnological data. The tropical sun may have imparted pigmentation to the skin of the Indo-Aryan—just as it has begun the same process with the skin of the Anglo-Saxon in Australia—but the ethnologist knows that the Indo-Aryan is of Caucasian origin. The Near East Mohammedan, for the most part, also belongs to the white race. But, in practice if not in theory, the Anglo-Saxon has denied membership in the white group to millions of Asia's whites. Driven into another grouping, they are too proud to deny the color classification. And it is from such externally imposed solidarity that Pan-Asia has sprung.

THE SAXON FELL AT SINGAPORE

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THE SAXON FELL AT SINGAPORE

WITH Singapore Saxon supremacy fell. When the Japanese drove the British out of that \$40,000,000 naval bastion, described as an impregnable fortress with the greatest floating drydock in the world, Asians rid themselves forever of the burden of the white man. Kipling had advised empire rulers to send forth the best and to take up the white man's burden. At Singapore the poor showing made by the High Command, in contrast to the gallantry of the soldiers, revealed that the Britons in power had long neglected the poet's exhortation.

Though the British were maintaining that they had "successfully disengaged the enemy," the "victorious withdrawal" from Malaya was a great blow to the white man's prestige in Asia. Coming after Pearl Harbor, Manila, the retreat from Malaya, the sinking of the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse," Singapore's fall was the fatal stroke.

Japan's popularity in Asia has followed an erratic course ever since Port Arthur. It has had many ups and downs. The low point was reached when Japan attacked China; the fall was so sharp that the Japanese met with hostility throughout Asia. Asians very nearly lost their hero-worship of Japan. But then came December 10, 1941, and the retreats of a proud and seemingly unconquerable western force. Japan's popularity began to mend.

According to many Japanese, the war in the Pacific is a war of races. Many of their German and Italian allies have also testified to that effect. Some Germans in Tokio have frankly admitted that all westerners, regardless of nationality, will be victimized by the Japanese when the time is ripe. Some American thinkers and American politicians have given expression to the same belief in race war. There

is a widely circulated anecdote which may or may not be authentic which tells that, soon after Pearl Harbor, a Chinese official was calling on a prominent American official, a member of the Cabinet, in fact. Both were naturally despondent. When the Chinese official stood up to take his leave, the American put a reassuring arm around him and said, "Now don't you worry. We're going to lick those yellow rats."

When the white man began his series of retreats before the yellow hordes, it was soothing balm to the ancient wounds of Asia. More than any Japanese words the Japanese deeds made propaganda. The white man, the most hated creature in Asia, was put to flight at Hong Kong, in Malaya, in Burma, and above all at Singapore.

China's necessary collaboration with the western powers had been the prime factor in checking the rising tide of color inspired by Japan. As a result, however, the West became unjustifiably self-confident. It was foolhardy to count too heavily on the pleasant aspects of the picture and to ignore latent dangers which could be built up to catastrophic proportions. For while great majorities in every Asiatic country were disillusioned about Japan and preferred an Allied victory, there were powerful minorities in all these countries which were so completely distrustful of western nations that they felt Japanese victory was a better outcome.

1. JAPAN'S PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

A major part of the Japanese strategy in Asia in the early months of the war, was, it seems to me, aimed at strengthening the hand of disgruntled minorities and at providing the peoples of Asia with a strong inducement to support the Japanese cause. It is in this light that the shocking treatment of the white populations of Manila, Hong Kong, and Singapore should be interpreted. To call the behavior of the Japanese military in these cities another evidence of Japanese crudity and barbarism is to be naive and serves no purpose save that of soothing pent-up feelings through name-calling. The Japanese had no excuse for singling out the whites; the deliberate mistreatment of white men and women was a Japanese puppet show staged for the enjoyment of Asiatics who had long been suffering indignities at

the hands of the West. It was a broad hint to every Asiatic that the Japanese were fighting against the westerners and against those Asiatics who were, according to their view, stupid enough to make common cause with the westerners. They also wanted to make it clear that the Japanese were the only eastern people who could act in this fashion. It was not hard to get the Japanese idea.

Knowing that their greatest mistake had been in China, the Japanese are now over-anxious to embrace the Chinese with "brotherly" affection. The Japanese can afford some very special offers. Even if they cannot give up occupied Chinese territory for the duration, they can turn over to the Chinese areas formerly held by various western powers and now reconquered by the Japanese. In fact the Konoye government offered the "return" of such former Chinese territories to a Japanese-dominated China as a special inducement. Premier General Hideki Tojo went even further on January 23, 1942, after Japan's spectacular victories. He went over the head of Wang Ching-wai and made an indirect appeal to Chungking. "Japan is chastising," he said, "a spoiled child who was pampered by Anglo-America. Now is the time for China's leaders to awaken and I take this occasion to urge them to do so."

Tojo made further efforts at conciliation. On February 16, 1942, he declared his government's aims in Asia. "The attitude of Japan toward the people of China is that of regarding them as our brothers. Japan intends to carry on Greater East Asiatic construction with the people of China by helping each other." He was equally enthusiastic about India: "Japan will not stint herself in extending assistance to the patriotic efforts of Indians to restore for herself the status of India for Indians and to throw off Anglo-American domination." The *China Times* commented nervously: "China naturally will be the chief object in the expected peace offensive. As 'the leader of East Asia,' Japan will do her best to stir up ill-feeling among the natives of these lands against Britain and the United States." Pressure was coming from another direction urging Chungking to come to terms with Tokio so that a United Asia could in common face the western menace. This time it was Premier Luang Bipul Songgram of Thailand who openly appealed to

Chiang Kai-shek to reach an agreement with Japan. "This is not a time," he said, "for Asiatics to be fighting among themselves."

Both the German and the Italian propaganda machines were backing Japan in this diabolical program. Without any faithfulness to their own avowed policy, and in contradiction of all the recorded evidence, German broadcasts told the world of the discovery of a new race—honorary Aryans. They maintained that "the Japanese and German pagan gods are symbols of the same pure Aryanism." There was a more concrete identification. The German god Wotang was discovered to be the same as the Japanese "god of the sun and the winds," both of whom were described as "watching over their people to keep them in military and patriotic spirits." The Italian editor Virginio Gayda was busy underscoring the inconsistency between Allied words and Allied deeds. Commenting on the Atlantic Charter, he said: "As to territorial changes not in accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, why are the British 'occupying' Palestine, Iraq, Egypt and India, and why is Roosevelt 'associated' with Soviet Russia which has 'seized' Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and part of Finland?" The damage in Gayda's charges was that they were true and palatable to Asians who had been saying the same things to themselves. The Germans and Italians were also assisting the Japanese by assuming the burden of propaganda in the Near Eastern Mohammedan world. Both Mussolini and Hitler claimed to be the saviors of Islam. Their radio beams spread all over the Near East and pierced the Middle East up to India; they had an eager audience of anti-British Arabs and Iranians.

Japan had two sets of arguments, like any other nation one for home consumption and the other to be used in foreign countries. At home, Professor Chikao Fujisawa, a leading Japanese political philosopher, was propagating the idea of a holy war through which Japan would unite the warring nations of the world under the divine rule of the Mikado. But abroad, especially in India now that China was supposed to be won, Japan posed as the liberator and friend of the suffering peoples of Asia. Day and night the short-wave stations were busy in Tokio, Shanghai, Saigon,

Bangkok, Singapore, and Rangoon, and the medium-wave stations in Penang. "Indians, this is your time to rise. Your leaders are in prison. Follow your movement!" said the spokesmen of Nippon in every known Indian vernacular.

These words were effective, especially because history was on the Japanese side. "The plain fact of the matter is," announced Pearl Buck, "and the sooner we realize it the better, that too many of the peoples of the East have not helped the people of the West in this war." But instead of admitting truths and answering discontent, western leaders glossed over military and political blunders with such arguments as "we were outnumbered." If the British had had the wholehearted support of the peoples on whose soil they were fighting, the Japanese could *never* have outnumbered them.

But an even greater source of uneasiness and disaffection in Asia—greater than suave radio messages and the epoch-making conquests of Japan—were the stupidities, the shortsightedness, the blunders of the white man, both at home and in the East. Should they be called blunders? Or should they be regarded as the natural results of the Saxon's outlook? However one interprets them, these dangerous attitudes and activities were clearly caused by the Saxon's racial pride, his imperial arrogance, his lust for gain, his political bankruptcy. That was oil for Asia's lamps of disillusionment and of naked hate. I am not speaking about the mistakes of the past; these could have been forgiven, had there been a genuine desire to remedy them. What was dead was dead. No, what mattered vitally was the continued arrogance and insularity—during a war that was unmistakably destroying the Saxon's glamour and glory—which merely paid verbal homage to the ideals of democracy and freedom and equality at a time of supreme trial. These were the materials which the Japanese used to feed Asia's flame of resentment. Let me cite chapter and verse, not out of my own experience, but out of the written and spoken words of the once-mighty Saxons. There is nothing so convincing as self-testimony, self-castigation, and self-flagellation. It is a dreadful record of inept words spoken and written, of awful things done and of things left undone. It will help us measure the chances Japan has of succeeding with its

propaganda, for my main purpose is to issue a warning to the West in the hope that it can mend its ways in time and avert the horrible finale that threatens to cut the globe in two.

2. EMPHASIS ON AUSTRALIA

Was Allied strategy in the Far East entirely dictated by military considerations? Did any other factor enter into the war picture which went against the military interest of all those who were fighting against Japan—including westerners as well as easterners? This question cannot completely be answered until some time after the war's end when we have at our disposal all the records and facts. But we can analyze some things even now. Rightly or wrongly, many statesmen in China and India felt that the policies of the United Nations, especially those of England and the United States, were not inspired solely by military considerations. They thought that too much power and personnel was concentrated in Australia at the expense of more important theatres of war in China and India. These Asiatic countries felt slighted; they thought the tragic myth of racial prestige had led England and United States to blunders of misplaced emphasis. It was openly charged that the white men of England and the United States considered the Japanese challenge to Australia a challenge to racial supremacy, while the Japanese challenge to China and India was regarded as a different matter. Because of this, it was further argued, General MacArthur was sent to Australia rather than to China or India. It is an open secret that too much material and many troops went to Australia from the United States and England at a time when their presence and deployment in China and Burma might have meant much more to the total cause of the United Nations.

It was natural for Australia and New Zealand to grumble against Great Britain in spite of this favoritism. On December 27, 1941, Prime Minister John Curtin complained: "I make it clear that Australia looks to America, free from any pangs about our traditional links of friendship to Britain. . . . We know that Australia can go and Britain still will hold on. . . . We are determined that Australia shall not go. We shall exert our energy toward shaping a

plan, with the United States as keystone, giving our country confidence and ability to hold out until the tide of battle swings against the enemy." What does this frank outburst imply? It means, in the first place, that Australia was critical of Churchill's tendency to concentrate all available power on the island fortress of England to the neglect of the defense of the dominions. It was, in the second place, an Australian testimony to the growing influence of geopolitics; under the changed nature of warfare, Australia felt closer to the Pacific system than to the old empire system. It also underlined, in the third place, Australia's slow but steady progress from the English sphere of influence to that of the United States. The inevitable disintegration of the British Empire had begun, it seemed, not in India, but in Australia, just as it had already started in Canada and the Union of South Africa. All these implications are clear in the statement made on January 31, 1942, by Walter Nash, New Zealand Minister to Washington. He advocated a unified war command of the entire Pacific under an American naval officer and criticized the British General Wavell's leadership as "inadequate." But these complaints merely emphasized the feeling that these countries were playing a role secondary to purely English interests. They in no way deny the Asiatic charge that Australia and New Zealand were the favored children of the Pacific so far as the United States and Great Britain were concerned.

That the Asians should be specially sensitive about favoritism shown to Australia was equally natural. Australia is the greatest politico-geographic anomaly in the present-day world. Unless something drastic is done to it during the post-war period, it is bound to be the cause of future armed conflicts. Australia's body lies in bed with Asia, but its heart is far across the waters . . . perhaps beside the white cliffs of Dover, or in San Francisco Bay. This is an exasperating situation for Australia's bed-fellow.

For years Australia has maintained its exclusive policy of "White Australia" in defiance of the ideal of racial equality as well as of the logic of geography. It will be a situation peculiarly wry if, in the near future, that Kangaroo marooned in yellow waters had to send out a distress signal to Asians whom it has so firmly and consistently excluded.

Homer Lea was prophetically right when he said: "It is in this realization that the armaments and military knowledge of Asian empires are now equal to those of Australasia that we become cognizant of the ominous gulf that separates the six millions of Saxons in the south Pacific from the thousand millions that surround them."

The "apocalypse of the white man's ignorance" is to be found in the Saxon's belief that Australasia could be held as his special preserve either through might or through immigration of white population; for while, under the most favorable conditions, the white race doubles itself in eighty years, the brown men and yellow men, even in the worst poverty, double themselves in one-fourth of that time. And to maintain that Australia cannot absorb a greater population is statistical nonsense on a par with the theory that colonies have never paid.

In China the Saxon committed a different type of mistake—and the Saxon continues to be my main target for hopeful and sound reasons—the Saxon had not the imagination to declare that Hong Kong belonged to China, even when it was about to fall. The picked troops of the Chinese Generalissimo, moreover, were not allowed to fight in Burma until it was too late—in Burma, of all places, where the Chinese frontier lay.

3. NEGLECT THE "NATIVES" AT YOUR PERIL

The Burmese blunders gave further proof of the bankruptcy of British statesmanship. U Saw, Prime Minister of Burma, and long a student of the Gandhi movement in India, went to England to negotiate with Churchill in view of the new situation in Asia. "I asked," said U Saw, "for dominion status for Burma within the empire in accordance with the provisions of the Atlantic Charter." But he found Mr. Churchill to be "very blunt." He confessed that the people of Burma felt that the Japanese were a very clever race, and yet he maintained that "we would rather trust the devil we know than the devil we don't." The tragic outcome was not dominion status for Burma, which would have kept the Burmese people on the side of the United Nations, but the arrest of U Saw on January 18, 1942. I have no sympathy with any Asian who would strike a bargain

with the dark forces of aggression even under the most trying circumstances. But the question is whether U Saw and the Burmese people would have cooperated with the Japanese had their just grievances been answered. To say that they would have been pro-Japanese anyway is misleading, and even if U Saw was an incorrigible traitor, the British cannot escape the charge of being traitor-breeders. Their unwillingness to part with power is bound to be the greatest incentive to a would-be traitor.

What happened when the Burmese had the dubious chance of responding to the arrest of U Saw? The British, through the arrest of U Saw, had apparently sincerely sought to prevent the formation of a fifth column in Burma. But the results were disastrous. Rangoon was bombed on December 23, 1941. Over a thousand people were killed. Two weeks later the Governor of Burma, Sir Reginald Hugh Dorman-Smith, wrote a dispatch to Whitehall, telling, according to the outspoken G. D. Gallagher in his *Action in the East*, "how the Asiatic population had stood by their duties, and he praised the dock laborers and the lowly sweepers [on whom the vital, rudimentary sanitary arrangements depended] for defying the Japanese bombs. This was untrue. Residents of Rangoon ridiculed his statements." The British Civil Service in Burma, of which the English are as unduly proud as they are of the civil service in India, was first to crack under the Japanese barrage, and it proved a handicap to the defense. It left the Burmese, the whites, the Anglo-Indians, the Indians, and the Chinese in Rangoon uninstructed and on their own. The Japanese took advantage of the situation and sent special and considerate advices to the Asians, such as the suggestion to move fifteen miles out of the city which was to be bombed thoroughly. Again according to Gallagher, a newspaperman of South African origin, "Burmese even took up arms against the British army as a result of the Japanese propaganda which told them that the British were debilitated, and now was the time to avenge themselves for the defeats the Burmese themselves had suffered dating back to the annexation."

Are further details necessary? An American volunteer pilot reported on February 28, 1942: "The Burmese are assisting the advancing Japanese in every possible way.

Some armed Burmese forces have joined the Japanese. . . . Burmese have even attacked armed Britishers." On May 12, 1942, Daniel Deluce reported to the *New York Times* after fleeing to Calcutta, that British troops were "knifed from ambush by blood-crazed bands of native traitors" while the enemy was bombing them from the sky overhead. Even the Burmese poongis or Buddhist priests discarded their profession of non-violence and killed as many British as they could lay their hands on. And here is a high official speaking. General Harold Alexander, who commanded the British in Burma, said at New Delhi on May 30, 1942: "The Burmese could be said to be ten per cent pro-British, ten per cent pro-Japanese, and eighty per cent pro-Burmese, and therefore indifferent. Unfortunately while no attempt had been made in years past to organize the active pro-British, the ten per cent pro-Japanese had first-class agents." But what about the eighty per cent who were indifferent? Could not they have been taught, by granting Burma dominion status that U Saw asked, that to be pro-British was to be pro-Burmese?

But far more damaging to the white man's interest and safety in Asia was the discrimination practised by the British against the Asian refugees from Burma. From the first day that Rangoon was bombed the great trek began, a procession to the Indian border of Englishmen, Americans, Indians, Anglo-Indians, Europeans, and others. Now, despite half a century of British rule, there is not even one good road linking upper Burma with India. There is at least one bad road to travel on and it is in connection with this track through the difficult and mountainous Burmese terrain that one of the most unpleasant tales of the war in Asia is told. Many reliable people have attested to its authenticity, while many other equally reliable people have refuted it hotly. And there are several versions of it. But, because it is so widely believed in India, we should know about it.

The British authorities are said to have reserved the one poor road for white refugees. The Asians who were making the perilous twelve-hundred-mile trek on foot or in bullock carts were forbidden to use it. When complaints reached the ears of Nehru, he went to the spot to investigate and upon finding some justification, he protested against

the racial discrimination being practised at a time when disaster had made all equally helpless and pathetic—white and colored. Thereupon, the British authorities modified their policy and declared that those Indians who wore trousers would be allowed to use the road. Now Indians have done without pants for at least three thousand years, and they find their sarong-like dhoti quite suited to the climate. If it were a question of their being invited into a westerner's home or to some ceremony, dress restrictions would have been understandable. But when one is fleeing for his very life, it is absurd to tell him what to wear. For that matter, a good many white men have made their escape from the Japanese without bothering about their dress.

Racial discrimination during the time of evacuation has been reported also from Hong Kong and Malaya. At Penang, even Americans were neglected by the British for a while. Elliott H. Simpson, a businessman in the Far East, said on his arrival in New York: "My chief complaint is that the British ordered the evacuation of British women and children in Penang on December 14th without notifying the forty Americans there or any other persons that they were doing it." Even the American consulate was in the dark on that day. And what about the natives?

4. POOR START FOR THE COMING PEACE

Astounding blunders were not confined to the conduct of war. Even more disheartening have been the mistakes made in connection with the coming peace by the various war leaders of the United Nations, who to date have been defeated in all but verbal battles. The leading question in the minds of the people of the occupied Asian areas is that which pertains to their future status. What is going to happen to them in the new world order vaguely promised by Roosevelt and Churchill? Will they be left free, like the peoples of Europe now subjugated by Hitler, when the Japanese are driven back, or will they be calmly handed back to their old masters? The answer of General Harold Alexander, British commander driven out of Burma by the Japanese, is unmistakable. Said he on May 30, 1942, at New Delhi: "Of course we shall take Burma back; it's part of the British Empire." Just like that. Now the Burmese are not going

to look longingly at the picture flatly described by General Alexander. The people of Norway are more than likely to rise against Hitler tyranny and to join their efforts at overthrowing the Nazis with those of the Allied armies re-entering their country. The people of Burma, if left with General Alexander's words, would hardly have a similar incentive.

The Free French, held high in popular esteem by the British and the Americans, are devotees of freedom only in so far as France is concerned; when it comes to their colonies, they still play the same old imperial tune despite the fact that at present the only instrument they have to play is the one loaned by the British and the Americans. On June 24, 1942, General Charles de Gaulle, with an unbecomingly ponderousness, defined the Free French political aims, including "the restoration of the complete integrity of . . . the French Empire." And the high-minded and beloved Dutch! As late as September 7, 1942, after being ignominiously driven out of the East Indies, the refugee Netherlands Government was reported from Washington to be considering "meeting the desire of Indonesian nationalists for what they call equality of status in a kingdom reorganized on somewhat federal lines." What a waste of words! In simple words it should have been admitted that there might be a few reforms, but there would be no independence. It all looks disheartening. What guarantee is there of a change of heart among Dutch, French, and British imperialists if the war is won for them? Will it be a restoration of the old order—French Indo-China to the French, East Indies to the Dutch, Burma to the British? The prospect is not at all appealing to the Asians, to say the least.

A somewhat cruder show of racial arrogance came from the United States, the nation on which the eyes of an ailing world centered hopefully for a vindication of the principles of democracy and freedom and equality. Negroes, though called upon to make the same sacrifices as the white, were not being treated equally in the armed forces and in war industries. The Committee on Race Relations of the American Association of Physical Anthropology protested against "the segregation of the blood of the white persons from the blood of Negroes in the blood banks" because "there is

no evidence that the blood of Negroes differs in any significant respect from that of the white persons."

There were unmistakable evidences of anti-orientalism. There was discrimination as to America's enemies. The Japanese got the worst of it, though Hitler and Mussolini have annoyed Americans for a longer period of time. Dr. Ales Hrdlicka of the Smithsonian Institution served no good purpose when he called the Japanese the "world's prime hybrid," and he aroused deep suspicion in India and China when he called for the creation of a strong "white-thinking outpost in the orient in Korea when the war is won." Again, not only were United States citizens of Japanese descent put into concentration camps, interned, or evacuated, 70,000 strong, but moves were made to deprive them of their citizenship. Now one has no right to object to safety measures, taken by a nation at war; in these days of fifth columns, particularly, it is better for a nation to be over-cautious than not to be cautious at all; it is better even to err on the safe side. But similar measures were not taken against United States citizens of German or Italian ancestry. And nobody can say that it is easier for a Japanese, with his distinctive appearance among westerners, to perform acts of sabotage than it is for a German or an Italian who looks very much like the Saxon. Even those orientals who have no use for the Japanese and who are fighting against Nippon could not fail to perceive the implications. No number of broadcasts sent to the East in all the eastern languages by Elmer Davis's organization can be the correction of such mistakes as these.

The religious pride and narrow-mindedness of Anglo-Saxon Christendom, one of the primary causes for humanity's division into so many exclusive groups, have also played their role. On August 30, 1942, Bishop Miquel de Andrea of Buenos Aires disclosed that according to President Roosevelt, "The only aim . . . worthy of mankind that can compensate for its sorrows is the speedy and world-wide establishment of the Kingdom of Christ among men, not only in word but in spirit and in fact." This was said after his visit to the President, and no contradiction came from the White House. Let us give President Roosevelt the benefit of the doubt and believe that he was referring

to the higher principles of any religion and of modern morality. Lord Halifax's statement about the same time leaves no room for doubt, however. Said he: "We know that, stripped of the accidents which have brought this or that nation into war, the real issue for us is whether Christianity, and all that it means, is to survive. It may be that some would think that an overstatement. We have not always considered what Christianity implies, or remembered that nearly everything of value in our lives has a Christian ancestry." Virtue is no monopoly of Christianity; nor is evil a monopoly of Christianity, in spite of the Nepalese saying: "First the missionary and the Bible; then the trader and the flag; then the soldier and the musket." And Lord Halifax, who was governor-general of India for five long years should know by this time that an overwhelming majority of the earth's population is non-Christian, and quite proud of religions which offer man equally glorious truths and values. If this really is a global conflict of ideologies in which people have aligned themselves on either side irrespective of color or creed, the terms religion and morality should replace the terms Christian religion and Christian morality.

INDIA TODAY

1. TO ARMS—OR NOT
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INDIA TODAY

THE shameful and costly debacle in Burma dramatically clarified the issues in the East. The need for not only military and strategic changes, but also political changes became urgent. The powers that be realized that something drastic had to be done if their other possessions were to be spared. Actions, and not words, were called for, and the Americans realized it more quickly than the British. The British are always quick to wake up too late, and even now they needed American prodding.

Action was the need of this hour of reckoning in Asia, and above all in India. Overnight India had become the center of the Allied strategy in Asia. Now that China was nine-tenths surrounded, with the closing of the Burma Road, India offered the only dependable action base. Indian war industries, furthermore, were second only to those of Japan in Asia. The Indian army of a million and a half well-trained mechanized troops was also a formidable factor. But of greatest importance was India's strategic position, never better described than by Homer Lea years ago: "There are in the world only three countries that possess preeminent strategic positions: the British Islands, the Japanese Islands, and India. The Indian Empire is in the strategic center of the third most important portion of the globe. . . . Radiating from it as a center, with one vortex common to all, are thirteen strategic triangles surrounding the entire Indian sphere."

Japanese were giving their own special recognition to the growing importance of India. First, they organized an Indian Independence Conference in Bangkok, then they established an Independent India Government in exile

there ; they were not to be outdone even in the use of words and slogans. They next organized an "Indian National Army" which would march into Hindustan to liberate the motherland. And they appointed an Indian Mayor of Penang. The Chinese General Cheng Ting Che knew what the Japanese game was. When asked why he was in Burma fighting against the Japanese, he stabbed his finger at India on the map and said, "Japan and Germany have a rendezvous here." They would cut the globe in half ; they should be prevented at all cost.

From the purely Saxon point of view, much more was at stake in India. It was India that lured the Saxon to the East, and it was India's wealth and geographic position that sustained his vast empire. Many imperialists have believed that an invasion of England would be preferable to the conquest of India by an enemy.

India had become the center of the problem of Asia for another reason. It had become the symbol of colonialism. People had begun to judge the sincerity of the Anglo-American powers in the light of their policies toward India. The acid test of today's idealism and promises for tomorrow was provided to a vast majority of the world's people by British actions in India. And these were not satisfactory or even reassuring ; on the contrary, they were of such a nature as to generate grave apprehensions of impending disaster. The world had been given a severe shock in Burma. Would India go the way of Burma or would she stand up and fight like the Philippines and China ? Even Gandhi recognized the danger when he propounded that unless India were free, her "hidden discontent may burst forth into welcome for the Japanese should the latter land in India. . . . But we can avoid such a calamity if we are free."

1. TO ARMS—OR NOT

As the future of the West in the East hung in balance in India, the Americans persuaded the British to feel that the Indian problem had to be solved to the satisfaction of the Indians in the larger interests of the West in the East. Supreme efforts had to be made both by British statesmen and Indian leaders to reach an amicable settlement.

The negotiations instituted by Cripps were one such supreme effort on the part of both Indian and British leaders. But unfortunately they failed. The failure of Sir Stafford Cripps' mission to India has been widely discussed and commented upon in America, but the heart of the matter has been left untouched. Let me, at the very outset, get to the source of the contention between the British envoy and the Indian leaders: the British were unwilling to arm the masses of India against the Japanese invaders, while the leaders of India, for their part, insisted upon creating a people's war by arming all those who were ready and able to bear arms.

The Indian idea was obviously advantageous from every military point of view—advantageous to the British as well as to the Indians, and also to the Americans and other United Nations. The British hesitation, therefore, had a deeper meaning. Highly conscious of their unpopularity in India, the British hesitated to arm civilians lest the masses turn against the old aggressors as well as against the new—against the British themselves as well as against the Japanese. Nor did they wish to put India in a position where it could conclude a separate peace with the enemy. And of course there were not enough modern weapons to go around; an army of bows and arrows would scarcely serve the purpose.

The Indian insistence was born of an equally long history. The story dates back to what the British call the Sepoy Mutiny and what the Indians call their First Revolutionary War; both are right since every revolution that fails is a mutiny and every mutiny that succeeds is a revolution. As a penal measure for the Sepoy Mutiny, a general program of disarming the whole of India was set in motion. This policy culminated in the Indian Arms Act in 1878, which deprived all Indians, but not Europeans living in India, of their right to have in their possession "any arms of any description." The subsequent interpretations of the Arms Act by British judges denied an Indian, in theory at least, a knife such as the one used by the average American housewife for cutting a loaf of bread, let alone the shotgun or .22 familiar to most Americans. The masses of India, according to the nationalists, are thus kept powerless—to

perpetuate the British Raj. A change in this policy, therefore, was regarded as the crucial test of the change of British heart.

Never during the course of the Delhi negotiations did the Indian leaders ask for an Indian general at the head of the army command; they were aware that they had no military genius who could replace General Sir Archibald P. Wavell. They conceded even more. They agreed that the larger issues of strategy should be delegated to the Pacific War Council of which President Roosevelt is the chairman. What they did demand was the creation of an Indian Defense Minister, a civilian with authority over the nation's politico-military policies. They asked for an Indian equivalent of Secretary of War Stimson, not for an Indian equivalent of Army Chief of Staff Marshall. When Jawaharlal Nehru, leader of the powerful Congress party, proposed civilian control over military policies, he was supported by a principle of statecraft upheld by all civilized nations since the time of Bismarck. He also dramatized the difference between democracy and dictatorship. And of course he sought to gain power to establish "priority" for civilians so far as small arms and ammunition were concerned.

Now in all democratic countries civilians are prohibited from bearing arms except by special permit. But that is quite different from the deliberate policy of depriving a people of their martial spirit and of keeping them away from military arts. This peacetime policy, moreover, is drastically modified when the enemy is poised at the nation's border. It has happened in England since Dunkirk. Home guards were organized all over the country; even aged members of parliament paraded the streets of London with antique weapons. All available instruments of defense were used in arming a disarmed and democratic people, and all available manpower of the nation was utilized in various ways. Out of a population of 33,000,000 between the ages of 14 and 60, Great Britain has mobilized 22,000,000 in the armed forces, in civilian defense, and in war industries. The British failure to repeat the same process in India is generally interpreted as an attempt to keep Indians as helpless as possible, without incurring the danger of an outright defeat in India at the hands of the Japanese.

Their urgent desire for a full share in the defense of their land has goaded Gandhi and Nehru into criticism of reinforcements from the United States and elsewhere. Indian leaders are by no means against aid from America. On the contrary, they appreciate it and are grateful for it. Such aid, from India's allies could form an eleventh-hour wall against the invaders behind which the Indians could gain time and could prepare themselves for the final battle. But the nationalist leaders are fearful lest the sudden peril of invasion and India's inability to meet it single-handed might be used later as a cloak to hide the old imperial policy. In that case India becomes a battlefield for foreign armies with the Indians themselves reduced to the status of helpless and inactive onlookers.

A limitless number of soldiers can be trained out of India's millions and they would make as good fighting material as any in the world. It is absurd to send foreigners to defend India when Indian volunteers are turned down by the thousands each month. Few Indians have ever received a commission in the Indian Army despite splendid records for bravery and military ability. It is only recently that a few Indian soldiers have been taken into artillery units. Even today, the British Empire Air Training scheme, operating in Canada, does not include Indians. And yet Indian Army cantonments are as well guarded as monasteries against any political excitement.

2. A PEOPLE'S WAR

Turn to China for an idea of what arming the Indian masses would mean. The historic war-lord system in China for years had given the world a sorry picture of the exploitation of the unarmed many by the armed few. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, however, not only trained a good-sized army, but he took the people into his confidence and armed even the civilians to harass the Japanese invaders with guerrilla warfare. What was made possible in poorly industrialized China by superhuman effort would be easy in India. For years India has been ahead of China in industrialization and lately it has become the Asiatic arsenal of democracy. Indian ordnance factories are producing over twenty thousand items essential to equipping a modern

army and are meeting most of the needs of the Indian army. India has supplied and is still supplying arms and ammunition to Australia, to China, and to the Near East, some of which could be held at home to arm the masses now that the enemy is knocking at India's eastern gates. The talk of scarcity of arms in India is an excuse to prevent India's armament. Even under present conditions India's people's army, the fond dream of Nehru, would be far more than a mere horde with bows and arrows, though even bows and arrows would serve much better than chains around the wrists in harassing the enemy.

The Chinese parallel can be carried further. For India can wage only the Chinese type of war successfully. Like China, India should fight in space rather than in time. The regular Indian army, to be sure, is larger and better equipped than the Chinese army was when the first shot was fired at the Marco Polo Bridge. And yet India can ill afford to repeat the mistake of the Battle of Shanghai in order to obtain a quick decision. The regular Indian Army should be saved during the early stages of the war and it should be augmented by a people's army.

A people's army does not have to be as well trained and as well equipped as the regular fighting forces. Such a people's army employing organized guerrilla warfare would transform India's two otherwise dubious qualities—teeming millions and great distances—into excellent military assets. Given such strategy, India's millions would provide an endless supply of guerrillas, while the main army would be kept intact for decisive action. Meanwhile, favored by the geographic situation, Indians could afford to draw the enemy inland so that the guerrillas could harry the invader on all sides. These hit-and-run tactics will come naturally to Indians. Long before Lawrence of Arabia and Chiang of China and Stalin of Russia perfected the art of guerrilla warfare, the Afridis around the famed Khyber Pass and the hill tribes of northern Bengal and Assam practised it. And it was also the main weapon of Shivaji—the so-called mountain rat—and his Mahrathas against the Mogul Emperor Aurangzeb.

Unfortunately, India's largest factories are only too well exposed to enemy attacks to sustain such a protracted

war. Calcutta, the next big objective after Rangoon in the Japanese westward drive, is the largest industrial center of India, and the Tata iron works at Jamshedpur, the greatest in the British Empire, are within sixty miles of that city. It is conceivable that the Japanese will succeed in capturing this area and in bombing such western industrial centers as Bombay and Ahmedabad. In that case, India will again have to follow the Chinese pattern, move the factories inland, and foster "guerrilla industries." In two respects India will be more successful in organizing such "induscos" than China has been. In the first place, India's machine-tool industries are well advanced. Secondly, rural India is well acquainted with the idea of cooperative enterprises through the decades-old program of cottage crafts sponsored by Mahatma Gandhi. And there is a nation-wide organization called the All-India Spinners Association, headed by Gandhi, which would lend itself neatly to such a new program.

The way to keep the Japanese at bay in India is to create another China in India. But the Chinese are a free people fighting, primarily, for their own interests; they have the strength and incentive of their cause to sustain them through untold suffering and sacrifice. Indians would rise to equal heights if they were fighting for their cause. As every one knows, the soul of India is divided. Independence has become a sort of national psychosis. It may sound unreasonable to the embattled peoples of America and England, but the Indians are so obsessed by the idea of independence that even the advance of the Japanese army to the eastern frontier has become a secondary concern with them. That is a clinical fact, and it should be accepted as such. The mankind of India should be helped to cure their illness by an outright grant of their dream of independence so that they can put their body and soul into the battle against the enemy.

This has become a military imperative since the battle for India is developing into the decisive battle of Asia. It may turn out to be more than that, if Hitler succeeds in breaking through the Caucasus and the Middle East to come knocking at India's western gates—the Khyber and the Bolan passes, those historic routes of invasions. Then there would be a gigantic pincers movement on India from the

east and the west, from the Japanese and the Germans, and the wars of East and West would effect their first and final land juncture on the soil of Hindustan. In that event, it would require an expeditionary force of millions and millions of Americans and Britons to avert a tragic denouement, and such an expeditionary force is a physical impossibility. It will be primarily the peoples of India and Asia, with the help of the United Nations, who will win or lose the battle there. That is why all the members of the United Nations have a mortal stake in the expansion of India's fighting forces and in the arming of India's masses. One more Indian soldier is one less American soldier who must take a passage to India. One more Indian guerrilla is one less Briton fighting in that far-off land. I have reason to believe that even American officials in India are finding it hard to drive this point home to the British bureaucracy.

The outside world has often wondered why the rulers of England consistently fail to grasp this simple fact. Often it has taken Britain at its word and believed that Indians are not prepared to shoulder new responsibility suddenly. Then again outsiders have thought that perhaps the Tories in England are still not prepared to pay the price of victory—the sacrifice of their vested interests in India. As Winston Churchill confessed in 1935, two out of every ten Englishmen depend on India. A moderate estimate of British investments in India is \$4,300,000,000—about one-quarter of all British overseas investments—which brings an estimated 4.9 per cent return per year. Indians constitute three-quarters of the total population of the British Empire, and nine-tenths of its colonial population. That is quite a large consumers' market for British manufacturers, and it is also the greatest source of imperial prestige and power. India provides opportunities for young Britons, and experience for British soldiers and politicians. It is a comfortable habitat for a large army in Asia, and it provides strategic bases for operations guarding Suez, the Persian Gulf, the Middle Eastern Empire, the Far East, and Australia.

There is a deeper cause, a psychological cause for British reluctance to face the realities of the Indian problem. It is the attitude of the Tories, headed by Churchill, toward the so-called native. Now I am not talking about the feeling

of the privileged toward his social inferior, but about the feeling of the complacent Tories that the native does not exist as a formidable human factor in war. They are unable to perceive the strength that the native masses may have; they are satisfied to feel they can win the war without the native masses. This feeling partly accounts for their defeat in Malaya and in Burma, where the masses either gave them no help or directly aided the enemy. It is the same feeling which inspires Churchill to retain as the Secretary of State for India Leopold Amery, the greatest enemy of India's aspirations and a Tory who has nothing but scorn for the country's masses. This is the man who once told the House of Commons that Britain should not condemn Japan for "defending herself against Chinese Nationalism." As for Churchill himself, according to his own admission, he learned the "fact of China" during his latest visit to the United States. And all the while China was one of the two countries which was restoring the world's faith in the invincibility of a determined people against the monster machines which looked so awe-inspiring after their feats in France. This fateful delusion that the natives do not count one way or another has prompted the British War Cabinet to reject India's demand for fuller freedom and India's insistence upon the arming of the masses.

But let us turn back to the Delhi negotiations. Nehru did everything in his power to make a success of the Cripps mission. Both Nehru and Cripps are aristocrats who have become democrats; both are admirers of the Russian experiment. They had been school chums in England during their youth. Nehru, therefore, was personally baffled when he found his friend bearing a Tory document and using the nineteenth-century white Sahib language. The verdict, however, came from Gandhi, that shrewd judge of character. Cripps, said Gandhi, hopes to improve the imperial machinery from within. "In the end it will be the machinery that will get the better of him." In other words, the best way to break a radical is to give him power.

During the Delhi negotiations, there was no complication of non-violence. Gandhi had chivalrously resigned from the Congress party and freed his fellow leaders from the inhibitions of non-violence. Being a confirmed pacifist,

he himself would not cooperate in the war effort, but wished his colleagues Godspeed if they could arrive at an honorable settlement with the British in exchange for full participation in the war. Here are Gandhi's own words, addressed to the leaders who were debating whether to join the war effort: "Ahimsa [non-violence] with me is a creed, the breath of my life. But it is never as a creed that I placed it before India, or for the matter of that before anyone except in casual informal talks. I placed it before the Congress as a political method, to be employed for the solution of political questions. . . . As a political method, it can always be changed, modified, altered, even given up in preference to another. . . . If you can get what you want, you will strike the bargain, and you may be sure that I will not shed a single tear."

All the leaders of the Congress party (save Gandhi and Abdul Gaffar Khan, known as the Frontier Gandhi, both of whom had resigned) were for participation in the war on the basis of a national government for India. It was only when the British rejected their demand for a national government which would arm the masses of India that they went back to Gandhi's doctrine of non-violent non-cooperation. This time non-violence was forced on India not by Gandhi's religiosity but by the British refusal. Under the circumstances, it was the best policy that the nationalists could adopt since the masses have learned Gandhi's tactics. Non-violence will also be used to resist the Japanese and it is well to have an idea of the power of non-violent non-cooperation. It is not pacifism as it is known in America and England; it has more in common with war. It *is* war—without violence. Gandhi's word for it is *Satyagraha*. It is a well-planned strategy which has at times paralyzed the mighty British Raj. Of course, there will enter two new elements when this method is used against the Japanese or Germans. Civil resisters will then be facing a people who have a different code of ethics from that of the British. They would be, secondly, encountering a fresh invasion of their land, an experience new to them. No one can say how they will fare against these two new elements. But the resistance will include such powerful and tried stratagems as the following: The spreading of a huge carpet of human bodies for the enemy to trample under horses' hoofs or iron tanks

or soldiers' boots—if he chooses; strikes and sit-down strikes and a general strike; picketing against those who in any way cooperate with the enemy; the boycott of enemy goods and currency; the non-payment of taxes; the ostracism of the enemy and their puppets; general non-cooperation; parallel governments in the occupied areas. A war ends when the army is defeated. This type of resistance does not end save in the withdrawal of the enemy or in the total annihilation of the invaded people.

If the United Nations feel that *Satyagraha* is not a strong enough weapon to use against the common foe, they can find a stronger one by recognizing the national government of India and its right to arm India's masses. But it should be admitted that *Satyagraha* is a contribution to the common cause none the less. It is bound to prove an asset in immobilizing thousands of enemy troops. Nor should the contribution of the Indian Army of a million and a quarter trained soldiers now under the command of General Wavell be overlooked. Thousands of Indian troops have left their mark of bravery in France, England, Eritrea, Abyssinia, the Sudan, Somaliland, the Western Desert, Libya, Iraq, Syria, the Lebanon, Aden and Iran. In the Far East they have already fought at Hong Kong, Singapore, and Burma. And thousands of Indian fighters are massed north of Iran to meet Hitler's divisions if they ever arrive, after breaking through the Caucasus.

3. THE RICHES OF INDIA

India's raw materials are of immense value to the United Nations. India is the world's second richest country in raw materials. Its resources of high-grade iron ores are the largest in the world, and India has the second largest supply of oil seeds. While India is second to the United States in the production of cotton, it tops America in tobacco. It has an international monopoly over jute. It produces one-third of the world's total output of manganese, and three quarters of the world's supply of mica. Besides being a great bread basket through its nation-wide cultivation of wheat and rice, it has one-third of the world's cattle, along with twenty six million goats, twenty two million sheep, and fourteen million horses.

In view of these rich and varied natural resources, India seems to have suffered from arrested industrial development. India has a long heritage of skilled craftsmanship from the days when Indian calicoes, silks, and muslins were fashionable in Europe. Yet only two per cent of the population is employed in industries, while seventy-five per cent of the people depend on the soil. The main reason for this was the British policy of erecting on India a colonial economic structure; India has been forced to remain a producer of raw materials, a source of tax revenue, and a market for British goods.

In spite of legal and political handicaps, however, Indian industrialists have lately gone ahead at a terrific pace so that India is now the eighth most industrialized nation in the world. It has a great textile industry and is the second largest manufacturer of steel in the British Empire. Its foreign trade for years has been twice that of France, and it is the second largest producer of coal in the British Empire. The world's largest sugar industry is to be found in India. It has made great strides in war industries also. The Hindustan Aircraft Factory at Bangalore has gone into the production of fighter and trainer planes, and Indian shipyards are busy building lifeboats, mine-sweepers, propelling machinery, floating docks, and warships; the long ship-building traditions of India have proved their value in this emergency. The country also manufactures guns, machine-guns, millions of rounds of ammunition, artillery, and tanks.

Tremendous as India's war effort has been so far, it is nothing when compared to the country's almost limitless potentialities, both in manpower and in material wealth. The British and the Indians are both responsible for India's failure to produce more at this time. Not even the vital needs of war have been enough to overcome the hostility of British interests toward Indian industrial development; on the other hand, many Indian industrialists and financiers, often backers of the Congress Party, have shared the divided loyalties of their countrymen at large, and are unable to give their best to the war effort while their nation is still in bondage.

India is an ally of the United Nations, but a half-hearted ally.

4. THE MOSLEM LEAGUE AND THE NATIVE PRINCES

To the leaders of India, the proposals conveyed by Sir Stafford Cripps did not appear to meet the issues squarely, and much bitterness was created in their minds when it began more and more to look as though the whole mission was an elaborate show being staged for the benefit of the American gallery.

Much has been made of the minorities question, on the ground that Britain could not afford to antagonize the Mohammedan world by ignoring the demands of the Moslem League, which was opposed to the wishes of the National Congress. Was this an argument or an excuse? It has also been argued that the Moslems form the bulk of India's fighting forces; this is answered by official British figures. According to these figures, given out in November, 1942, the Indian Army is about half Hindu, one-third Moslem, and about one-fourth per cent Sikh.

Let us look at these two organizations, the All-India National Congress and the Moslem League. The Congress Party is a national body, representing Hindus and Moslems, Christians and Sikhs, industrialists and Untouchables. The Moslem League is a sectarian body, composed only of Mohammedans. More Mohammedans support the Congress than the Moslem League. The Northwest Frontier Province is the most predominantly Moslem area in India; ninety five per cent of the people there are Mohammedans. And yet that province, behind the leadership of Khan, the Frontier Gandhi, completely supports the Congress and is opposed to the League. The latest test of power between the two organizations came in 1937 when India went to the polls under the new constitution. It was provided that the Moslem candidates were to be voted upon only by Moslems, yet Congress Moslems captured three-fourths of the seats while the Moslem League could muster only one-fourth of the Moslem electorate and less than one-fifteenth, or about six per cent, of the total Indian electorate. Thus the Congress holds the confidence not only of the Hindus, but also of the great majority of the Moslems. It is also by far the strongest

and most representative political organization in India. By ignoring the declared principles of this majority party and giving extraordinary and unjustifiable strength to the minor Moslem League, the Cripps proposals in effect gave veto power to a minority within the Moslem minority over the destiny of India.

The structure of the Congress party, moreover, is democratic; it has annual elections, including that of its president. The Moslem League, on the other hand, has in M. A. Jinnah a debonair but strong-willed permanent president who believes that democracy is not for India. Jinnah himself once belonged to the Congress, but he now proposes a partition of India along religious lines. This Pakistan dream of his, as we have seen, is something of a nightmare, and obviously an overwhelming majority of the Moslems themselves reject it. Yet the Cripps plan accepted its principle and in the midst of a revolutionary war, sowed the seeds of civil war. Post-Cripps India will need not only an Indian George Washington to win independence, but also an Indian Abraham Lincoln to save the Union by dealing with secessionists firmly and resolutely—but with malice toward none.

The problem of the Native Princes was also dealt with in an unreasonable and reactionary fashion. There are about 560-odd native potentates who are known, according to their "classes," as chiefs, rulers, nabobs, rajahs, and maharajahs. These medieval personages naturally do not see eye to eye with Indian nationalists. They have always been used by the British as puppets, and without British protection few of them would have survived the people's wrath. The proposals relayed by Sir Stafford Cripps provided for full protection of their rights under their individual treaties with the Crown, treaties carefully drafted by the Crown to protect the might of the British. These rulers could either send a henchman to the constitutional convention proposed or they were free to stay out of the Indian Union and carry on their present relationships with Britain. They would, of course, decide to carry on in the old way.

The Congress leaders could not tolerate anything that would break up the Indian Union in this style. There was a more fundamental reason for their refusal. The plan

proposed a veritable betrayal of the peoples of the Native States. For there are around ninety million "subjects" of these 560-odd rulers and these people were completely ignored in the document. The nominees of the 560 privileged rulers, not the elected representatives of ninety million people, were to be the spokesmen of the Native States. The Indian leaders challenged Great Britain to make up its mind whether it was fighting to defend democracy or to retain feudalism. It would have been a clear vindication of democracy had the people been preferred to the Princess. It would have been an expedient action too, since nobody in India wants these maharajahs. If the British want them, then they become a purely British problem and not an Indian problem. Recent events have filled many of the Maharajahs with gloom; some of them have begun to build castles in California.

Few Americans can conceive of the extremes of riches and poverty that exist in present-day India. The native princes have truly fabulous incomes. Here, for example, are some figures on the wealth of these rulers of Native States to whom the British were so eager to give a permanent place in India: The Maharani of Travancore, one of the most progressive states in India, receives roughly one dollar from every seventeen of the national revenue; the Nizam of Hyderabad and the Maharajah of Baroda, one in thirteen; the Maharajahs of Kashmir and Bikanir, one in five; and not a few Princes appropriate one of every three or one of every two dollars of the state's revenue. In Jamnagar, three-fourths of a million pounds in 1927-1928 went to the personal treasury of the Prince, while expenditure for education was 1.5 per cent. and on medical relief 0.9 per cent. By way of comparison, it might be pointed out that the King of England receives about one of every sixteen hundred units of national revenue; the Emperor of Japan, one in four hundred.

5. CRIPPS VERSUS CRIPPS

There was a time when talk about India's internal dissensions did somebody some good; it served, to a certain extent, to defend the existence of the British in India. Today it does irreparable harm, not only to India, but also to England, to the United States, and to the other United

Nations. It is definite aid to the Axis powers to exaggerate the cleavages in India. The Japanese have already shown themselves masters of the art of taking advantage of the internal rivalries of a country they have conquered or wish to conquer.

Of course, Indians have had no illusions about Churchill. They have known him too long and too well. Could he have changed when he sent Sir Stafford to India? If so, how, asked the Indians. It would take a miracle to change his stand on India. He is still fond of resounding words on the theme of India, "That most truly bright and precious jewel in the crown of the King, which more than all our other Dominions and Dependencies constitutes the glory and strength of the British Empire." Are these really his own words? Or is he merely echoing his father's words, uttered years and years ago? Said Lord Randolph Churchill, Secretary for India in 1885: "That most truly bright and precious gem in the crown of the Queen, the possession of which, more than that of all your Colonial dominions, has raised in power, in resource, in wealth and in authority this small island home of ours far above the level of the majority of nations and of States." It is almost word for word; like father, like son, despite the years that have passed.

The real surprise was in Sir Stafford's conversion. The erstwhile liberal had become an arch-imperialist; his old school friend Nehru found it hard to believe. It was painful for Nehru to be forced later to describe many of Sir Stafford's charges flatly as outright "lies," and to describe Sir Stafford as a "devil's advocate." Sir Stafford seemed to out-Churchill Churchill in misleading the world about what happened in India and he appeared to Indians a thwarted and frustrated man, whose hope for going down in history as one of the great figures of this war was dashed in India. There is no greater reactionary than a converted liberal who has tasted the fruits of power, or so Indians thought where Sir Stafford was concerned. And if they could not believe Sir Stafford Cripps, what Englishman could they believe? It was the last straw.

On August 5, 1942, for instance, Sir Stafford asked the House of Commons, and thereby the waiting world: "Is it reasonable then for the people of India, while hostili-

ties are continuing, to demand some complete and fundamental constitutional change? Is it practical in the middle of a hard-fought war in which the United States, China and Britain are exerting all their strength to protect the eastern world from domination by Japan?"

But Sir Stafford had already answered that question himself on October 26, 1939, in the same House of Commons: "The right honorable gentleman has said that you cannot have an election in India. You can have elections in Quebec, so why not in India? If people are busy [on war work], put more people on. Surely we are not going to say that we will jeopardize the whole future of this country in India because people are so busy in India that they cannot have an election. That seems to me to be so fantastically unreal, in the face of the enormous dangers that exist in this situation, that it cannot, I am convinced, be anything except an excuse that is put forward by people who do not want an election in India today." And just two years later, it was Cripps making the same excuse.

In an article in the *New York Times* for August 23, 1942, Sir Stafford wrote: "When I was in India it was not possible to get the leaders of the Congress party and the Moslem League even to meet, much less to discuss, any constitutional question . . . the Moslem League, which upon any communal or religious issue speaks for a great majority of the Moslem population of 90,000,000."

But Sir Stafford had already answered his own insinuations in 1939, when he said: "The controllers of the Moslem League are drawn almost entirely from the professional, landlord or industrialist class of well-to-do Moslems, whose interests are quite different from those of the Moslem masses. By aggravating religious passions these leaders can bring in behind them a large bulk of the 80 millions of Moslems who inhabit India. They would like to see the return of the Moslem domination of India, to which they look back with pride and longing, but as this is impossible, they have regarded the continuation of British rule as on the whole the lesser of two evil alternatives.

"We must ask ourselves," continued Sir Stafford in 1939, "whether the 250 million Hindus are to be denied self-government in a United India because 80 million

Moslems either are afraid of it or put forward an impractical suggestion for the division of India [the very plan that was given its first official blessing in the proposals that Sir Stafford carried to India in 1942, amid great fanfare and world publicity] in order to prevent the Indian peasants and workers from obtaining the control of their own country."

Sir Stafford has still more to say to the man he became in 1942. "In truth," he said in 1939, "if the 80 million Moslems were left to make their own political decision without any injection of communal animosity, the great majority of them would support the Congress Party's program. In fact, many of them do today. Actually the President of the Congress is himself a Moslem and there are many Moslem organizations which oppose the Moslem League and support Congress in its demands. The attitude that is being adopted today by the British Government is that they can and will do nothing further until the Hindus and the Moslems settle their differences. This gives the reactionary leaders of the Moslem League the power to prevent the people of India getting self-government almost indefinitely." Well, not even Gandhi or Nehru could have made a better reply to Sir Stafford in 1942. But in 1942 Sir Stafford singled out Jinnah as the sole spokesman of Moslems in India and argued that the Congress could not be granted anything that Mr. Jinnah does not approve.

In 1942, to prolong this painful investigation, Sir Stafford became overnight a champion of the 560-odd princes in India and forgot about the 90,000,000 people who live under them. The proposals that he carried to India stated: "The Indian states shall be invited to appoint representatives in the same proportion to their total population as in the case of representatives of British India as a whole and with the same powers as British Indian members." But at 6.28 p.m., London time, on Thursday, October 26, 1939, Sir Stafford had himself exposed the patent injustice of the situation in the Native States: "I believe we have to make up our minds . . . whether we are genuinely determined, not in words but in action, to give self-government to India . . . or whether we are to ally ourselves with the reactionary Indian princes, as we have been doing in the

past, for a joint exploitation of the Indian people by the British Raj and the Indian Princes." I do not think that the most thorough-going Indian nationalist would wish to improve upon this simple and forthright statement.

In 1942, again, Sir Stafford Cripps bitterly attacked Gandhi, calling him a "visionary" and accusing him of unwittingly aiding the Japanese. In 1939, Sir Stafford said of Gandhi: "The man whose opinion counts most today in India and who has the greatest power is Gandhi. The Congress Party will follow his lead, and Jawaharlal Nehru, whom I regard as the best statesman in India, gives Gandhi his complete support." In 1942 Sir Stafford aided Churchill in attempting to show that Gandhi did not represent even a Hindu minority, and his friend in India in 1942 was not Nehru, but Jinnah, whom, in private conversation in New York, I heard him denounce in 1940.

One could go on indefinitely, with the former Cripps giving the lie to the later Cripps, but what is the use? The Indians will remember Sir Stafford as a bad dream. Sir Stafford serves in this narrative merely as a stepping stone to the gravest crisis in the history of Indo-British relationship since the time of the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857—Gandhi's civil disobedience campaign of 1942. The British have a curious logic. They have already described this latest phase of the Gandhi revolution as a rebellion which is "under control." It reminds one of Napoleon's remark to Gaspard Gourmand at St. Helena. "I have been reading," said Napoleon, "three volumes on India. What rascals those English are!"

6. GANDHI'S GREATEST FIGHT

Given no other choice, as representatives of a great people and leaders of a revolutionary movement pledged to India's freedom, the Congress high command met in Bombay on July 15, 1942, and drafted a resolution demanding an immediate end of British rule in India. Then the leaders went back to their constituencies to prepare the people for the final struggle with the British bureaucracy, if the worst should happen. The people were not to be called upon to embark on a program of action until August 7, when the draft resolution of the Working Committee of the Congress

would be placed before a larger body of representative Indians called the All-India Congress Committee. The atmosphere was tense. Gandhi had made statements informally about the "greatest campaign of my life." He might die a martyr while leading the movement, the uneasy people felt. It was to be an open revolt.

The British Government of India reflected Churchill's characteristic tenacity. They too prepared. The machinery was made ready to nip the revolt in the bud. This time the British went further than ever before in vilifying and black-mailing India's unimpeachable idols and India's freedom movement. It was natural enough. For if they did not tell the biggest lies of their life, the people of America, who were deeply sympathetic toward Indian aspirations, would question the wisdom of the plan being hatched. The best thing they could do under the circumstances was to create the impression, however false, that Gandhi was an appeaser, a pro-Japanese fifth columnist. Since these descriptions would arouse the greatest emotional reaction among Americans, why not use them to blacken Gandhi's otherwise good name? And that is exactly what they did, these British bureaucrats acting upon the advice of Whitehall. On August 4, 1942, three days before the Bombay meeting of the Congress Committee, and four days before the reign of terror that began with Gandhi's arrest, they released what they called a seized secret document of Gandhi's original "quit India" resolution. Those who know India and Gandhi and the Congress party realized that this was a well-timed comic-opera plot for the benefit of Americans, many of whom took it on faith, for a while at least. Now, in the first place, there has never been any need of raiding a Congress office, since one of the basic policies of the Gandhi movement is to have no secrets; an official could pick up a telephone and call the Congress Secretariat itself to provide the desired copy. In the second place, the Government had "seized" this so-called secret document months before, on May 6 to be precise, but had withheld it until it could be used to impress America. England has been fighting the Battle of India in the United States against Gandhi, not in India against the Japanese.

The allegedly incriminating part of the resolution, later completely changed, was: "If India were freed, her first step would probably be to negotiate with Japan." But what the British failed to mention was more important. For the same resolution stated: "The Congress is of the opinion that if the British withdrew from India, India would be able to defend herself in the event of the Japanese, or any aggressor, attacking India." Thus there could never be the slightest doubt about the resolve of the Congress party to resist a Japanese invasion or any other invasion. Gandhi is a man of God; to him no human being is beyond repair. So long as a man is endowed with human nature, he is subject to improvement, which improvement could come either through persuasion or through force. Now this is in direct contrast to the theories of Marxism, which regards the bourgeois as beyond saving. It is also drastically unlike the philosophy of fascism, which bases its belief entirely on force and which regards many races and many nations as sub-human. But it is one of Gandhi's main rules of public conduct that all avenues of negotiation and persuasion should be tried before a break is made. Gandhi has done that with the British, and the very people who were now blackmailing Gandhi had appreciated that in times past. Even this time Gandhi wanted to see the Viceroy and talk things over with him with a view to arriving at a friendly settlement; it was the Viceroy who refused to negotiate. Gandhi wished to follow the same course with the Japanese, in the hope that he might be able to dissuade them from attacking India and persuade them to get out of China. And he was going to promise them "stubborn resistance," in case the Japanese ignored his humane appeal. Maybe he was hoping against hope; but then he was also hoping against hope when he contemplated a conference with the British. There was never a question in his mind of appeasing Japan. That charge was based on a deliberate falsification of facts by the Tories headed by Churchill.

Here is Nehru's commentary: "Gandhi always sends notice to his adversary before coming into conflict. He would thus have called on Japan not only to keep away from India but to withdraw from China. It is absurd to say that any of us envisaged any arrangement with Japan giving her

right of passage." Gandhi is no less emphatic: "I have never, even in a most unguarded moment, expressed the opinion that Japan and Germany would win the war. Not only that, I have often expressed the opinion that they cannot win the war, if only Britain will, once and for all, shed her imperialism."

At the very moment that he was calling on one-fifth of the human race to use direct action to end British imperialism in India forever, on August 7, 1942, this greatest statesman and saint of our time had the equanimity to announce: "We must remove the hatred for the British from our hearts. At least, in my heart there is no such hatred. As a matter of fact, I am a greater friend of the British now than I ever was. . . . This is my claim, at which many people may laugh, but all the same, I say this is true." If ever a man has proved himself fit to sit at the head of the coming peace conference, it is Gandhi. No other man, president or prime minister or leader of however powerful a nation, has a greater claim to that honor and responsibility if the coming peace is not going to be another Versailles, and if the new world order is to be founded on justice, equality, freedom, and love which, at its least affirmative, is the absence of hatred and rancor.

This man was made a prisoner within twenty-four hours of his Christ-like utterance. There ensued a wave of violence, but that was not his plan, nor that of the Congress Party. But the nation was deliberately left leaderless by the British; the British have always known how to deal with violence, but they have ever been confounded by non-violence. Look at the history of India of the past quarter century. The real threat to the British authority in India is not of violence—which many times, for that matter, the British themselves have inspired—but the non-violent non-cooperation of the people, the effects of which are increasingly clear as the days go by.

In order to appreciate fully the stand of the Congress Party, it should be borne in mind that the British Government struck at the Party and its leaders before civil disobedience started. In fact, Gandhi was hopefully planning further negotiations with the Viceroy, and seeking mediation

from the President of the United States, as the great representative of the greatest western power, from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as the head of a great eastern nation, and from Ivan Maisky as the representative of an East-West country. The Moslem President of the Congress, Azad, was authorized by a formal resolution to make appeal to these three. But the British did not want mediation from outside. They struck before Azad could write the letters or Gandhi could see the Viceroy.

The British propaganda machine cleverly maneuvered the facts so that Americans would miss this all-important point: the willingness, nay, the insistence of Indian leaders upon reopening the negotiations and mediation from an acceptable but impartial third party. Many of the professional American mouth-pieces of the British have been busy misrepresenting the true state of affairs in India and there has followed an unsurpassed campaign of abuse of India's freedom movement in the very country from which India, and the world, have taken their dreams of liberty and democracy. Some went even so far as to interpret Secretary Hull's speech of July 23, 1942, as a rebuke to India. "It has been our purpose," runs Hull's passage in question, "in the past—and will remain our purpose in the future—to use the full measure of our influence to support attainment of freedom by all peoples who, by their acts, show themselves worthy of it and ready for it." The whole tone of the speech was that of an exhortation to fight for freedom. Well, India is fighting for her freedom. You cannot blame her for following Secretary Hull's advice.

The singular lesson of the failure of the Cripps mission as well as of the present impasse created by the civil disobedience movement is that both the British and the Indians have lost all ability to come to terms with each other. Outside mediation is clearly indicated. All parties in India, with the half-hearted exceptions of the Moslem League and the British Government, have demanded mediation. There is a division in the ranks of the Moslem League on this point, and there is a similar division among the British. Only mediation can now save the situation in India, and only the solution of the Indian problem can save the situation in Asia.

7. THE CHOICE: NEHRU OR BOSE

Asia's disillusionment about the West is something like a stepladder. All Asia has despaired of western aims, and so all Asians stand somewhere on this ladder of disillusionment. Japan does not appear in this picture, since it is up the ladder and over the fence. But three rungs are most important, the lowest, the middle one, and the topmost. On the lowest rung stands Madame Chiang Kai-shek, but the important thing is that she stands on the ladder of disillusionment. She has the least cause for grievance against the West; she has secured for her country a good deal of, if not all possible help for her people. She and her country have received the greatest amount of justice from western powers, and lately China has attained a measure of equality in the councils of the United Nations. The West does not have too much to worry about her or about China.

On the middle rung of the ladder of Asia's disillusionment stands Nehru. He is a spiritual child of both the East and the West, and he is a great admirer of western science and political internationalism. Though he is an avowed enemy of British imperialism, he has espoused institutions of democracy. If he leaves the middle rung and starts for the other side of the fence, it will not be his fault but that of the West; it will be because of his growing feeling that his people can never get full justice from the Anglo-Saxons. In spite of all his struggles and strikes, he is eager to join hands with the West of his conception—but only on terms of equality. He could be won over and India could be won and Asia could be saved from going the Japanese way. He holds the key to the West's future in the East—but that key has to be used by Anglo-American hands.

On the topmost rung of Asia's disillusionment stands the turbulent figure of Subhash Chandra Bose. He is one of those Indians, and Asians, for that matter, who are so disillusioned about Englishmen that they would join up with anyone who fights the British. And he has already joined up with the Germans and the Japanese, believing that India and Asia can never meet the West on equal terms save through a thorough defeat of the Saxon launched by a Japanese spearhead. Tokio is making full use of Bose. A

dramatic reminder of the type of Japanese danger that the United Nations face in India came at the very moment Sir Stafford Cripps was carrying on his futile negotiations. The Japanese were having a rival conference at the time for the alleged purpose of attaining India independence. Japanese bombers brought delegates of the Indian Independence parties from Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand, and Shanghai. From Berlin came Bose, who had recently absconded from Calcutta.

Bose is more dangerous than the British and the Americans realize. For he has never been known to be a fascist and he is not regarded as a fifth columnist by most Indians; in fact, he had communistic leanings. He is simply thoroughly anti-British, and anti-Saxon beyond hope. Because of his long record of suffering and sacrifice, he has the reputation of a great patriot in India. The confirmation recently came from Gandhi, when Bose was reported killed in an airplane accident. "The nation mourns with you," wired Gandhi to Bose's mother, "the death of your and her [India's] brave son." This from the Mahatma who had ousted Bose from the Congress Party on ideological grounds!

In Bengal, Bose is the idol; he is the native hero. And Bengal is next on the Japanese list, now that Burma has fallen. From Bengal the Japanese can push on to the little province of Assam, thus completely isolating the Chinese government at Chungking. Bengali villages are buzzing with the rumor that the Japanese are bringing with them an army of one hundred thousand Indians to "liberate" India. Bose is supposed to lead this force. Some of these soldiers must be the Indians who deserted the British and went over to the Japanese in Hong Kong and Malaya. Some are new converts from among the captured. The rest are recruited from Indian civilians who worked or did business in Manila, Shanghai, Thailand, Malaya, Hong Kong, and Singapore.

Bose can never be brought back to the democratic camp. But the growth of his following in Asia, and especially in India, can be checked. Bose's only strength, apart from his Japanese support, arises from British stubbornness and failure to yield. They can prick Bose's bubble reputation by recognizing Asia's equality. If Nehru had something like

the freedom of India to offer to the masses, even Bengal would refuse to listen to Bose and would fight for the United Nations. Nehru's hand can be strengthened. But Bose's hand can be strengthened too. It is Nehru or Bose. Let us understand them.

NEHRU

Jawaharlal Nehru is the one Indian every American should know. This man who, in *Time's* phrase is "honestly and brilliantly anti-Fascist," is the leader, and three times president, of the Congress Party in India—the most powerful of that country's political groups. He is a worldly erudite man who has spent some nine years in nine jails as a political prisoner.

Nehru will probably be India's first president, when and if India is free. Meanwhile he is Gandhi's friend and Gandhi's most likely successor. He is the chief negotiator with Britain on India's behalf. There is no *real politik* about him, and he has not developed any political machinery to manufacture popularity. And yet he is second only to Gandhi in the collective consciousness of India. He plays Chiang Kai-shek to Gandhi's Sun Yat-sen, or Stalin to Gandhi's Lenin. The reasons for Nehru's vast mass appeal, however, cannot be grasped unless it is realized that he is a legendary figure.

In fact, a national hero starts out by being a legend in any country, though the motif of that legend may differ from culture to culture. In the United States, for example, it is the success motif and the log-cabin legend that appeal to the people. In India, it is the renunciation motif that galvanizes the masses. In America, a have-not should become a have to prove his mettle, while in India a have should voluntarily become a have-not to prove his spirit of selfless service.

Nehru's change of heart has been peculiarly Indian. It was in the tradition of Prince Gautama who became a mendicant Buddha. Gandhi, a Prime Minister's son, became the champion of the dispossessed. Nehru, the Brahmin aristocrat, became Nehru the socialist.

The first thing you notice about Nehru is that he is extraordinarily good-looking. Born of blue-blooded parents and bred from the best families through many generations,

Nehru is high-spirited and his well-proportioned head sets off a handsome physique. His regular classical features seem chiseled out of marble—such is his pure Kashmiri Brahmin complexion. His large brown eyes are generally sad in repose, but they shine with strength when he is engaged in earnest talk. His nostrils flare with the sensitivity of a thoroughbred, and save for his bald head, which is carefully hidden under a Gandhi cap, he is a perfect specimen of Indian manhood.

The second thing you notice about Nehru is that the born aristocrat has accepted Gandhi's simplicity but not the Mahatma's asceticism. While with him, you are constantly aware of the fact that although he is for the masses, he is not of the masses. There is a regal quality in his simple way of life. Always immaculately dressed—in white linen while in India and in Bond Street suits while in England—he sets the styles for the more polished among the Indian nationalists.

He takes an American's delight in driving his own car, and if he likes talking with you, he will take you around his Anand-Bhavan estate in Allahabad. The present Anand-Bhavan, which means "abode of happiness," is in fact Anand-Bhavan II. Its more magnificent predecessor, which boasted the first swimming pool in Allahabad, was given away by Nehru's father to the All-India Congress. Re-named Swaraj-Bhavan, meaning "independence hall," it now harbors the permanent secretariat of the Congress Party.

Even the present Anand-Bhavan has lovely grounds. At the center like a diadem stands the large family house with its columned porches in front of each floor. Most of the time you would find this house ringing with the laughter of children. Nehru adores children, perhaps a compensation for his long solitudes in jail. If you are lucky, you might meet there Nehru's sister, who became the minister of health and local self-government in the Congress administration of the United Provinces.

Here in this household you would not be served any tea, wine, or liquor—after all, Nehru is a Gandhi-man. But you would be amazed at the culinary dexterity of Nehru's cooks. Nehru's father was a great connoisseur of food and wine, and from him the son has acquired exquisite tastes.

But he is now ashamed of betraying any such "weakness" (save for an occasional demand for mashed potatoes).

After dinner you might be conducted to his library where you would find portraits of his father, Motilal, of Gandhi, and of his friends, Generalissimo and Madame Chiang of China. But the room is crowded with pictures of his daughter Indira, his only child. Perhaps in this profusion of Indira's portraits is to be found a clue to a spiritual loneliness to which Nehru often alludes. He first lost his father, who died while leading the national struggle. The death of his mother and of his wife were hastened by the hardships of the same struggle for India's independence. Both his sisters have long been married, and now Indira has left Anand-Bhavan—she was recently married.

In the same room there is another clue to Nehru's loneliness—the thousands of English, French, and American books, the stacks of liberal magazines from all over the world. A spiritual son of both the East and West, he is nowhere completely at home. He is always anxious to get away from the sounds of the cities and turmoils of political life, and his real joy is a hike in the Himalayas. But since he has no time for such fun, his wanderlust has to be satisfied either in a cell in prison or in this room.

In prison, and in this library, he manages to snatch some time for his second love—writing. Most of his writing is in English and in a style that has established his reputation as a master of English prose. He wrote a thousand-page history of the world in the form of weekly letters to his daughter from jail, where he had no benefit of reference books. This book is hailed as one of the intellectual feats of our time.

But you haven't met the real Nehru until you have spent hours with him on his moonlight-flooded terrace. Nehru is fond of telling stories in the Platonic style with several detours. During such informal sessions, he seldom gives evidence of his celebrated haughtiness. And yet he is too self-confident to be suave, and too honest to be smooth. He is candidly intolerant of cant and cant-makers.

Jawaharlal Nehru has participated in active heroism. His devotion to freedom has turned him into an "habitual" jailbird. The constant confinement has failed to smother

the fire in his heart. The British law courts have sentenced him to seventeen years and nine months out of his twenty-five years of allegiance to the independence movement. Sometimes, of course, he has been released before the term of his imprisonment expired. Now fifty-three, he has spent years in the jails of British India as well as those of the Native States. In 1928, he led a demonstration against the Simon Commission, and was severely beaten by the mounted police in Lucknow. On several occasions, he received murder threats from terrorist quarters.

It is necessary to know Nehru's family background in order fully to appreciate his suffering and sacrifice. He was born with a silver spoon in his mouth. For two centuries, the Nehru family has possessed great wealth and prestige. His ancestors moved down to the plains from the Kashmir Valley at the behest of the Mogul Emperor Faruksiar. Raj Kaul, the ancestor, was given a huge estate by the Mogul near a *nahar*, or canal, and hence the surname Nehru. For the same historical reason, the Nehrus have always considered themselves custodians of both the Hindu and Moslem cultures.

Jawaharlal's father, Motilal Nehru, was the outstanding lawyer of his day. His position in the nationalist movement was equally prominent. Legends have grown up and persisted, in spite of all denials, about the reputedly extravagant living of Motilal and Jawaharlal Nehru. One story has it that the Nehrus sent their linen to a Paris laundry every week. The truth is that frequent donation by the Nehrus to the cause of independence have made the family considerably poorer.

At sixteen, Nehru went to England with his parents. There he entered Harrow and later went to Trinity College, Cambridge, and came under the influence of the writings of Oscar Wilde and Walter Pater. Consequently, he adopted what he calls Cyreneicism and what most people call hedonism. At twenty, Jawaharlal Nehru took his degree from Cambridge and joined the Inner Temple. In 1912, he was called to the Bar. After seven years in England, he returned to India where he plunged headlong into the political whirlpool.

His rise to the front rank of the nation's leadership was unusually rapid. To start with, he was a gifted man with fire in his heart. Secondly, the elder Nehru's great prestige was behind him; he was standing on the mighty shoulders of his father. But more important than either of these two factors, Gandhi took a fancy to Jawaharlal and made him his protégé. It is this India threesome—Nehru-father, Nehru-son, and Gandhi—that has led India's nationalist movement.

The personal relationship between Nehru and Gandhi, in fact, is perhaps the most outstanding feature of the Indian political mosaic. They are so different, and yet Nehru is likely to tell you that "failure with Gandhi is preferable to the gaining of a temporary advantage without him." To this, Gandhi would respond readily by confiding in you that "we know that neither of us can do without the other, for there is a heart union between us which no intellectual difference can break." And yet the differences between the Mahatma (great soul) and the Pandit (savant) are sharp enough to symbolize the difference between the India of World War I and the India of World War II.

Gandhi is a medieval genius who believes in a way of life primarily based on agriculture and cottage crafts; he is the Super Peasant of India. Nehru is the Super Worker, a modern western socialist, who has visited Soviet Russia and who now goes from town to town declaring that "the only solution for India's problems lies in socialism, involving vast revolutionary changes in the political and social structure in land and industry as well as the feudal autocratic Indian States system which has long outlived its day."

Gandhi's faith is pinned on social evolution, a gradual and voluntary conversion. The younger man thinks that India should work toward social revolution, and that force is necessary. To Gandhi, non-violence is both a matter of policy and an article of faith; to Nehru it is merely a matter of policy. I know that Nehru was for violent resistance to the Japanese aggressors in case the British granted his demand for a people's army in India. He went out of his way to join hands with Sir Stafford Cripps, while Gandhi assumed a less compromising attitude. Gandhi believes that under proper supervision the class with property and bank

accounts will hold their wealth in trust for the people. To Nehru this sounds medieval. He objects to Gandhi's mixing religion with politics. He believes it dulls the edge of revolutionary ardor.

Both Gandhi and Nehru are democrats, but the older man lacks Nehru's international orientation. Nehru declared his personal war against fascism as early as the Spanish Civil War, and he sided with democratic forces during the Chinese, Abyssinian, and Munich crises. He is a great personal friend of the Chiangs, and together they are working for a reborn Asia based upon Indian-Chinese collaboration. Nehru groups imperialism with fascism as the common targets of the United Nations. For to Nehru "they are twin brothers, with this variation, that imperialism functioned abroad in colonies and dependencies while fascism and Nazism functioned in the same way in the home country also . . . and the world could not continue for long part free, part unfree."

BOSE

Subhash Chandra Bose, virtual head of the radicals, has been forced to that point rather than elected to it. A series of accidents has played as significant a role in the evolution of his radicalism as his own militant thinking. There are leaders in India who hold more extreme economic and political views than those held by Bose, but they are neither as magnetic nor as influential as Bose. On the other hand, there are one or two men who hold the same views as Bose and who also have greater mass appeal. But they do not wish to make an open break with Gandhi. As a consequence, Bose stands out as the leader of India's disillusionment about the West.

There is hardly a leader in India, and Nehru is no exception, who has suffered more at the hands of the Government than Bose. What makes Bose a real martyr is that he has also suffered at the hands of the members of his own party.

The British Government has been most severe in Bengal, and the bureaucracy has used its most extreme coercion on Bose. The authorities are afraid of both Bose and Nehru, but Bose has never received the consideration

which Nehru has been given. Bose's prison terms make a baker's dozen if his latest incarceration is taken into account, and in the 1941 instance he was arrested long before any other Indian leader. His elder brother has also faced several prison terms.

The British Government was particular about Bose because it holds the theory that Bose's Congress allegiance was just a facade, and that actually he was the "heart and brain" of the so-called terrorist group, the Bengal cult of bomb-throwers. The charge has been discussed on the floor of the Legislative Assembly, and even aired in the Anglo-Indian press. In 1926, Bose filed a suit against the paper, *Englishman*, which had alluded to his deadly and revolutionary connections. He was then in a prison serving one of his numerous terms, but succeeded in getting an apology and damages of 2,000 rupees. What has pained him more has been his realization that many of his fellow Congress leaders hold the same views and have never wholly trusted him. He flatly denies the charge, and no tangible evidence has ever been produced to prove his connections with the so-called terrorists.

There is a close parallel between the careers of Nehru and Bose. Both started out as the idols of the Indian youth, and before 1930 both shared the limelight equally. Between 1929 and 1931, both Nehru and Bose became prominent in the Trade Union movement. In 1928, Nehru and Bose were equally responsible for the formation of the Independence League, which for the first time issued a serious challenge to Gandhi's comparatively moderate policies in favor of Dominion Status. The mass appeal of both Bose and Nehru was founded on their advocacy of a militant outlook.

But from 1930 onward, Nehru began to outshine Bose as far as political influence was concerned. Perhaps the main reason is the difference in personalities. Both Bose and Nehru have written what can loosely be called autobiographies. Reading *Toward Freedom* by Nehru gives one the feeling of coming into contact with a Himalayan personality, while reading *The Indian Struggle: 1920-34*, by Bose, reminds one of the turbulent and unpredictable Indus.

Subhash Chandra Bose was born in Cuttack, Bengal, in 1897. His father was a Government Pleader of middle-class

means, and although not a Brahmin, was regarded by his friends as a highly cultured and noble man. He saw to it that his son received the best education available, which the young Subhash deserved, for he had a brilliant record as a student.

He studied for seven years at the Protestant European School at Cuttack, and it was during those years that the seeds of anti-British feeling were sown in his mentality. He was a sensitive youngster, and he resented the feeling of superiority that his Anglo-Indian classmates displayed.

Thereupon his father sent him to England, where, within six months, he passed the Civil Service examination and stood fourth in the list. Soon, however, he resigned from that much-coveted position, and joined Gandhi's Non-cooperation Movement of 1921. Later he came under the inspiring influence of the late C. R. Das, the last great leader of Bengal, and became his right-hand man.

In 1930, while in jail, Bose was elected Mayor of Calcutta, and in 1938 he was elected the President of the Indian National Congress. The following year he again managed to get elected, but he had invited Gandhi's opposition and he soon became a victim of the Gandhi-Patel purge. His course ever since has been a long struggle against the Gandhi group. He wavered between Hitler and Stalin as his model of the Strong Man needed to make India free, but there is one point on which he has never changed: he wants to throw the British out of India. There is something peculiarly Irish about him in this respect, and it was no accident that he became the best and most trusted Indian friend of Eamon de Valera. Bose, fair of complexion and impressively built, has a face which has always reminded me, strange as it may sound, of the face of the Buddha as conceived by Chinese artists.

Bose's latest activity has been quite symbolic. Describing himself as the "President of the India Independence League," and accompanied by the "members of the League Executive Council," he visited Vichy about July 8, 1942, and worked toward Axis cooperation.

WARNING TO THE WEST

WARNING TO THE WEST

THE MANIFEST choice between Nehru and Bose proves that the battle of Asia is as much psychological as military. The final outcome will not depend entirely upon military might and soldierly prowess; it will greatly depend on preventing Nehrus from becoming Boses. Recent events have proved that the machines of modern war have only one master—unyielding soldiers and civilians who believe in the ideals they are fighting for. Only the masses of Asia can win the battle of Asia, but these masses must have something worth fighting for.

The West will decide. The British, French, and Dutch, the three great colonial powers of the East, can take direct action in enlisting the wholehearted support of Asia's people; but it appears that their long years of imperialism have very nearly deprived them of vision. And they have also discredited themselves in the eyes of the East. The leadership, therefore, will have to come from the people of the United States. America is the only western power that is still trusted in Asia. On the one hand, it can put an end to its collaboration, at times almost identification, with British foreign policy; this would prevent the spread of fear of a new Anglo-American imperialism and halt an open break between East and West. On the positive side, it can compel its great allies to rid themselves of imperial interests; this would win millions of new, wholehearted and powerful allies in Asia.

Is it too much to expect of America? Whether the United States likes the idea or not, the truth is that the world's center of cultural, economic, and political gravity has, after 450 years, at last sailed after Columbus across the

Atlantic. The responsibility of the United States should be equal to its power. To America must fall, I believe, the unpleasant task of injuring the pride of some of its great allies in the effort to free Asia. Nothing less will do if the war in Asia is to be won. It is futile to point to the atrocities of the enemy and to the relative humanity of our side. That may give us satisfaction, but it will not bring us new comrades in arms.

There are two Wests, one of the Hitler-Aryans and the other of the Saxons. The East has no faith in the Hitler-Aryans, but the tragedy is that so far the East has not enough faith in the Saxons either.

The growing tendency in Great Britain and the United States to put limits on freedom, indulged in by Secretary Hull on down in this country and by Churchill on down in England, must also be halted. When freedom is qualified, we enter a dangerous zone, more familiar to the Nazis and the Japanese than to the West. It will have to be freedom for all or freedom for none in this global war and in the coming global order. Japan has unveiled the morbid and menacing side of the Asian mind; it has also unintentionally taught the world that if there is to be a common science all over the world, there will have to be a common conscience too.

The coming of age of a world conscience could be postponed for a century by an inter-continental war between the East and the West, or by a racial war between the whites and the non-whites. Such a titanic struggle would be a hundred years' war, far graver and more horrible than the one we are fighting now. Such a calamity should be averted at all costs. And the cost of dispensing justice to the East is not too great. It would not be as difficult as one thinks; Asia's illness has not yet become malignant. Nationalism in Asia, as we have seen, is not of that dangerous type to be found in Europe; it is a defensive nationalism, bound to disappear with the coming of a sense of security and freedom from the western menace.

America and Russia still provide some feeble bonds between the East and the West, and China too. India half belongs and half does not, which, by and large, is the position of the rest of Asia.

If, as seems somewhat likely, the effort is made, under the leadership of the United States to do political justice to Asia and prevent an East-West conflict, the war will be won more quickly. But the real challenge of the East will still remain, though on a broader front. It may fade away for a time during peace. But in time it is fated to bring on a new war. For the conflict is not a political or military affair; so long as the attitudes of the West remain unchanged, the barriers will stand and the conflict will threaten.

It is not hard to believe that the Nazis and Japanese will be chastised or annihilated. There will remain the victorious Saxon, symbol of the arrogant West. It is to the Saxon, therefore, that this warning to the West has chiefly been addressed. Asia has still some hope for his improvement.

The Saxon will have to make the greatest sacrifices. He will have to pay a psychological price. He has been accustomed to regarding himself as a supreme being for centuries. Now he faces a world which refuses to recognize him as such. With all his civilized values, he will have to go on in the role of a military tyrant and be the most maladjusted human in the world, on the one hand. On the other, he can go through a psychological revolution which would release him from his self-created shell and enable him to be happy as an equal among equal men. These vast changes in attitudes and thought-patterns and behavior-patterns will have to reshape not only the governments of Great Britain and the United States, as great states, they will also have to reshape the minds and lives of the West.

East has warned the West, then. Let it not be said that crucial changes in the behavior of the western man were left unmade for the want of challenge. And let it also be remembered that, as Buddha has said, "Only a friend warns; the enemy strikes."

THE END

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